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ABStRACt
This thesis considers the evidence for current assertions that the book of 
Ecclesiastes is a deterministic work composed during the Hellenistic period. It 
reviews the linguistic and socioeconomic arguments for its dating either to Persian or 
Hellenistic times, and concludes in favour of the latter (Chapter 1). An examination 
of key terms occuri'ing in passages thought to be deterministic follows. The contexts 
in which these terms are used support the thesis that Qohelet was a determinist, and 
that this concept is expressed in the catalogue of seasons in 3:1-8 (Chapter 2).
Recently, Joseph Blenkinsopp has challenged deterministic readings of 3:1-8 
on new grounds: this thesis provides a response to the specific criticisms raised by 
his article (Chapter 3). Thereafter, it goes on to discuss the question of whether “the 
work of God” and “the work which is done under the sun” are equivalent, providing 
fresh evidence is produced to demonstrate that this is indeed the case (Chapter 4), 
and offering a new explanation as to how Qohelet may have reconciled the concept of 
determinism with free will (Chapter 5). Thereafter, it considers the activity of God in 
the sphere of human emotions and concludes that the ultimate decision not just about 
what human beings do, but about what they feel, rests with God (Chapters 6, 7).
Finally, this thesis views the determinism of Ecclesiastes against its Jewish 
background and possible Stoic sources: it reaches the conclusion that Qohelet’s 
thought and manner of expression is fundamentally Hebraic but that he probably had 
some knowledge of Stoic determinism as well (Chapters 8, 9). The apparent 
connection with early Jewish deterministic texts and Stoicism supports the current 
consensus that the book of Ecclesiastes was composed in the period 250-225 B.C.E..
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Chapter 1 
Ecclesiastes and its Hellenistic Context
I, Introduction
Despite the identification made in early Jewish and Christian exegesis,! it is 
generally accepted today that Solomon was not the author of the book of 
Ecclesiastes. The reasons for this early identification of Qohelet with Solomon 
hinged largely on the editorial superscription to the book in 1:1, in which Qohelet is 
described as “the son of David, king in Jerusalem” and on Qohelet’s own words in 
1:12 in which he describes himself as “king over Israel in Jerusalem.” Only two kings 
(David and Solomon) aie noted to have mled Israel from Jerusalem. Thereafter, the 
northern tribes broke away from the union, leaving Jerusalem the capital of Judah (1 
Kgs 12:16-20) and ruled by the Davidic line.
The identification of Qohelet as “David’s son” (i.e. Solomon) in the later 
superscription of 1:1 however, is not made in 1:12 nor anywhere else in Ecclesiastes. 
Nevertheless, it most likely aiose from the description of the so-called “Royal 
Experiment” in 1:12-2:12 where Qohelet experiences all the trappings of wealth and 
pleasure appropriate to a king. 2 The depiction of the various luxuries enjoyed by 
Qohelet is reminiscent of the Solomonic court (1 Kings 10). This identification was 
made easier still for the editor by Qohelet’s claim to have “increased in wisdom, 
more than all who were in Jerusalem before me.” Again, this was a statement which 
called to mind Solomon’s legendaiy wisdom (1 Kgs 5:9-14 [Eng. 4:29-34]). Most 
modern coimnentators would agree however, that although the “Royal Experiment” 
in 1:12-2:12 may be intended to recall the glory of Solomon, Qohelet seems not to
tXg. Qoh. 1:1; 1:12; Midr. Qoh. to 1:1, 12; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.11, 14, 15; Tertullian, 
Adv. Val. 2; De Prœ. Hœr. 7.
2 R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; London: Marshall, Morgan & 
Scott, 1989) 34.
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have wished to cultivate the impression that the author of his work was Israel’s most 
famous king.3
Although the 17th Century scholar Grotius is sometimes noted as being the 
first to suggest the unlikelihood of Solomonic authorship for Ecclesiastes, this 
distinction in fact belongs to Luther.4 The conclusions of both in this regard were 
followed eagerly in the 19th century and indeed it has now become almost a cliché to 
cite the words of Franz Deiitzsch in this regai’d: “If the book of Koheleth were of old 
Solomonic origin, then there is no history of the Hebrew Language.”5
If Solomon be not the author of Ecclesiastes, when was the book actually 
written? Theories of the date of authorship vaiy wildly. E. Renan argued for a date 
as late as the first century B.C.E..^ This has now been ruled out by the discovery of 
Qohelet scroll fragments at Qurnran, the earliest of which (4QQoh^) has been dated 
to the mid-second century B.C.E..7 This provides a terminus ante quem for the 
work. In addition, many scholars have asserted some form of dependence for Ben 
Sira on Ecclesiastes.^ Taking the date of Ben Sira as 180 B.C.E., this would suggest a 
date for the composition of Ecclesiastes prior to 200 B.C.E.. A terminus post quem is 
suggested by the high proportion of Ararnaisms and the appearance of two 
Persianisms in the book. Both point to a postexilic date.
3 R. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World (New York: Bloch, 1968) 60.
4 H. Grotius (Annotationes in Vetus Testamentum [ed. G. Vogel; Halae; Curt, 1875-76] 1.434-35) 
grounded his conclusions on the high proportion of Ararnaisms in the book, pointing to a postexilic 
date. Luther {Tischreden, LIX. 6) ascribed authorship to Sirach and described it as a Talmud, 
probably composed from books in tiie library of Ptolemy IV Euergetes.
5 F. Deiitzsch, Commentary on the Song o f Songs and Ecclesiastes (Leipzig: Dorffling & Franke, 
1875; Edinburgh: Clark, 1877; reprmt. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 190.
6 E. Renan, L ’Ecclésiaste traduit de l ’Hébreu avec une étude sur Tage et le caractère du livre (Paris: 
Levy, 1882) 51-54.
^ J. Muilenberg, “A Qoheleth Scroll from Qumran,” BASOR 135 (1954) 20-28; F. M. Cross, “The 
Oldest Manuscripts from Qurnran," JBL 74 (1955) 153, 162.
®C. H. H. Wriglit, The Book o f  Koheleth (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883) 41-46; T. Noldeke, 
“Bemerkungen zum hebrâischen Ben Sira,” ZAW 20 (1900) 81-94; A. FI. McNeile, An Introduction 
to Ecclesiastes (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1904) 34-37; G. A. Barton, Ecclesiastes (ICC; Edinburgh: 
Clark, 1908) 53-56.
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The current scholarly consensus would make Ecclesiastes a product of the 
early Hellenistic period, probably around 250 B.C.E..9 This dating is based largely 
on socioeconomic evidence, but also to some extent on the grounds of the alleged 
presence of Greek thought in Qohelet’s work. Other scholars have aigued that the 
reported parallels between the work of Qohelet and Greek thought are so general as 
to provide no evidence whatsoever for a date in the Hellenistic period. Citing the lack 
of grecisms in Ecclesiastes as additional evidence for their view, dates in the Persian 
period have been proposed where the socioeconomic evidence is said to tally with 
the social background presupposed by the book.io This introductory chapter will 
therefore examine the linguistic and socioeconomic evidence before Qohelet’s 
worldview is discussed in more depth.
II. The Language of Ecclesiastes 
In the past decade there has been renewed interest in the language of 
Ecclesiastes. Most recently, Seow has argued that linguistic considerations entirely 
preclude the possibility of dating the book later than the fourth century. For him, it 
is a product of the Persian period, specifically between the second half of the fifth 
century and the first half of the fourth. This conclusion is also defended by Seow on 
socioeconomic grounds.! !
Even supposing a Hellenistic dating for the composition of Ecclesiastes, the 
lack of gr’ecisms in Qohelet’s work should come as no surprise. In the book of 
Daniel, most certainly a product of the Hellenistic period, the use of Greek
9 D. Michel, Qohelet (Dannstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988) 114; Whybray, 
Ecclesiastes, 11-12; J. L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes (Philadelphia: Westmmster, 1987) 50. 
to  H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT XVI, 4; Leipzig: Scholl, 1932) 45-49. J. L. Kugel, “Qohelet 
and Money,” CBQ 51 (1989) 46-49; C. L. Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context of ‘The Preacher’s 
Hermeneutic’,” PSB NS 17 (1996) 168-95; “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” JBL 
115(1996) 643-666.
t t  Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context o f ‘The Preacher’s’ Hermeneutic,” 171.
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loanwords is limited to the musical instruments played at the dedication of 
Nebuchadnezzar’s image in chapter 3 (on'’p/D“irT’p = KiGapic “zither”, ]nn2DQ/]ntû3oa 
= ijjaXTfjpLoy “dulcimer” , = oup(|)&)nia “orchestra, bagpipes” [Dan 3:5, 7, 10,
15]).! 2 The intent behind the use of these Greek words is specifically to introduce 
an “exotic” foreign element into the stoiy of Daniel in a foreign court. ! 3 There are no 
grecisms in Daniel which might be construed as belonging to everyday speech. Nor 
do we find grecisms in Ben Sira or Hebrew texts from Qurnran.
In contrast to the author(s) of Daniel, Qohelet does not seek to create an 
“exotic” foreign atmosphere in his work. That is not to deny the possibility of 
foreign influence on his thought, but the fact remains that Qohelet expressed himself 
in a language which would be accessible to the contemporary (Hebrew) reader. It 
uses a form of Hebrew which is probably colloquial: certainly the epilogue says that 
Qohelet “taught the people wisdom,”! 4
Another important fact which should be noted is that Qohelet’s use of 
Persianisms does not preclude a Hellenistic dating. The term D^ns, although of 
Persian origin, occur s in Dan 3:16; 4:14. The use of the Persian loanword Dins in the 
context of the Royal Experiment is evidence just as valid for a Hellenistic background 
to Ecclesiastes as a Persian. Indeed, if one considers this particular passage, the 
context appears to fit the Hellenistic era rather better: Crenshaw asserts that the 
series of first person verbs in this passage, “I built...”, “I p l a n t e d . “I m a d e . i s
12 F. Rosenthal, A Grammar o f Biblical Aramaic (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1983) 59. i
!3 J. A. Montgomeiy {Daniel [ICC; Edinburgh: Clark, 1927] 201) remarks on the “cosmopolitan” i
natui'e of the musical instruments in Daniel compared with the Temple music as found in 1 Chr 25:1; t
2 Chr 5:12-13. N. Porteous {Daniel [OTL; London: SCM, 1979] 57-58) also calls attention to the !
“rhetorical effect” achieved by the repetition of the list of officials in 3:2, 3 (many of which are |
Persian loanwords: cf. Rosenthal, A Grammar o f Biblical Aramaic, 58) and by the list of (largely i
Greek) musical instruments. |
14 The point that Qohelet is using a form of colloquial Hebrew is made by Seow himself I
(“Linguistic Evidence for the Dating of Qohelet,” 666) but was also previously suggested by i
Crenshaw (Ecc/e^rmstex, 31).
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indicative of Qohelet’s “personal involvement in a life of luxury at any e x p e n s e ” ,!  5 
but it is clear that Qohelet is actually working very hard in this passage. In the space 
of five verses (2:4-9), there are eleven first person verbs, covering every aspect of 
managing an estate. Qohelet describes the material benefits which he enjoys as the 
just rewai'd of hard work ("bar bDD '’pbn n’n nn—2:10).
Traditional interpretations of the “Royal Experiment” focus solely on the 
sensuality of the objects described in that passage: the fruit trees in specially watered 
orchards (2:5-6), the material wealth, livestock and servants which Qohelet 
accumulates (2:7-8).! 6 This is no pleasure dome however, but a thriving business. 
The Persian paridaida {par-te-tas) from which the Hebrew o i l s  and the Greek 
TrapdÔeiaoç is derived seems mainly to refer to parks and pleasure gai'dens (Cant 
4:13 cf. AHW 833; LSJ 1308), but may also have a utilitarian function (Neh 2:8). 
The usage of the Greek derivation TrapdSeLooc in the Ptolemaic period as referring to 
an (economically productive) orchard, however, is also appropriate to the context of 
the “Royal Experiment.” In the same context, an interesting parallel to Qohelet’s 
usage in an apparently economic context of the terms D'DHD “vineyards” (2:4), nua 
“gardens” (2:5) and □■’Dins “orchaids” (2:5) occurs in Papyrus Petrie III 26: “If an 
ox, or beast of burden, or sheep or any other animal trespass on another man’s arable 
land, or orchard (irapdôeicroy), or garden (Kfjiroy), or vineyard (dp .t reX (j5ya)...” !7
Seow’s article on Qohelefs use of language will prove valuable in reopening 
the debate on the setting of Ecclesiastes, for he does much to show that Qohelet
15 Crenshaw, Ibid., 78.
16 e.g. A. Verheij, "Paradise Retried: On Qohelet 2:4-6,” JSOT 50 (1991) 113-115; S. de Jong, 
“Qohelet and the Ambitious Sphit of the Ptolemaic Period,” JSOT 61 (1994) 85-96. For a dating of 
the text to this period on very different (and almost certainly eiToneous) grounds, cf. A. D. Corré, “A 
Reference to Epispasm in Koheleth,” VT 4 (1954) 416-18.
17 H. L. Ginsberg {Studies in Koheleth [New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950] 
42) argues drat TrapàBetCToç is not used in the sense which Qohelet attributes to it imtil the 3rd 
century B.C.E.. and that the same sense is not attributable to its irsages in Cant 4:13 and Neh 2:8.
Ecclesiastes and its Hellenistic Context 6
might have written considerably earlier than the cuiTent consensus would suggest. By 
his own admission, however, almost all of the featuies of Qohelefs vocabulary and 
syntax are common to both the Persian and Hellenistic eras. The exception to this is 
Qohelefs use of in a legal/economic sense which he argues is characteristic only 
of the fifth to fourth centuries and it is on this basis that he dates Qohelefs work 
conclusively to the Persian p e r io d .  18
As I demonstrate in a forthcoming article however, this conclusion is 
f l a w e d .  19 Evidence exists for a sustained usage of in its technical legal/economic 
sense well into the Christian era. Since an investigation into Qohelet’s use of this 
root forms the body of Chapter 4 of this thesis, a full discussion on its use for dating 
the book of Ecclesiastes will be found therein.
in. Sociohistorical Evidence 
Tal Numismatic Evidence 
In his article on the sociohistorical evidence for a dating of Ecclesiastes to the 
Persian period, Seow considers significant the fact that it was at this time that coins 
were introduced to Palestine. The “daric” began to be minted from around 515 B.C.E. 
onwards and coins of other denominations were minted in the provinces. In Seow’s 
own words, “Coins began appearing [in Palestine] during the Achaemenian period, 
although they did not become common until the second half of the fifth century. And 
numerous hoards have been found at various sites in Israel, all dating to the fifth 
century and later. ”2 o
While it is true that the economy of the Persian Empire was to some extent
18 Seow, “Linguistic Evidence for tlie Dating of Ecclesiastes,” 665-66.
19 Rudman, “A Note on the Dating of Ecclesiastes,” CBQ 61 (1999) (forthcoming).
20 Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context o f ‘The Preacher’s’ Hermeneutic,” 171-73. Kugel also dates 
Ecclesiastes to the Persian period, partially on economic grounds (“Qohelet and Money,” 46-49).
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based on the use of coinage, the economic documents which Seow adduces as 
evidence of this fact still show that many financial transactions at this time were still 
made in terms of goods or semces .21 If Qohelet’s work can be said to reflect a 
thoroughly monetarized environment (5:9 [Eng. 10]; 7:12; 10:19), then that 
environment would better fit the Hellenistic era. Where baiter did not prevail in the 
Persian period, transactions commonly took place involving weights of silver rather 
than coinage per fg.22 This must therefore cast doubt on whether money was 
utilised as widely as Seow would like to suggest. Hengel is certainly of the opinion 
that “by and lai'ge one might say that minted money was finally established in 
Palestine only through Ptolemy II, and largely superseded barter.2 3
A remarkable aspect of Palestine’s archæology is that so far no Persian darics 
have been found. Such coins as occur (and these are relatively scarce compared with 
finds from the Hellenistic era) are very often Greek drachms.24 After 404 B.C.E., 
Persian governors minted their own copies of these coins. 2 5 Indeed, this state of 
affairs, in which Greek money was used either in preference to, or because of the 
scarcity of, the Persian daric in Palestine may be reflected in the appearance of a 
possible Greek loanword (= Gk. Gen. PI. Ôpaxiiûp) occurring in late (i.e.
Persian period) texts such as Ezra 2:69; Neh 7:69-71.26 By way of contrast, the
21 Seow, Ibid., 172.
22 E. Stern, {Material Culture o f  the Land o f the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 B.C. 
[Warminster: Aiis & Phillips, 1982] 215) citing Arad Ostraca No. 41; F. M. Cross, “The Discovery 
of the Samaria Papyii,” BA 26 (1963) 112. The earliest mention of coinage from Elephantine may be 
found in Papyrus 35, 11. 3-4 [400 B.C.E,] in A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri o f the 5th Century B.C. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1923) 130-31. Another text from Egypt dated 402 B.C.E. specifically mentions 
payment in “money of Greece” (E. G. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri [New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1953)271.
23 M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (London: SCM, 1974) 1.44, 2.34-35, 2.208-9.
24 K. Galling, Studien zur Geschichte Israels im persischen Zeitalter {Tiihmgen: Molir, 1964) 101; 
Stem, Material Culture o f the Land o f the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 B.C., 227.
25 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.33.
26 Stern {Material Culture o f the Land o f the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 B.C., 228) does 
not deny tlie existence of such a loanword, but argues tliat m these two contexts, the autlior meant to 
write D’DimiK “daiic.”
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Ptolemies were careful to maintain a strict coinage monopoly, with foreign coins 
being called in and reminted. 2? in Palestine, finds of coins minted by Ptolemy II 
Philadelphus (283/2-246) exceed those minted by Ptolemy I Soter (323-283/2) by 
four-fivefold and of all other coins previously minted (Pre-Ptolemaic, Attic, 
Phoenician, Philisto-Aiabian and those of Alexander) by eightfold.28 This evidence 
become still more impressive when one compar es Philadelphus’s reign of thirty-six 
years against almost two centuries of the “highly monetarized” Persian economy 
which Seow cites as evidence for a fifth-fourth century date for the composition of 
Ecclesiastes.
Thus, while a case can be made for a Persian background to Qohelet’s interest 
in money and for the economically advanced society which is represented in 
Qohelet’s work, a closer parallel may be found in the far' more widespread use of 
coinage in Ptolemaic times, specifically under Ptolemy II Philadephus. Although 
Persian period documentation from Egypt and Mesopotamia indicates the growing 
impor’tance of coinage in economic transactions, the physical evidence from 
archaeological finds does not support the thesis that its use was as widespread in 
Palestine at this time as Seow suggests. In contrast, finds from the Hellenistic era are 
extremely rich and ar e suggestive of an economic background much the same as that 
which is presupposed in Ecclesiastes.
(b) Trade and Industrv
The question of whether the book of Ecclesiastes can be said to reflect any 
particular' time in terms of the business atmosphere evoked by Qohelet’s writing is a 
notoriously difficult one and a good case can be made by commentators arguing for a
27 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.36.
28 1.43-44.
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Persian or a Hellenistic backgi’ound: both eras experienced times in which there were 
substantial increases in trade, resulting in prosperity for at least some of the 
inhabitants of Palestine. M. Dahood has even used Qohelet’s interest in the world of 
business as evidence for a Phoenician origin to the work,29 although his arguments 
for the same based on the language and orthography of the book have found little 
favour in more recent yeai's.30
As examples of the growth of trade in Persian times, Seow cites the 
population expansion which appears to have taken place in coastal areas, particularly 
Sharon, and archaeological evidence from tell Dor, tell Abu Hawam (Haifa) and tell 
Shiqmona showing that these were centres of manufacture for textiles, puiple-dye or 
for the storage of grain and wine. Inland, one finds evidence of foreign coins 
(unsurprising in view of the appar ent scarcity of the daric in Palestine—see above), 
ceramics, precious metals and jewellery, glass and alabaster. this culture is, Seow 
argues, in line with the cosmopolitan Jerusalem described in Neh 13:15-16.31
Unfortunately, little information exists about agricultural innovations in 
Palestine during the Persian period, although it is known that the Persians made 
unsuccessful attempts to establish their native fruit trees (apricot, peach and cherty) 
in Asia M in or . 3 2 in  the Jordan valley, the Persians apparently also established
29 M. Dahood, “Caiiaanite-Phoenician Influence in Qoheleth,” Bib 33 (1952) 30-52, 191-221 (esp. 
220-21 for commercial background); “Qoheleth and Recent Discoveries,” Bib 39 (1958) 302-318; 
“Qoheleth and Northwest Semitic Philology,” Bib 43 (1962) 349-365; Canaanite Words in Qoheleth 
10,20,” Bib 46 (1965) 210-212; “The Phoenician Background of Qoheleth,” Bib 47 (1966) 264-282.
30 R. Gordis, “Was Koheleth a Phoenician? Some Observations on Methods in Research,” JBL 71 
(1955) 105-9; A. Schoors, “The Use of Vowel Letters in Qoheleth,” UF 20 (1988) 277-86; J. R. 
Davila, “Qoheleth and Northern Hebrew,” Maarav 5-6 (1990) 70-72.
31 Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context o f ‘The Preacher’s’ Henneneutic,” 174-75. The problem with 
Seow’s picture of population expansion is precisely that such expansion took place on the coast (and 
not, apparently in the hill countiy). The building remains from die Persian period in Palestine are in 
fact remarkably scanty (Stern “The Archaeology of Persian Palestine,” in W. D. Davies & L. 
Finkelstein (eds.). The Cambridge History o f  Judaism Vol. 1: The Persian Period [Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1984] 90-91).
32 H. Koester, History, Culture and Religion o f the Hellenistic Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 
79.
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balsam plantations. These were relatively small at the time of Alexander (Pliny, Hist. 
Nat. 1 2 . 1 1 1 - 2 3 )  but were significantly extended as the Hellenistic period went o n .3 3  
Rapid and sustained development of trade and agriculture in Ptolemaic 
controlled areas occurred in the eai'ly Hellenistic era. For example, the trade in 
commodities such as precious metals, textiles, ceramics and glass was an important 
feature of business life at this time and underwent considerable e x p a n s io n .  3 4 The 
necessity of competing with the Seleucid power in the north meant that Ptolemaic 
Egypt became in the words of W. W. Tam, “a money making m a c h i n e .” 35  The state 
in effect was the property of the king who as a result of the various royal 
monopolies in tiade and agriculture, became immensely rich (a situation which may 
well be reflected in the Royal Experiment in 1:12-2:12).36
During the foundation yeai's of the Ptolemaic period, particularly during the 
reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Egypt and her provinces experienced an economic 
boom. Evidence for this assertion comes in part from the Zeno papyri, a series of 
letters fr om the representative of Philadelphus’s 8ioiKT|TT|C (Finance Minister) to his 
master reporting on the state of the king’s possessions in Palestine. For example, 
Gaza is mentioned as an important centre for the trade of incense, myrrh, aromatic 
goods, spices and other luxmy items.37 Papyrus was planted in Palestine in this
33 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.45.
34 Koester, History, Culture and Religion o f  the Hellenistic Age, 76-79.
35 w . W. Tam & G. T. Griffith, Hellenistic Civilization (3rd rev. edn.; London: Methuen, 1959) 
179.
36 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.35-36; C. Préaux, Le monde héllenistique: La Grèce et 
l ’Orient de la mort d ’Alexandre à la conquête romaine de la Grèce (232-146 av. J.-C.) (Paris, 
Nouvelle Clio, 1978) 208-12. In this context, see m y forthcoming article “Qohelet’s Use of 
JHSL 23/2 (1997), which argues that Qohelet’s statement that he attained more wisdom or wealth 
“than all who were before me in Jerusalem” (1:16; 2:7, 9) refers to die kmg’s ability to amass more 
wealth than his contemporaries: the expression ’Dab n’n used in die context of kingship is actually an 
idiom meaning “to be subject to” (Cf. 1 Sam 29:7; 29:8).
37 V. Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society 
of America; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1959) 70.
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p e r io d .3 8 Grain and olive oil were important Palestinian exports and the slave trade 
also played a lively part in the local e c o n o m y .3 9 Other goods, such as smoked fish, 
cheese, meat, dried figs, fruit, honey and dates, were also exported according to the 
Zeno archive (PCZ 59012-14). The cities of Jamnia and Ascalon were also founded 
or refounded at this time as a result of the Ptolemies’ active sponsorship of urban 
building projects in Palestine (notably, such projects were not sponsored in Egypt 
itself, a ch'cumstance which may suggest that Palestine remained comparatively 
underdeveloped during the Persian p e i io d ) .4 0
While the archaeological evidence demonstrates an expanding Palestinian 
economy in Persian times, economic growth appears to have increased considerably 
under Ptolemaic rule. New agricultuial settlements sprang up around Jaffa in the 
middle of the third centiuy B.C.E. and a Hellenistic warehouse incorporating among 
other things an oil press, dyeing equipment and a workshop has been found in the 
same area. A dye-works was built at Tell Mor around this time and the importance 
of this industry to the local economy is confirmed by evidence of a wholesale wool 
dyeing business found in the Hellenistic strata of Gezer. This also implies the 
presence of sheep farming and weaving industries.^i
The Ptolemaic practice of planning the national economy is reflected by a 
range of technological innovations, such as improved oil and wine presses, the 
treadmill, the plough, and the introduction of new crops and improved breeds of 
livestock.42 One such technological advance is the introduction of the wheel for 
raising water: a technique previously unknown in Egypt and Syria-Palestine.
38 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.46.
39 1.41-42.
40 Koester, History, Culture and Religion o f the Hellenistic Age, 209.
41 Hengél, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.46.
42 1.47.
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Artificial irrigation appears to have been unknown in Palestine before the Hellenistic 
period: it is notable that the first explicit mentions of such a practice occur in 
Ecclesiastes and Ben Sira (Eccl 2:6; Sir 24:30-31). While no archaeological evidence of 
such practices exist for Palestine in the Persian period, one finds at Adullam in Judea 
in the Hellenistic period artificial pools, terraces and canals much like those described 
by Qohelet in his “Royal Experiment” (Eccl 2:6).43
(c) Society
The book of Ecclesiastes tells us much about the nature of society when 
Qohelet was writing. It was apparently a time of frenetic commercial activity (2:4-9; 
4:4, 8; 11:1-2). But it was also a time when there was a great divide between rich and 
poor (5:11 [Eng. 12]). While the wealthy could afford to indulge themselves in the 
luxmies which Qohelet recommends, the poor suffered under heavy burdens and 
corruption was rife (3:16; 4:1). Nor was there much hope for the individual, 
apparently, in going to law. Justice could be, and seemingly was, denied to those 
who were lower down on the social scale (5:7 [Eng. 8]).
Kugel and Seow have both pointed out that this situation is or may be to 
some extent applicable to Palestinian society during the period of Persian 
domination.44 to be sure, most of Seow’s examples of paiallels to the situation as 
described in the text of Ecclesiastes come from Egypt and Mesopotamia. However, 
parallels exist with the situation in Judah as described in the book of Nehemiah in 
which people were forced to take out loans against their property to buy food during 
a famine or to pay taxes (Neh 5:3-4) or even giving their childien as pledges for debt 
(5:5).45 this was not an unusual situation, for Nehemiah goes on to remark on the
43 76W., 1.46.
44 Kugel, “Qohelet and Money,” 35-37, 46-48; Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context of ‘The 
Preacher’s’ Heiineneutic,” 182-85.
45 Seow, Ibid., 185; Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.49.
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heavy taxes exacted by former governors from the general populace (5:15).
On the other hand, the situation which we find in the Hellenistic period is 
also one in which these conditions occurred. Whereas very little is known for sure 
about the socioeconomic situation in Palestine during the later Persian period to 
which Ecclesiastes has been dated by Kugel and Seow, the situation during the 
Hellenistic period, as well as being infeiTed from Egyptian documents of the time, is 
described in Palestine by the Zeno archive. In a letter to Zeno, one of his Palestinian 
employees complains that his wages aie unpaid by his Greek masters on a regular 
basis because “I am a bai’barian...and am not able to speak Greek ( otl oùk 
€TTLo-Ta|iaL éXXT]yLCeLi/).”46 In general, those natives who were prepared to 
“hellenize” by learning to speak Greek faied much better than the non-Greek 
speaking “bai'baiians” who were ruthlessly exploited by the Greek upper classes.47
Just as in the period of Persian domination, defaulting debtors in the 
Hellenistic era could be sold into slaveiy.48 The Ptolemaic system which steered the 
economy also had a more insidious influence on society however. As we have seen, it 
could bring spectacular benefits for some (notably Greeks or Hellenized natives), but 
denied ordinary people a share in the benefits of the economic giowth which took 
place in the third century B.C.E.. In the words of Koester: “The primary cause [of 
social injustice and umest] can...be found in the system of state monopoly, which 
continuously confronted the native working class with oppressive rules and 
regulations, but never granted a share in the proceeds of their labor and in the general 
wealth of the country.”49 Such a scenario for society during the Ptolemaic period 
gives added irony to Qohelet’s words “What profit is there for a man in all his labour’
46 PColZen 2,16ff, no. 66, 18, 21 cited by Hengel, Ibid., 1.39, 2.31.
47 Ibid., 1.38.
48 /W .., 1.49, 57.
49 Koester, History, Culture and Religion o f the Hellenistic Age, 55; Tclierikover, Hellenistic 
Civilization and the Jews, 72.
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which he undertakes under the sun?” (Eccl 1:3, cf. 3:9). The double entendre behind 
Qohelet’s recurrent use of VriDD (“to occupy”, “to afflict”) in such statements as “I 
have seen the business/affliction which God has given humanity to be 
occupied/afflicted with” (in m vb  nixn nnb o'n'px ]ni ndx nx TTxn—3:10 cf. 
1:13; 2:23, 26; 4:8; 5:2 [Eng. 5:3]; 8:16) may well reflect this social setting and draw 
an implicit parallel between the actions of the oppressive Greek employers of the 
day and a deity who demands no less work of his subjects.
IV. Thought
No author’s work can be said to be entirely original. All are to some extent 
dependent for their worldview on their cultural background and history. Indeed, 
Qohelet himself might be said to concur with such a view in his statement “that 
which has been is that which will be, that which has been done is that which will be 
done: there is nothing new under the sun” (1:9).
Most coimnentators agree, however, that Qohelet’s thought is at times veiy 
different from anything which we find elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible.^o Indeed, this 
fact was recognised at a very early stage. In Midrash Rabbah, we read: “The sages 
sought to suppress the book of Qohelet because they found in it words of heresy” 
{Midr. Qoh. to 1:3; ll:9).5i This naturally gives rise to the question of what 
precisely is the cultuial backgound that gave rise to Qohelet’s work.
faf Ancient Near East
(i) Mesopotamia
Similarities between Mesopotamian thought and that of Qohelet have in the
50 Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet (BZAW 183; Berlin: de Gniyter, 1989) 
289; H.-P. Müller, Neige der altliebraische ‘Weislieit’: Zum Denken QohalSts,” ZAW9Q (1978) 238- 
64; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 52; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 23,
51 R. B, Salters, The Book o f Ecclesiastes: Studies in the Versions and the History o f  Exegesis 
(Ph.D. Diss.; St. Andrews, 1973) 3.
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past been noted. This is particularly true in the case of the Epic o f Gilgamesh, and 
almost all commentaiies make an overt comparison between Eccl 9:7-10 and the 
speech of Siduri the barmaid to Gilgamesh in the Old Babylonian version of this saga 
(Tablet x, iii [ANET, 90]).52 Affinities have also been noted with other 
Mesopotamian texts such as the ludlul bel nêmeqii^^l Will Praise the Lord of 
Wisdom” 2.10-38 \ANET, 434-35]) which states that divine decrees are hidden from 
human sight (cf. 3:11; 8:17) and that righteous and wicked may receive the same 
treatment from the gods (cf. 8:12-14). This view is also to be seen in “A Dialogue 
about Human Misery” (27.276-80 {ANET, 438-40]). At the same time, humanity’s 
evils are stated to be against the will of the gods ([VIII] 11. 79-86, ANET, 439) and 
firmly rooted in human perversity. The essential problem is that the gods are remote 
and interfere in human life only in the most general ways ([VII-VIII] 70-77; [XXIII] 
11. 243-44; [XXIV] 11. 255-64, ANET, 439-40). If some aspects of this text may be 
termed fatalistic, it is certainly not as thoroughgoing as in the work of Qohelet. 
Another oft cited parallel occurs in the “Pessimistic Dialogue between Master and 
Servant” (VIII 11. 55-60, ANET, 438) which adopts an ambivalent attitude towai’ds 
women, similar in some respects to that of Q o h e le t .5 3  Qohelet’s apparently 
contradictory attitude towards women (7:26; 9:9) will form the subject of Chapter 6 
of this thesis.
Among more recent commentators, O. Loretz has argued forcefully for a 
Semitic background to the thought of Qohelet. For him, the parallels with 
Mesopotamian literature, although not enough to prove direct dependence, point to a
52 For a detailed treatment, see J. de Savignac (“La sagesse du Qôhélétli et l’épopée de Gilgamesh,” 
FT 28 [1978] 318-323). Cf. e.g., Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 158-59; A. Lauha, Kohelet {W iAT  19; 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978) 169-70; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 162; Wliybray, 
Ecclesiastes, 143. The caution of Ranston {Ecclesiastes and the Early Gt'eek Wisdom Literature 
[London: Epworth, 1925] 146) in asserting Qohelet’s dependence on this work is, as Whybray 
remarks, justified.
53 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 51-52; Murphy, Ecclesiastes (WBC 23A; Dallas: Word, 1992) xlii-xliii.
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shared worldview (Loretz is particularly impressed by the parallels between Eccl 
9:7-9 and the Epic of G i l g a m e s h ) .  5 4 it would be surprising if this were not the case, 
however. The question is, can a Semitic background account convincingly for all of 
Qohelet’s thought?
(ii) Egypt
Parallels also exist between the book of Ecclesiastes and Egyptian thought. 
This need not in itself be surprising, since Israelite wisdom was to some extent 
influenced by Egyptian ideas. For example, the dependence of Prov 22:17-24:22 on 
the Egyptian “Instruction of Amenemope” remains generally accepted, although 
some scholars have recently cast doubt on this hypothesis.55
With regar d to the book of Ecclesiastes itself, the situation is altogether less 
clear'. Comparisons have been made to such texts as the “Instruction of 
^Onchsheshonqy” {AEL 3:184-217, 159-84) and the “Dialogue between a Man and 
his Soul” (11. 65-68, ANET, 405) with their injunction to enjoy life’s material benefits 
in the face of uncer'tainty or death (cf. Eccl 9:7-10; 11:7-12:7).56 Others have argued 
that Ecclesiastes is a “Royal Testament” in the vein of the teaching of Merikare 
{ANET, 4 1 4 -18),57 although Qohelet apparently drops his royal persona after 2:12. 
The idea of dependence per se between Egyptian wisdom and the work of Qohelet 
has in fact never gained general acceptance, and though the works discussed in this 
section are frequently cited in commentaries, this is largely to demonstrate that
54 O. Loretz, Qohelet und der Alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und theologischer Thematik des 
Buches Qohelet (Freiburg: Herder, 1964) 45-134.
55 Wliybray, The Composition o f the Book o f Proverbs (JSOTSup 168; Sheffield: JSOT, 1994) 
132ff. Discussions on the influence of Egyptian thought on the wisdom of Israel may be found in W. 
McKane, Proverbs (OTL; London: SCM, 1970) 51-208; R. J. Williams, “The Sages of Ancient 
Egypt in the Light of Recent Scholarship,” JAGS 101 (1981) 1-19.
56 B. Gemser, “The Instructions of ‘^ Onchsheshonqy and Biblical Wisdom Literature.” in Congress 
Volume, Oxford, 1959 (VTSup 7; Leiden: Brill, 1960) 102-28.
57 K. Galling, Der Prediger (HAT 18; Tübingen: Mohr, 1969) 88; G. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel 
(OTL; London: SCM, 1972) 226-237.
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thinkers in different cultures considering similar questions (“how much control do we 
have over our own fate?”, “how should we approach death?”) tend to reach similar
conclusions.58
(b) Greece
The question of whether Qohelet shows traces of Greek thought refuses to go 
away. H. Ranston argued that Qohelet is dependent on early Greek philosophy, 
particularly the work of Theognis.59 Comparisons have also been made with 
Heraclitus (fl. 500 B.C.E.), whose philosophy exerted considerable influence on Stoic 
thought.60 Others have sought parallels with the main philosophies of the 
Hellenistic era (notably Stoicism and Epicureanism).61
The most thorough treatment of the question of possible Greek influence on 
Qohelet’s work has been provided by R. B raun .62  According to Braun, Qohelet was 
indeed influenced directly by his Hellenistic enviromnent in his choice of terms and 
phrases such as bnn (=tÜ<j)oç), pin"' (=o<{)6Xoc), bor; (=rr6i/oc),
(=0€O(|)lXoç) and even indirectly (through a posited Phoenician borrowing from 
Greek) in the case of the phrase down nnn (=bcj)’ qXiQ or Wo top qXioy).63 Braun 
also considers more general questions such as the style in which Greek philosophical 
thought was presented (e.g. the diatribe, an idea later put to use by Lohfrnk in his
58 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 51-52.
59 Ranston, Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature, 13-62. M. Strange argues strongly 
against this position, however (The Question o f  Moderation in Eccl 7:15-18 [S.T.D. Diss; Catholic 
University of America, 1969] 115-120.
59 E. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus, nebst Koheleth und besonders im Buch 
der Weisheit (Berlin: Rehner,1886).
51 T. Tyler, Ecclesiastes (London: Williams & Norgate, 1874) 10-29; E. H. Pliimptre, Ecclesiastes 
(Cambridge: C.U.P., 1881) 30-32; E. Bickerman, Four Strange Books o f the Bible (New York: 
Schoken, 1967) 141-49; J. G. Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” HAR 9 (1985) 
169-87; J. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995) 58-59, 62.
52 R. Braun, Kohelet und die friihhellenistische Popularphilosophie (BZAW 130; Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1973).
63 Ibid, 44-55.
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commentary) and philosophical concerns common to the general stock of Greek 
thought and that of the author of Ecclesiastes.64 Braun’s work has not won full 
acceptance, but it nevertheless still enjoys some measure of support from more 
recent commentators.65
Since the appearance of Braun’s work, Lohfink has also appeared as a 
champion of the theory of widespread borrowing from Greek thought in the work of 
Qohelet. Lohfrnk’s dating of Ecclesiastes to the period 190-180 B.C.E. is almost a 
necessary concomitant to his belief in heavy and diverse Greek influence on the 
work. In Lohfrnk’s view, Ecclesiastes was written as a response to a religious crisis 
provoked by the Pro-Hellenist element in the upper classes and was designed to 
combine the best elements of Greek philosophy and Judaic religious b e l i e f .  6 6
Parallels for this intention certainly exist: Aristobulus, writing in the mid- 
second century, attempted to write a commentary on the Pentateuch in the light of 
Stoic philosophy, and Philo of Alexandria also attempted to combine Greek 
(primarily Platonic but to a lesser extent Stoic) and Jewish thought in a series of 
works.67 However, there are real problems with Lohfrnk’s position.
First of all, Lohfrnk dates the book (deliberately) to a time of social tension. 
Syria-Palestine had recently been racked by wars between the Ptolemies and the 
Seleucids, having been temporarily overrun in 219 B.C.E. by Antiochus III and finally 
coming under Seleucid control in 195 B.C.E., only five years before the proposed date
54 See n. 71 below.
65 o. Kaiser, “Judentum und Hellenismus,” VF 27 (1982) 69-73; M. V. Fox {Qohelet and his 
Contradictions [JSOTSup 71; Sheffield: Almond, 1989] 16) states: “Although many of the parallels 
Braun adduces are not persuasive, he has imdoubtedly made the case that Qohelet was not isolated 
horn his contemporaiy intellectual context.”
66 Lohfrnk, Kohelet (Wm’zbiu'g: Editer, 1980) 7-15. The book is dated to the late second centuiy on 
slightly different grounds by F. Hitzig {Der Prediger Salomo’s [KHAT; Leipzig: Weidmann, 1847) 
122-24.
67 Koester, History, Culture and Religion o f the Hellenistic Age, 144; T. H. Tobin, “Logos,” in 
ABD 4.350.
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of Qohelet’s work. Yet Ecclesiastes says nothing of the economic upheavals which 
must have accompanied these invasions. The socioeconomic setting presupposed by 
Ecclesiastes is one of peace in which individuals may acquire considerable fortunes 
through business (2:4-11; 4:7-8; 5:9-10 [Eng. 11-12]). Fortunes are lost as well as 
made (5:12-14 [Eng 5:13-15]; 11:1-2), but this is the result of unlucky speculation 
rather than the devastation of war.
Secondly, Lohfink perhaps goes too far in imagining an elaborate background 
for Qohelet and his work. For example, he suggests that Qohelet belonged to an 
important priestly family and that the Jerusalem Temple was used as an educational 
establishment in an attempt to counter the growing influence of Greek schools. One 
of the “set texts” for study was what we now know as the book of Ecclesiastes. 68 In 
many ways, Lohfink’s reconstruction is not unlike the rather fanciful “ideal” 
biography of Qohelet built up by Plurnptre.69 The book of Ecclesiastes contains 
very little hard evidence about the author. The fact that respectable commentators 
can differ so profoundly about its setting illustrates that only the most general 
conclusions can safely be reached on the question of Qohelet the man.
The difficulties with Lohfink’s dating of Ecclesiastes lead us back to the third 
century B.C.E.. This was, as we have seen, a time of peace and of economic 
expansion commensurate with the background presupposed by Qohelet’s work. It is 
at this point that an examination of the possibility of influence from the main Greek 
or Hellenistic philosophies of that period is appropriate.
(Ï) Epicurean Philosophv
Many other commentators have argued for the influence of Greek philosophy 
on Qohelet’s work. Tyler accounted for the contradictions apparent in the book of
68 Lohfink, Kohelet, 8.
69 Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 35-55.
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Ecclesiastes by suggesting that Qohelet combined elements of Stoicism and 
Epicureanism in his work. In doing so, Qohelet sought to ai'gue against them and so 
reassert the traditional Judaic faith.70 Again, this is a position not unlike that of 
Lohfink who posits that the contradictions in Ecclesiastes can be resolved by 
understanding the book as a diatribe. 71 However, Podechard is conect in pointing 
out the problems with Tyler’s theory of Epicmean influence on the work of 
Qohelet.72 Tyler aigues that Qohelet’s recommendation to joy is in line with 
Epicurean belief and specifically links Eccl 5:18-20 with the concept of drapa^La or 
tranquillity which should be the goal of the Epicurean sage. 73 A closer inspection of 
Epicurean thought, however, shows that where Qohelet considered that the best that 
could be expected of joy would be that it might enable the individual to lai'gely forget 
the supreme injustice of death (5:19 [Eng. 20]), the Epicureans faced death squarely 
and without qualms: “death is nothing to us” (Epicums, Letter to Menoeceus, 124; 
Lucretius 3.830). The state of drapa^La is not based on self-delusion. Nor is it the 
experience of what Epicurus would call “kinetic” pleasure (cf. Qohelet’s 
recommendation to “eat and drink” in 2:24; 3:13; 5:17; 8:15). Rather, it denotes the 
complete absence of fear- or pain (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 1 2 7 -3 2 ). 74 The 
serene attitude to life and its vicissitudes which the Epicueans counselled is in fact 
utterly alien to Qohelet.
rii) Cvrenaic Philosophy 
Although a thorough investigation falls outside the bound of this thesis, a
70 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 10-29, 33.
71 Lohfink, Kohelet, 10, following Braun, Kohelet und die friihhellenistische Popularphilosophie, 
36, 165, 179 and S. de Ausejo, “El género literario del Ecclesiastés,” EstBib 7 (1948) 394-406.
72 E, Podechard, L'Ecclésiaste (Paris; Lecofifre, 1912) 95-102.
73 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 20.
74 A. A. Long & D. N, Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1987) 1.121-25.
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much closer parallel to Qohelet’s exhortations to joy exists in the philosophy of the 
Cyrenaics. This school was active in the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (283/2- 
246), and took its name from the province of Egypt where it originated. Their main 
tenets were that life was unknowable and unjust and that the corr ect human response 
was consequently to seek what happiness was attainable through material 
pleasure.75 in this, they differed significantly from the Epicureans (DL 10.136). 
They also advocated suicide as a legitimate response to the inequities of existence, in 
line with the statement of Theognis, “Of all things to men on earth, it is best not to 
be bom...or, once born, to pass as quickly as possible through the gates of Hades” 
(Theognis 425-7, cf. Eccl 4:3). Cyrenaic philosophy quickly became one of the main 
philosophies of Ptolemaic Egypt in the time of Philadelphus and eventually had to 
be suppressed because of a sharp increase in the suicide rate.76
Unfortunately, we have little information about the Cyrenaics other than that 
derived from fragmentary quotations and reports. We cannot know whether Qohelet 
was directly influenced by this philosophy. However, the Cyrenaics no doubt 
contributed to and were a reflection of the Hellenistic Zeitgeist of the third century 
B.C.E.. If the generally accepted dating of Ecclesiastes to the mid-third century or not 
long after is conect, we should not be surprised at the affinities between the thought 
of Qohelet and the philosophy which had created such a stir elsewhere in the 
kingdom of Philadelphus.
(iii) Stoic Philosophv 
The area of possible Greek influence on the work of Qohelet which has
75 H. D. Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and (Beckenham: Groom Helm, 1983) 200-201; W. K. 
C. Guthrie, History o f Greek Philosophy Vol. 3 (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1969) 493-94. For texts, see 
E. Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta (Leiden: Brill, 1961) 36, 40-41, 43-44 (fi\ 
145, 156-57, 161, 181-83).
76 Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta, 57 (fir 247a-b).
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elicited most discussion is its relationship to the thought of the Stoics. The 
conclusions of Tyler as far as Stoic influence on Ecclesiastes was concerned were 
quickly accepted by Plumptre, Siegfried and Condamin.77 However, doubts as to 
this theory surfaced early and Delitzsch and McNeile contended that everything in 
Ecclesiastes could be accounted a natur al development of Semitic thought.78 Barton 
also concurTed with this view, claiming that such parallels as exist between 
Ecclesiastes and Greek philosophy prove “...at most that Qohelet was a Jew who 
had in him the makings of a Greek philosopher.”79
In more recent times, Gammie and Blenkinsopp have also advanced the 
hypothesis of some form of Stoic influence on the author of Ecclesiastes. 8o 
Gammie’s methodology is superior to that of many of his predecessors in that he 
largely limits his discussion to known Stoic belief of the third century B.C.E..81 He 
attempts to resolve the discrepancies between Qohelet’s thought and that of the 
early Stoic leaders by arguing that Qohelet accepts some Stoic ideas and argues 
against others. Similarly, Blenkinsopp suggests that the catalogue of times in 3:2-8 
was produced by a Stoicizing Jewish sage, being quoted by Qohelet in order to argue 
against it. 8 2 Although the consensus remains that Qohelet was active in the third 
quarter of the third century B.C.E., the idea of Stoic influence on the book of 
Ecclesiastes has gained no firm acceptance.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Stoic philosophy is that it advances the
77 Plumpti’e, Ecclesiastes, 30-32; C. G. Siegfried, “Review of T. Tyler, Ecclesiastes,” ZWT  (1875) 
284-291, “Der jiidische Hellenismus,” ZWT (1875) 469-489; Prediger und Hoheslied (HAT II, 3/2; 
Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1898) 8-10; A. Condamin, “Etudes siu’ TEcclésiaste,” RB 9 
(1900) 30-44.
78 F. Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 210; E. Renan, L ’Ecclésiaste, 62-63; A. H. McNeile, An Introduction 
to Ecclesiastes, 43-44.
79 G. A. Barton, partially quoting McNeile above (Ecclesiastes, 34).
80 Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 169-87; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: 
Another Interpretation,” 55-64.
81 Gammie, Ihid, 173.
82 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another hiteipretation,” 61.
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concept of a highly developed form of deteiininism. This is the belief that everything 
in the cosmos is controlled by a single force, which may be termed “God” or 
“Fate.”83 The consequences of such a belief as far as humanity is concerned is that 
the individual is not responsible for his/her own thoughts and actions. This has 
important moral repercussions when it comes to the question of human evil: should 
individuals be punished for their own wickedness, or should blame be allotted to the 
deity who controls their actions? This was a problem which preoccupied the second 
and third leaders of the Stoic school, Cleanthes and Chrysippus and their solution 
was to limit the influence of determinism over human actions (although the approach 
of each was fundamentally different).84
This problem was also curi'ent in Judaism around 180 B.C.E. when Sirach was 
writing. Apparently, the wicked could justify their actions at the time by making an 
appeal to a highly developed and logical form of determinism which had gained some 
ground in Jewish thought at that time:
Do not say, “The Lord is to blame for my failure”; it is for you to avoid doing
what he hates.
Do not say, “It was he who led me asti-ay”; he has no use for sinfiil men.
The Lord hates eveiy kind of vice; you cannot love it and still feai* him.
When he made man in the begimiing, he left him free to take his own decisions;
if you choose, you can keep the commandments; whether or not you keep faith is
yours to decide.
He has set before you fire and water; reach out and take which you choose;
before men lie life and death, and whichever he prefers is his.
For in his great and mighty power the Lord sees everythhig.
He keeps watch over those who fear him; no human act escapes his notice.
83 R, Taylor, “Determmism,” m Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (London & New York: Macmillan, 
1967) 2.359.
84 W. C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University, 
1944) 344-50.
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But he has commanded no man to be wicked, nor has he given licence to commit
sin.
(Sh 15:11-20, NEB Translation)
The precise relationship between Ben Sira and Ecclesiastes remains unclear', but the 
passage above may suggest that some pai'ts of Stoic deterministic theory exerted an 
influence over Judaic thought before the Greek domination over Palestine came to an 
end. On the other hand, evidence also exists for a deterministic worldview in biblical 
texts which may date from a time prior to the Hellenistic period (Exod 7:2-3; Pss 
31:15; 139:16). Under these circumstances, the explanation offered by the sinner for 
his actions in this passage from Ben Sira may be seen as being in line with purely 
Judaic thought.
Many commentators have argued that Qohelet himself was a detenninist.85 
No full agreement exists on the nature of this determinism, nor whether any aspects 
of this determinism can be shown to come fi'om a source in Stoic philosophy, as 
opposed to a Hebraic sour ce. The object of this thesis is therefore twofold: firstly, it 
aims to show that Qohelet was indeed a determinist. It will also consider questions 
such as the problem of human evil and how Qohelet explains this in the light of his 
deterministic belief. A natural corollary of this will be an investigation into the extent 
to which Qohelet regards the human will as being free to make choices and how this 
is combined with the concept of determinism. Finally, having built up a pictme of 
Qohelet’s worldview, this will be compared with determinism as it is expressed 
elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, early Jewish texts, and with Stoic beliefs of the third 
century B.C.E. in order to discover the probable source(s) of Qohelet’s thought.
85 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes,25A-55\ Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth, 37-38; R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs 
Ecclesiastes (AB18; Gai'den City: Doubleday, 1965) 221; Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 192; 
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
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Chapter 2 
Qohelet and Fate
I, Introduction
Was Qohelet a determinist? Many commentators have suggested as much. 
Delitzsch, for example, despite dating Ecclesiastes to the Persian period, nevertheless 
saw key texts expressing Qohelet’s worldview such as Eccl 3:1-15; 9:11-12 as 
deteiininistic, stating that “(Man) is on the whole not master of his own life.” i 
More recently. Fox has argued in much the same vein. 2 Other commentators more 
wary of committing themselves on this question have nevertheless hinted that at 
least some aspects of Qohelet’s work may be explicable from a deterministic angle. 
Thus, Crenshaw states: “If we cannot determine our future, however much we try, 
God’s disposition towards us becomes a matter of life and death...The inevitable 
consequence of such thinking would seem to be some form of determinism.”3
Some commentators such as Podechard have argued that determinism is not 
evident at all in Ecclesiastes. Many passages presuppose a certain amount of free 
will on the part of humanity.4 Indeed, Qohelet regularly uses the imperative form of 
the verb which implies that the reader has a choice of whether or not to follow 
Qohelet’s advice (4:17 [Eng. 5:1]; 5:1 [Eng. 2]; 3 [Eng. 4]; 5-7 [Eng. 6-8]; 7:9-10, 13- 
14, 16-17, 21, 27; 8:2-3; 9:7-10; 10:4, 20; 11:1-2, 6, 9-12:1). These are powerful 
arguments against understanding Qohelet as a determinist, so the fact that so many 
commentators continue to see evidence of determinism in his work may appear 
surprising.
1 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 254-5; 365-7.
2 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 192.
3 Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 136. Whybray’s position on tlie 
concept of “gift” m Ecclesiastes is shnilai*: “God may give joy and pleasure; man can never achieve it 
for himself, however hard he may tiy.” (“Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23 [1982] 89).
4 Podechard, L ’Ecclésiaste, 192.
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At a fundamental level, determinism and free will are incompatible concepts. 
Nevertheless, philosophers who we call deteiininist have tried to combine them. For 
example, Chrysippus, the third leader of the Stoic school, argued powerfully for the 
influence of determinism on all earthly events (Cf. e.g. SVF 2.997). Nevertheless, 
when confronted by the dilemma of whether this meant that human beings were not 
morally responsible for their own actions, he also found a place for a limited degree 
of human free will in his worldview (e.g. SVF 2.1000). The same might also be said of 
his predecessor Cleanthes (e.g. SVF 1.537; 2.993). The Stoicism of the 3rd century 
B.C.E. therefore advanced a form of “soft determinism” (the belief that humanity’s 
actions are guided by a combination of predestination and free will), as opposed to 
“hard determinism” (the belief that all human action is preordained and that free will 
is therefore an illusion).
In the Hebrew Bible itself, there also exists a tr adition of determinism, as Von 
Rad has pointed out. 5 However, what is noticeable about biblical determinism when 
compar ed to later beliefs, is that it is more concerned with expressing the idea of 
divine sovereignty over history than of pursuing the logic of its own thought to 
explain the relationship between the individual and the world. Instead, it is content to 
reaffirm traditional Hebraic thought in this regard. Thus, Von Rad states: “...even 
when the use of the term ‘determinism’ is justified, it is never a question of a 
complex of ideas that have been thought through philosophically and logically. Thus, 
for example, the individual’s freedom of decision in religious and ethical matters is, 
strangely enough, scarcely affected.”^
It is possible therefore that Qohelet is advancing a form of soft determinism 
in line either with biblical or Stoic thought. Such an idea cannot be ruled out on the
5 Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 263-283.
6 Ibid, 263.
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basis of Qohelet’s apparent belief in human free will elsewhere. However, only a full 
investigation of the relevant passages and key tenus said to be deterministic can tell 
us more about Qohelet’s worldview. This chapter will therefore be concerned with 
exploring Qohelet’s use of such key tenus in contexts where determinism might be 
implied.
II. Kev Terms in Ecclesiastes 
1 .nnpD / nnp
The noun nipü occurs 7 times in Ecclesiastes (2:14, 15; 3:19 [3x]; 9:2, 3), and 
its associated verb n ip  3 times (2:14,15; 9:11). Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, these 
tenus appeal' to have a neutral sense: in Ruth 2:3, the noun nipa describes the happy 
accident of Ruth gleaning in the field of Boaz. In 1 Sam 6:9 it is used to distinguish 
between divine retribution and ordinai'y misfortune. In 1 Sam 20:26 it refers simply 
to a chance occuiTence. All 19 usages of the verb nip  in the Hebrew Bible appear to 
cai'ry this sense of “chance” happening (cf. BDB 899-900). In Ecclesiastes however, 
Vnip occurs almost exclusively in the context of death (the only exception being 9:11 
in which it denotes the occurrence of ill-fortune). This section will therefore 
investigate Qohelet’s understanding of this tenu against the backdrop of its usage 
elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible.
(a) The Versions 
(i) The Septuagint
The Septuagint renders the MT’s, nipo as ovv&VTi\\ia (“meeting”), and the 
M T’s, nip  with ouvdvTdct) (“to meet”). These are good literal translations of both 
Hebrew terms, although they do little to explain the meaning of Vnip as Qohelet uses 
it. Some commentators have posited that the term nipD in Ecclesiastes is a grecism
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which translates the term au|X(j)opf|. For example, Podechard cites Plumptre as 
drawing a parallel with the saying of Solon to Croesus in Herodotus 1.32, T rd v  eo n  
dyGpwrroc oi)p,cj)opfi, “Man is altogether a chance.”? Podechard’s argument against 
this is probably correct, however. The quotation from Herodotus suggests that one’s 
life and the opportunities or obstacles which present themselves are subject to no 
external force, but are random. The fact that some events in human life are subject to 
chance is, however, also the idea behind the usage of nipD in 1 Sam 6:9; 20:26. If the 
term nipD in Ecclesiastes were to mean “chance event”, then it would demonstrate a 
connection with Hebraic, rather than Greek, thought.
(iii The Vulgate
The observation of Crenshaw that the term mpQ is primarily bound up with 
the concept of deaths is well illustrated by the Vulgate, which translates it three 
times with the noun interitus “death” (2:14; 3:19 [translating mpD twice]), once with 
occasus “downfall, death” (2:15), once with the more neutral conditio (3:19), 
although the occiuTence of interitus immediately preceding gives it a negative 
meaning. In 9:2, 3 for the remaining occurrences of the term nnpD, the Vulgate uses a 
circumlocution involving the verb evenio “to happen, befall.” The interpretation of 
the term nnpQ therefore has a strongly negative slant which is conditioned by the 
context in which Qohelet uses it rather than by the meaning which Vnip has in the 
rest of the Hebrew Bible.
(iii) The Tar gum
The Targum translates the MT’s mpQ with prTX/p:;ix (“happening”,
7 VoAQchavA, L ’Ecclésiaste, 50. Plumptre (Ecclesiastes, 135) remarks concerning Qohelet’s use of mpn in 3:19 and the saying m Herodotus 1.32: “(here) we have an echo, almost a direct translation, 
of a Greek saying.”
8 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 85.
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“event”) and the MT’s m p  with “to happen” in all locations. Predictably,
the Tai'gum goes its own way with its interpretations of the relevant verses, but 
these nevertheless offer some insight into the Targumist’s understanding of 
Qohelet’s use of V m p.
In 2:14, the Tai’gum speaks of the role which the sage plays in mitigating 
divine judgement on a sinful world by offering his prayers to God. The result of a 
failure to do so is that “punishment comes upon the world, one thing will befall all of 
them” (pnbiD n’’ in  x n iB iB  •’rt'’). Subsequent to this, in 2:15
Qohelet/Solomon goes on to remark, “According to the fate of Saul...also such will 
befall me” ]'’iD...bix:iJ ]11;ixd). In this case, the tei’m nipG is perceived not as
referring to death, but to the stripping of the kingdom from Saul as a consequence of 
disobedience and sin.
In 3:19, the Targum modifies the bleakness of Qohelet’s assertion by stating, 
“For what happens to guilty people and what happens to the unclean beast is the 
same for all of them” (pn^B'? in  pDix XDXOO onx).
Here the MT’s nipQ is understood as refening to death. The same, however, cannot 
be said of the Targumic interpretation of 9:2, 3. In 9:2, the Tai'gum renders Qohelet’s 
thought deterministically: “All depends upon Fate, and from Heaven it is decreed 
what will happen. The same thing befalls evei’yone, the innocent and the guilty” 
(nxDiy in inoy I 'n r i  iq iT^nx p  x^ bn x’bmn x'pid XT'-nbi). This
is echoed in the succeeding verse (9:3) in which the Tai'gum states, “There is an evil 
Fate (lit: ‘planet’) in all the world in all that is done under the sun, for one thing 
befalls evei’yone; all the inhabitants of the eaith” (xobr ‘ptq pixnt^j) ""Tn bDb
ÿh>^±> i n  pi;ix m ix  xm:d mnn iB i^ m n ). The precise nature of this evil fate is 
uncertain, although the Tai’gum in this verse implies that it may be connected with
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judgement after death.
Thus, there is a common theme in the Targum’s interpretation of passages in 
which the term nipQ occui’s. It denotes the intervention of the deity in some form. 
This may be punishment as a consequence of sin, or it may refer to the divinely 
ordained time of one’s death. The use of the teim bîQ “Fate” in these passages to 
explain the term mpQ is indicative of a deterministic reading by the Targumist, for 
*7TD ultimately refers to one’s destiny as it appears in the stars. Despite Rabbinic 
injunctions against such practices, astrology features veiy heavily in the Targum of 
Qohelet, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.9
The Targumist’s use of the term bïD in these locations perhaps suggests that 
he considered there to be a link between the teiins mpD and nu (“appointed time” 
[3:2; 7:17]) as referring to death, and that he was cognizant also of the coiresponding 
implications for Qohelet’s worldview, namely that there was an outside agency at 
work in the determination of one’s moment of death and that correspondingly, the 
tenn mpo should not retain the meaning of “chance event” which it has elsewhere in 
the Hebrew Bible.
(iv) The Peshitta
The Peshitta translates the noun mpQ in all locations with the teim
and the verb mp with the equivalent This Syriac root has the basic meaning “to
happen, befall” and is, for example, used in the Peshitta of Gen 42:29; Josh 2:23 in a 
neutral sense. Some ambiguity must be said to exist, however, since the noun may 
also have the sense of “chance occurrence” and is used to translate mpD when it is 
used in this sense elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. 1 Sam 20:26). In effect then, 
the question is left open as to whether the Peshitta understands Vmp in Ecclesiastes
9 P. S. Kiiobel, The Targums o f Job, Proverbs, Qohelet (Edinburgh: Clai'k, 1991) 29.
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as referring to chance occmrence or just to “that which happens.”
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis
The interpretations of the Vulgate and Targum are reflected in Mediæval 
Jewish exegesis of the relevant passages. Rashi on 2:14, 15 sees the teiin mpQ as 
ultimately referring to death to which all must succumb, whether wise or foolish. 
Thus on 2:14 he states: “Also, I, who praise the wise man over the fool, know that 
they both will die” (in'iD’ *7’0Dn p  DDnn nx nnoo ['’nin'] '^ x m),
whilst on 2:15, he comments: “Since they will both die, perhaps I will think in my 
heart from now on that what happens to the wicked man will also happen to me” 
Cnp" ■’2X D3 nipQD nnm nmrrx xdïï iniD’ Bb). Notably, Rashi here
extends the reference of mpD from death to include what happens to the individual 
during his life. Rashi’s comment on inx mpQ in 9:2 makes it cleai’ that he 
understands it as referring to death: “And they know that the end of 
everyone—righteous or wicked—is to die, and they all have one fate in this world 
...but there is a difference between them in the world to come” fPDn 
XDH nn'JB onsn W...nm tü-' nnx nnpûi mob vm  nt^ xi pn^ i0x). Rashi 
goes fuilher in his exegesis of other passages however, and gives some idea of what 
he considers to be the meaning of the term nnpQ.
Thus, on 3:19 Rashi remarks: “This is the reason for the matter, that the 
Holy One, blessed be He, gave a fate and a mishap (lit: “meeting”) to humankind and 
there is a fate and a mishap to the beasts, and He gave one fate to both of them, for 
just as this one dies, so does that one” ZJBi nipD n”npn p] idx nmn xin 
no HT DQ nîîy dcdd b  .]ra inx n^prûi nonn'? ijbi mpD oix). While Rashi 
sees the term nnpQ as bound up with death in this verse also, he also makes it parallel 
to the term which also occurs in Ecclesiastes (9:11) in a passage sometimes seen
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as betraying deteiministic overtones. As shall be demonstrated in the next section, in 
which the noun is considered, this term in the Hebrew Bible refers to some form 
of encounter, but to one which is planned or co-ordinated. Thus, it refers not to a 
“mischance” as such, but to an event which is determined by some agency.
Rashbam follows the general interpretation understanding nnpo as referring to 
death in 2:14: “I shall die just as one of the fools...” (□’bBiDn moxty).
However, he too expands on what he understands to be the meaning of mpD 
elsewhere in his commentary. Thus, he explains the term mpG in 3:19 by the use of 
the term “rule”: “for what happens to humankind and what happens to beasts is 
the same. There is one rule, that both die in the same way” (mpûT oixn nnpD nna? 
inx p'-rBD DTiDîD XB inx .iHX mpü naran). The use of a term such as 
again suggests an ordering principle which governs death. Here Rashbam most 
likely implies that death is an ordinance imposed by God. Such an interpretation is in 
line with Qohelet’s own words in 3:18. The use of is also prominent in 
Rashbam’s interpretation of 9:2: “every misfortune is directed and designated to 
come upon them, and the same thing befalls them all” (m]Q'iTQi ntnnn riB")
inx mpDi m-'br xb 'p). Here, Rashbam’s understanding of the text is most 
certainly deterministic: the events which befall the individual cannot be attributed to 
chance but to a co-ordinating outside force. Death (nipo) is but one manifestation of 
this force.
Like Rashi and Rashbam, Metzudath David also understands nnpo in 2:14 as 
a reference to death: “I know that there is one fate, the fate of death: behold it befalls 
them all, be they wise man or fool” (nx nip'' mn nriBn nnpD xin nnx nnpQty "’nvT 
*210 IX n*’n'’ DDnn obB). Likewise in his interpretation of 3:19, he remarks: “There is 
one fate that is common to both, namely that just as this one dies, so does that one
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die” (ht mû" p  nr mD’ ikjxd b  onBüP mx nipD tüi). On 9:2, he expounds on 
Qohelet’s thought in a similar vein, “Everything comes to them as it comes to all. He 
(Qohelet) proceeds to explain: there is a common fate for the righteous and the 
wicked” (:)dibi inx nipD 0 isüi mm xb‘’ü bd ont? XB' ^m). Notably, 
Metzudath David’s choice of the term nni: to explain nipb in 2:14 may be 
suggestive that he too understands the term to be indicative of something more than 
“chance”, since this term is most often used in a legalistic sense: i.e., it typically 
(although not exclusively) means “death penalty” rather than “death.”i o
In fact, Mediæval Jewish commentaries are almost unanimous in their 
adoption of this position. Sformo is unique in the interpretation which he places on 
9:2, in which he understands rnpQ as referring to divine assistance granted to human 
beings: “The divine aid given to the wicked, the unclean and the sinner for their 
deeds, is the same as that which is given to the righteous for the deed of the wise 
man.” (obm n b B sn  p'mt) iBK) bd  □n'pBDn xbin'pi XQo‘?'i vm b  nbxn m^xi rro i). 
Even though he differs so fiindamentally from his fellow exegetes as to offer a 
positive meaning for the term nipD, he too understands it as something more than 
simple chance.
Thus, the position of the Mediæval Jewish commentators, with the exception 
of Sfomo, on the meaning of the term iipQ seems to be that it refers specifically to 
death. In this, they follow in the tradition of some versions, particularly the Vulgate 
and Tar gum. The closeness of some of the Mediæval Jewish exegetes to the position 
of the Targumist in particular, that death is not a product of chance, is suggested by 
the use of words such as PB, nriB or b b  to explain the term nipD. It is open to 
question whether these terms refer to the general rule that all die, or whether they
19 M. Jastrow, A Dictionary o f the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the 
Midrashic Literature (New York: Judaica, 1992) 780.
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allow for the determination of a specific time of death for every individual. However, 
Qohelet’s use of the term np ^"appointed time” in passages referring to death (3:2; 
7:17) certainly does suggest that the time of one’s death is effectively in the hands of 
an outside agency, as shall be demonstrated presently.
(c) Modem Commentators
The conclusion of the Vulgate, Targum and the majority of Mediæval Jewish 
commentators that the term mpD refers to death is reflected in the positions of many 
modem commentators. Thus, Crenshaw argues concerning nipn/n ip  that “both the 
noun...and the verb...have an ominous nuance everywhere in Ecclesiastes with the 
possible exception of 9:11 which emphasises the unpredictability of events.” 
Nevertheless, the tendency in recent times is not to see the term nipQ as indicative of 
a belief in determinism on Qohelet’s part. Fox describes n p ü  as “‘fate’ in the sense 
of what happens to someone, as opposed to what he does to himself (not in the 
sense of what is predetermined).” 12 Fox is certainly conect in his assertion that 
nipD is “what happens to someone” (i.e., that it refers to events outside human 
control). However, although the term nipQ may not have the explicit sense that an 
event is predetermined, this does not preclude its referring to such an event.
In the final analysis, Vrnp as it is used in Ecclesiastes cannot refer to a chance 
occurrence. The fact of death is not a matter of chance: it is the one event which is 
guaranteed to come to all. Nor is the timing of one’s death down to chance, for as we 
have seen, Qohelet uses the term np (“appointed time”) of death (3:2; 7:17). While 
Qohelet is disturbed by death, he recognises that it is an evil to which all must 
submit (8:8; 9:2-3, 10). Qohelet’s main concem with death in fact seems to be the 
unpredictability of death’s timing (7:15; 8:14).
11 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 85.
12 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 184.
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This element of unpredictability is not incompatible with the idea that one’s 
time of death is determined by God. Indeed, it is this very circumstance which is the 
source of the crisis in Qohelet’s thought, for there is no apparent causal connection 
between one’s religion or morality and the length of one’s allotted span. Indeed, it 
may even be that the intent behind Qohelet’s use of the term mpD is not that death 
is a “chance” occurrence, but that the time at which it occurs is an unpredictable one. 
Certainly this element of unpredictability is behind the use of the verbal form rnp" in 
9:11, and since it is said generally by Qohelet in the verse following that “Man does 
not know his appointed time...(it) falls suddenly on them” (9:12), the same might 
also be applied to the “appointed time” of death. From the idea of “chance 
happening” to “unpredictable happening” there is not a great semantic shift, and 
though Qohelet may observe in 3:18-21 that both humankind and animals suffer 
death, it is impossible to say for certain when this will happen and what happens to 
the soul afterwards. The only predictable thing about death for Qohelet is that it will 
occur.
(d) Conclusion
This study has sought to demonstrate that Qohelet’s usage of Vnip diverges 
to some extent from its biblical backgtmmd. Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, V nip  
has the sense of “chance happening”, “event.” In Ecclesiastes however, it is used 
almost exclusively of death: the single event which is absolutely certain to come to 
all. Qohelet cannot mean by his use of the term nipQ  that the time at which one dies 
is a matter of chance, since his use of the word ru) (“appointed time”) in the context 
of death (3:2; 7:17 cf. 12:7 for God as the giver and taker of the life-breath) implies 
that there is a fixed time for this occurrence, as indeed there is for all things (3:1-8, 
17; 8:8).
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The idea that nipü does not have this sense of “chance occuiTence” in 
Ecclesiastes is supported at least to some extent by the Versions. Both the LXX and 
the Targum translate with neutral terms meaning simply “happening”, “event”, as 
indeed does the Vulgate in 9:2, 3. Even the Peshitta’s rendering is to some
extent ambiguous.
From the actual interpretations offered by the Targum and the Mediæval 
Jewish commentators of passages in which Vmp appears, it is clear that there was a 
general consensus that Qohelet’s usage of this root was not indicative of a belief in 
chance as a governing force in life. Such interpretations as are offered, if they ar e not 
explicitly deterministic, often imply the role of God in determining the moment of 
death.
Although one cannot go so far as to say that Qohelet’s usage of Vmp of itself 
indicates a belief in some kind of Fate governing existence, it certainly serves to 
underline a certain passivity in human life: human beings may attempt to “do”, but 
ultimately their lives are defined by things that “happen.” Qohelet’s use of the term 
mpD therefore serves to underline the unpredictability of the time of death, the fact 
that it is outside human control (cf. 8:8), without the implication that it is a matter of 
chance, for Qohelet’s understanding of death elsewhere highlights the role of the 
deity in determining the moment of its occunence.
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2. WS
The noun rm occurs only once in Ecclesiastes (9:11), and once elsewhere in 
the Hebrew Bible (1 Kgs 5:18 [Eng. 5:4]). In 1 Kgs 5:18, it refers to a misfortune (the 
occurrence or not of which is evidently determined by God), although there it is 
modified by the adjective In the Hebrew Bible, the verbal foim can mean
“encounter (with evil intent)” or “harm” (Josh 2:16; Judg 8:21), but it may also have 
the more neutral basic meaning of “meet” (1 Sam 10:5; Gen 32:2). In MH, M. 
Jastrow emphasises the cormotations of misfortune that often carries. 14 in Eccl 
9:11, the term is typically translated “chance” in English Bible translations.
The Hebrew text under consideration here reads: sb 3  nnn nxni 'no# 
|n xb nai onsb xb nai nnb o'-QDnb xb c.n nonbon nmnab xbi n^bpb 
□bD nx nip' ni; '3 (“So I turned and I saw under the sun that the race is not to 
the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to 
those with understanding, nor yet favour’ to the skilftil, but time and ‘meeting’ 
happen to them all”).
In view of the discussion which has just centred on the meaning of nipD in 
Ecclesiastes (i.e. that it means “[unpredictable] happening” rather than “chance 
happening”), it is significant that Qohelet uses the verbal form nip ' in this verse to 
describe how “time and meeting” manifest themselves in human life. This suggests in 
turn that the noun ms does not refer to the influence of chance over human 
endeavour. In order to put this to the test, the meaning of the latter will now be 
investigated.
W  The Versions
t3  Fox {Qohelet and his Contradictions, 261) remarks that in this particular instance, it is 
impossible to determine whether :SJ1 is a necessary modifier to this temi, or merely juxtaposed with 
D3EI for emphasis.
^4 Jasti'ow, Dictionary,\\35.
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ri) The Septuasint
The LXX’s, o t l  K a ip ô ç  Kal dtrdytr|p,a G w a v r^ o e ra i  adp.’ttaCtLv aÙToîc 
(“for time and meeting befall all of them”) remains close to the literal meaning of the 
Hebrew, particularly with the use of dTrdyrnp.a (“meeting”) to translate the Hebrew 
ms. It does not, however, immediately clarify Qohelet’s understanding of the term. 
The relationship of form between the LXX’s dîTauTrip-a for 333 and the LXX’s 
QVvâvTX\\ia for mpQ is noteworthy, however, since it would appear to suggest that 
the LXX translator saw the two concepts as interrelated. At any rate, the occurrence 
of the derived verbal foim ouyavTTjoeTaL in this verse to translate the MT’s m p' 
suggests that this may have influenced the choice of a related noun to translate the 
subject of the verb.
fii) The Vulgate
The Vulgate’s sed tempus casumque in omnibus, is to some extent 
ambiguous, since the noun casus can mean either “accident”, “event”, “occui’rence” 
or “mishap.” Its semantic range does not, however, coincide with the idea of 
“meeting” in the Hebrew 3;3. In many ways therefore, this seems to be more an 
attempt to interpret the difficult Hebrew 333 rather than translate it. As fax* as the 
Versions ar e concerned, this translation is the odd one out since it appears to suggest 
explicitly an element of randomness in events (Cf. the use of the ablative form casu, 
“by chance” in Latin). Although a poor rendering, it does at least attempt to make 
sense of the Hebrew. As such, it appears to have influenced all English translations 
(e.g. Gen. B, AV, RV, RSV, NRSV, NEB, REB: “time and chance”).
(iii) The Tar gum
The Targum’s, pnb3 n' 3i3' xn'333'i |T3 onx (“but time and
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meeting happen to all of them according to their Fate”) illustrates an early 
deterministic reading of this verse, and emphasises that the Targumist understood the 
phrase 3331 ri3 as referring to more than mere random occurrence. The term xn'3i3 
translates the MT’s 333, and is translated “chance” in Jastrow, (although its only 
citation is for Tg. Qoh. 9:11). However, like the Hebrew verb 333, the Aramaic verb 
3“13 has the sense of “to happen”, “to meet,” “Chance” is a misleading translation in 
this particular context, since a thing which happens according to the planets is not 
random but preordained. In many ways, it is worth bearing the idea of “meeting” in 
mind which is evident in both the Hebrew and Aramaic versions, and which also 
underlies Qohelet’s use of the terms mp/mp3 in Ecclesiastes.
(iv) The Peshitta
The Peshitta’s rendering, is literal
and makes use of the Syriac cognate term to translate the MT’s 333. In Syriac,
this term has very much the same semantic range as its Hebrew equivalent (i.e. 
“meet”, “befall”, “happen”), and in fact is regularly used to translate V333 by the 
Peshitta. 15 Thus, it sheds no further light on the meaning of the term 33s in Eccl 
9:10.
Although no definite pronouncements can be made on the basis of the 
evidence thus far adduced as to whether Qohelet’s view of the world is deterministic, 
or whether he sees existence as altogether more random in nature, it is noteworthy 
that the Targum consistently carries forward a deterministic interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes. This in turn is frequently followed by the Mediæval Jewish exegetes.
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis
"15 K. Brockelniaii, Lexicon Syriacum (Hildesheini: Georg Olnis, 1966) 556.
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The work of the Mediæval Jewish exegetes may also cast some light on 
Qohelet’s intent here. Rashbam appears to follow the deterministic reading of 
Targum when he states: onb nnp' nnp&i 33si nr “the appointed time, meeting and 
event befalls them...” Japhet and Salters translate nnpQ here as “fate.” 16 This is a 
nuance which is not made explicit in Ecclesiastes, where the root refers only some 
form of (unpredictable) happening. Nevertheless, their interpretation of Rashbam’s 
underlying intent is probably correct, since in his comment on 3:19-20 as we have 
seen, he interprets Qohelet’s nnpD as a 3H3Q or “rule” 17 (Cf. the statement in Abodah 
Zarah 54b: 3in3 33ri3D3 nbir “the world (nature) follows its own law”), thereby 
implying God’s role in determining the ultimate end of his creatures.
Ibn Ezra’s interpretation is more explicitly deterministic and is essentially 
derived from that of the targum: n330no inx3 rcnwon p  inx n3'33 3:3 dn'3 (“the 
meaning of 333 is the meeting of one of the arrangement [of stars] with one of the 
seven [aspects]”). this understanding is underlined by Gomez Aranda’s comment on 
Ibn Ezra’s exegetical technique: “Ibn Ezra makes a play on words: n3'33 signifies ‘the 
meeting of the stars’ which influences the fortune (333) of Man.” 18 thus, Ibn Ezra 
clearly sees the hand of Fate at work in the events which Qohelet describes and 
explains them in terms of astrology. Rashi’s comment that the interpretation of 333 
is 13B0D3 “as its apparent meaning” is not helpful for our' purposes.
Thus, at least some of the Mediæval Jewish commentators saw the workings 
of Fate rather than chance behind the events and circumstances which Qohelet 
describes in the Book of Ecclesiastes. This deterministic interpretative tradition, as 
shall be demonstrated in due course, comes even fur’ther to the fore in the attempts of
16 s. Japhet & R. B. Salters, Rashbam on go/zeW (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985) 182-83.
^7 Ibid., 120-21.
18 m. Gomez Aranda, El Comentario de Abraham Ibn Ezra al Libro del Eclesiastés (TECC 56; 
Madrid: CSIC, 1994) 147.
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targum and some mediæval exegetes to explain Qohelet’s use of the term ri3 
(“appointed time”).
(c) Modern Commentators
The alternative interpretative tradition represented by the Vulgate, that 333 
refers to a “chance occurrence” continues in the thought of most modern 
commentators. Thus, Crenshaw states: “Chance governs human lives, according to 
Qohelet...No one can prepare for the unexpected or compensate for randomness.”i  ^
Such a reading of 9:11 is also reflected in the various translations offered for the term 
333 by others: “Zufall” (Zimmerli, Lohfrnk), “Glück” (Hertzberg), “Bad luck” 
(Scott).20 Glasser refers to the “accidents” (in the sense of chance happenings) which 
govern life, as does Seow.21 Whitley is in a minority in his suggestion that while 333 
may refer to a “mischance” elsewhere, here it has the neutral sense of “event” or
“happening.”22
As Fox points out, even if 333 in Eccl 9:11 is semantically neutral, the 
occurrences which Qohelet describes therein are examples of rnisfortune.23 the term 
333 denotes something which prevents the strong from victory in war' and the swift 
ft'om winning the race. In other words, it deprives those with a peculiar' talent from 
experiencing the just reward of that talent. taken in isolation, these two examples 
might suggest single, isolated incidences of bad luck, yet Qohelet goes on to say that 
the wise may not be able to earn their living, nor the intelligent riches, nor the skilful 
gain favour' because of 3331 H3. these latter examples are indicative of more than a
19 Crenshaw, 164.
20 Zimmerli, Der Prediger (ATD 16/1; Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1962) 223; Lohfink, 
Kohelet, 71; Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 160; Scott, Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 245.
21 E. Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet (Paris: Cerf, 1970) 157; Seow, Ecclesiastes (AB 
18C; Garden City: Doiibleday, 1997) 308.
22 C. F. Whitley, Koheleth: His Language and Thought (BZAW 148; Berlin & New York: de 
Gruyter, 1979) 80.
23 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 260-61.
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single piece of misfoitune affecting the outcome of an action. They illustrate ill- 
fortune dogging entire lives, perhaps even the whole of existence.24
Muiphy follows Ginsberg in seeing here a reference to death. 25 Murphy 
argues that “No matter what one’s talents, because of events beyond human control, 
one never has a sure grip on success. The ‘time of calamity’ is an unfortunate time, a 
fortuitous event that happens when one cannot cope with it. It refers to death, but 
also to any serious adversity.” Although Murphy’s interpretation of the verse as 
referTtng to death creates contextual problems, it is interesting to note that he 
focusses on the fact of the outcome of one’s efforts being ultimately “subject to 
events beyond human control.” 26 if  such events which determine the outcome of 
one’s efforts are not coordinated, then they may be denoted by the term “chance.” If 
they are coordinated in some way, then the outcome of one’s actions are subject to 
Fate.
In this context, it is particularly str iking that in none of the examples for the 
noun 33s or the verb 333 given above is the event which it denotes a random 
occurrence or meeting. In the case of Josh 2:16 and Judg 8:21 there is intent behind 
both uses of the verb: Josh 2:16 speaks of pursuers meeting their prey and Judg 8:21 
of Gideon “meeting”, or falling on Zebah and Zalmunna following their challenge, 
with the intent of killing them. In those examples of a more neutr al meaning for the 
verb, we see God’s angels meeting Jacob in the wilderness in Gen 32:2 and the 
prophecy of Samuel in 1 Sam 10:5 that the spirit of God will come upon Saul when
24 E. Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 152.
25 H. L. Ginsberg (Qoheleth [Jerusalem 7 Tel Aviv: Newman, 1961] 116) argues that UJai ru) refers 
specifically to the time of death in Eccl 9:11. This assertion is influenced by the appearance of nun nr 
in V. 12, a passage which is frequently interpreted thus. In this he follows Barton {Ecclesiastes, 164) 
and ultimately Metzudath David. Whilst the thought which he sees hi 9:11 is not alien to Qohelet, it 
does not explain why those with a peculiar talent do not enjoy the reward thereof in life. Ginsberg’s 
position is also adopted by Barucq {Ecclésiaste [Paris: Beauchesne, 1968] 163) and Murphy 
{Ecclesiastes, 94).
26 Murphy, Ibid., 93-94.
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he meets a company of prophets. Neither of these meetings can be said to be chance: 
on the contrary, they are intended by at least one of the parties involved. Even the 
single usage of the noun in 1 Kgs 5:18 (Eng. 5:4) is, as I have argued, reflective of the 
same: the non-appearance of a 332 to trouble Solomon’s reign is attributed to God.
(d) Conclusion
In conclusion then, the evidence gathered in this section supports the 
hypothesis that the term 332 in Eccl 9:11 is not to be understood as implying that 
events in human life are subject to chance. Despite the interpretative translation of 
the Vulgate (founded apparently on little more than guesswork), which appears to 
understand chance as the controlling force in existence, the Targum and some 
Mediæval exegetes bear' witness to the existence of a tradition in which the verse was 
understood in quite the opposite sense; namely that human life was largely subject to 
a deterministic force. Qohelet’s use of 332 in conjunction with the term D3 
(“appointed time”) is significant, for it implies that 332 is not random but 
coordinated. This conclusion is in fact close to that of Whybray, who remarks, 
“pega\ like miqreh,..does not mean ‘chance’ in an impersonal sense, but simply 
what happens. What will happen, and when it will happen, are beyond human
ability to foresee. ”2 7
This conclusion finds fiirther support from a consideration of the contexts in 
which V332 is used elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. Whether used in the sense of 
“attack” or “meet”, the action denoted by V332 is always the product of intent. The 
implication for Eccl 9:11 is similarly that the inexplicable adversities in life which 
beset human endeavour' are the product not of life’s randomness but of its 
orderliness.
27 Wliybray, Ecclesiastes, 146.
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3. D3
The importance of the term D3 to Qohelet’s worldview may be seen in the 
fact that it occurs 40 times in Ecclesiastes (3:1,2 [x4], 3 [x4j, 4 [x4], 5 [x4], 6 [x4], 7 
[x4], 8 [x4], 11,17; 7:17; 8:5, 6, 9; 9:8,11,12 [x2]; 10:17). We have seen examples of 
how the term is used in conjunction with mpQ and 332 in contexts where some form 
of divine intervention in human affairs is being asserted by Qohelet. The object of 
this section will be to explore how Qohelet uses this term in isolation.
Since 30 of the 40 occuiTences of the term ri3 occur in the passage 3:1-11, the 
investigation of this text will form a large part of this section. Thereafter, its usage 
will be considered in 7:17; 8:9; 9:8; 9:12;10:17.
3:1-11
30 out of 40 occurrences of the noun ri3 appeal' in the passage 3:1-11. This 
passage is therefore crucial for oui' understanding of what Qohelet means when he 
speaks of ri3 (“time”). The views of modern commentators on the passage vary. 
Some see in 3:1-11 a deterministic worldview expounded by Qohelet: others an 
unrealised and unrealisable ideal of acting at the appropriate moment which was so 
much a pai't of Israelite Wisdom.
3:2-8 is essentially a list of opposite or neai-opposite actions which may 
occur in the course of a human lifetime. Although this section does have a degree of 
importance for our study, and will be commented upon in due course, it will not 
immediately yield the thought behind the term n3 as used by Qohelet. This 
investigation will therefore focus initially on 3:1 and 3:11.
ta) The Versions
Both ]Dî and f  2 n are unusual terms, and may be indicative of the relatively
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late Hebrew of Qohelet. p'[ “time”, “appointed time” (so BDB 273-74) occurs 
elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible only in Neh 2:6; Est 9:27, 31. All of these occurrences 
have the idea of an appointed time for some event. In Neh 2:6, Nehemiah tells the 
King at what time he will return from his visit to Jerusalem. In Est 9:27, 31, the 
appointed times for Jewish festivals are described, p n  in the sense of “business”, 
“matter”, “thing”, may also be a late usage, occuning three times outside Ecclesiastes 
(Isa 58:3, 13; Prov 31:13) and three times in Ecclesiastes (Eccl 3:1; 5:7; 8:6). In Isa 
58:3 the context is of furthering one’s affairs by fasting, in Isa 58:13 it is used of 
business which breaks the sabbath, and in Prov 31:13 of the business which the 
diligent wife pursues.
The structure of 3:1 suggests that ]Qî bDb and psn bDb p3 are parallel in 
meaning. Thus H3 for Qohelet would have the meaning of “appointed time.” This is 
also suggested by the LXX which translates ri3 with Kalpoc in 3:2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
11, yet in 3:1 uses xpd^oc for the MT’s nr and Kaipoc for the MT’s ]QT. The 
Vulgate’s tempus is also used to translate the MT’s pT in 3:1, whilst in 3:2, 3,4, 5, 6, 
7 , 8 ,11  it translates the MT’s nr. In 3:1, the Vulgate translates the MT’s nr with 
the noun spatium (“period of time”). The Targum meanwhile, uses the equivalent 
Aramaic teiins for “appointed time”: X]Dî for the MT’s ]DT and x n 'r  for the MT’s 
nr. It thus affords little help fi'om a lexical perspective in interpreting this passage. 
The Peshitta’s which is equivalent to the Hebrew ]2T is used twice to
translate both the MT’s pT and nr in 3:1. Thus, the Versions unanimously support 
the conclusion that nr and p î mean the same thing, i.e. “appointed time.”
By whom are these times appointed? All commentators, whether they argue 
that the catalogue of times is an expression of the wisdom ideal of attempting to act 
at the appropriate moment, or whether they understand it in a deteiministic sense.
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understand the times of 3:1-8 as appointed by God.28 This is also the position of 
the Tai’gumist, who once again understands 3:1-11 as advocating a deterministic 
worldview. The occurrence of the term bîn in the Targum’s rendering of 3:9, “What 
advantage is there to a working man...unless he is helped by Fate from above?” 
(xb'rbi xbîûn r^noD 'bib'x.. .nbs nnab n'x nmo no) gives yet another indication of 
the grip which deterministic thinking held over the Ar amaic translator of Ecclesiastes.
As shall be seen presently, the teim bm which occurs in the Targum with 
some frequency in a deterministic context, also appears in the work of several 
Mediæval Jewish exegetes. On this subject, E. Levine remarks:
On fifteen occasions the targum utilises the terra MAZAL which I, with serious 
reservations, have translated as ‘Providence’...In post biblical Judaism it is a most 
problematic concept. In the targum, God deteimines mazal (Cf. V, 18; VI, 2; X, 6) 
and good mazal is a reward given to deserving people (V, 17). On the other hand, 
mazal is used to describe inescapable fate: a person can do nothing to change his 
mazal (IX, 11). Due to its mechanistic and deterministic features, the targum uses 
it to account for such inequities as the suffering of the righteous and the well being 
of the wicked (VIII, 15). The mazal elements in the targum testify that Pharisaic- 
Rabbinic tradition did not eradicate the grip of astrology on the popular mind, even 
in cases where mazal triumphed over zekut, i.e. accrued merit, “Everything is 
determined by mazall" (IX, 2). Yet here too on occasion the tai'gum tempers tliis 
fatalism by explaining that God determines even what the mazal will bring (IX,
12). Finally, the targum includes a stem warning against the study and practice of 
astrology (XI, 4), although it is itself contaminated by it.29
This fatalistic understanding of existence also underlies the Targumist’s 
interpretation of 3:11 in which Solomon prophesies concerning Jeroboam and the
28 Siegfried, Der Prediger, 39-41; M. Devine, Ecclesiastes or the Confessions o f an Adventurous 
Soul (London: Macmillan, 1916) 56; Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 61; D. Kidner, A 
Time to Mourn, and a Time to Dance [Leicester: Inter-Varsity, 1976] 38-39; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 
73; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 171.
29 E. Levine, The Aramaic Version o f  Qohelet (New York: Hennon, 1978) 75-76, cited by Knobel, 
The Targums o f Job, Proverbs, Qohelet, 29.
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division of the kingdom: “The Lord made everything beautiful in its time: for the 
quarrel which happened in the time of Jeroboam son of Nebat was fitting to happen 
in the days of Sheba son of Bichri but it was delayed and happened in the days of 
Jeroboam son of Nebat for if it had happened in the days of Sheba son of Bichri, the 
Temple would not have been built” (smiîD mm x'tm mn'Dn nsty " xbiD m 
m  'DVD nxim '“idd m  'Qvn 'inob 223 m  ornm 'ürn mm
xmpiD m3 'DHQ mn xb m  3332; '0T3 mn ib'Xi 333). Thus, the Taigumist again
understands the phrase in#3 ns' as illustrative of Qohelet’s deterministic worldview. 
The actions which human beings perfoim occur at the time set by God and are thus 
“beautiful” from God’s perspective, playing a part in his wider plan for the world.
By way of contrast, the Vulgate renders the phiase inü3 ns' with bona 
tempore suo which lays emphasis on the idea of the appropriateness of an action 
performed at the right time. This would therefore appeal* to support the position of 
those who understand the “times” of 3:1-8 as expressing the wisdom concept of 
acting appropriately. Further evidence in favour of this understanding of the 
tianslator’s thinking comes from an examination of the Vulgate’s rendering of the 
phrase 32033 nu in 8:5, 6, which will be considered in the next section. The LXX’s 
KoXà èv KQipw aÙToû which translates inw3 H2 ' is completely neutral and gives no 
clue as to the translator’s understanding of the verse’s meaning.
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis
The approaches of the Mediæval Jewish exegetes to the passage 3:1-11 vary 
as much as those of their more modem counterpaits. For example, Rashbam sees in 
the passage an exposition of divine rule over a just universe: “For everything there is 
a season: all works have their time and every matter under the heaven has its 
appointed time—evil times and good times—to pay people their reward according to
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their deeds: payment of evil and payment of good, times appointed for evil and times 
appointed for good.”3o (m30rf nnn “i0K p n  bobi , ]Qî onb 0' O'0r3n bob .]Dï bDb 
.333 D3b0r33 .m  D3b0n .DbUS '23 3313303 n3'13b Db0b .3333 '31) .331 '3!) .31) 3b 0' 
.3333 b0 3'3:U3 3P1 b0 D'3^). Here we have an idea close to that of Fate. The “times”
of humankind are deteimined by God, but they also have to do with the idea of 
reward and punishment. Rashbam’s interpretation appears to be two pronged, or at 
least ambiguous. On the one hand, the (human) deeds described in 3:1-8 aie the 
objects of divine judgement. The opposing deeds (e.g. “a time to kill, a time to heal”) 
denote good or evil actions on the part of the person being judged, whilst the 
opposing emotions (e.g. “a time to weep, a time to laugh”) represent the effects of 
the divine reward or punishment for these deeds.
This is also reflected to some extent in Rashi’s comment on 3:1, which 
apparently links this passage with 2:26: “Let not the gatherer of wealth from vanity 
rejoice, for even though it is in his hand now, the righteous will yet inherit it; only 
the time has not yet anived, for everything has an appointed season when it will be.” 
(r'33 xb p'1:;0 xbx .D'p'lii 33301" I'W 31'3 X33 3'03:; ox '3 b333 ]333 P]03X3 330' bX 
.3'3' '33 D33p ]33 0' 131 b3b '3 ]3î3). Such an interpretation of the verse certainly 
fits Qohelet’s statement in 3:17 that, “God will judge the righteous and the wicked, 
for there is a time for every matter and for every deed there.” Essentially, Rashi 
claims that God allows the sinner to gain apparent advantage but that in actual fact, 
when the time is right, God will right this injustice. Rashi goes on to illustrate this by 
applying the actions in 3:2-8 to biblical events perfoimed by God, or at the 
command of God. Thus “A time to give birth” refers to the nine month term which 
God sets for gestation. “A time to die”, to the limit of the yeai's of eveiy generation. 
“A time to plant” refers not to agriculture but to the metaphor of planting a kingdom.
30 Japhet & Salters, Rashbam on Qohelet,\\A-15.
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and “a time to uproot” its opposite. Of “a time to kill”, Rashi remarks, “an entire 
nation when the day of its punishment aiTives” (nnnps Dr* riQ'b0 ri33K) and
links this to God’s judgement in Isa 14:30 on Philistia. “A time to heal” refers to 
God’s healing the penitent in Isa 19:22. Of “a time to break”, Rashi comments “the 
wall of the city, when it is decreed upon it” (ri'bu 1M303 i'0n riDin), refening to Neh 
1:3 “and the wall of Jemsalem is breached.” Rashi’s commentary on 3:1-8 continues 
in the same vein. Like Rashbam, his reading of 3:1-11 emphasises the lack of human 
conti’ol and the fullness of divine control over events in life.
Rashi remains consistent in 3:11 in the view which he holds regarding 
Qohelet’s thought when he states: “At the time of good, it is beautiful that the 
reward be given for good deeds, and at the time of evil, it is fitting for the recompense 
for evil deeds.” (x'n n'lxi nwin rwm .man n0w3 i30 mb0n xnb x'n ns' nman nrn 
3023 mb03b). Such an interpretation of 3:11 is the logical conclusion to Rashi’s 
reading of this passage in which, as we have seen, he understands the actions and 
their opposites in 3:2-8 as the actions of God rewarding the righteous and punishing 
the wicked. Essentially, Rashi’s understanding of the text is that Qohelet is holding 
forth on the theme of justice in the world, and making a positive affirmation that all 
events are divinely ordained, either as reward or punishment. this view is in itself, 
not far' from that of a fatalist since it emphasises the divinity behind events rather 
than humankind.
Both Rashi and Sfot'no understand übü3 in 3:11 as referring to (the wisdom 
of) the world, but they do so in a way consonant with Qohelet’s statement that 
“humankind should not find out the work of God fiom the beginning to the end.” 
Rashi remar ks concerning God’s placement of this wisdom in the nb “heart, mind” of 
humanity: “He did not put it all into the heart of everyone, but a little to this one and
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a little to that in order that man should not comprehend the entire deed of the Holy 
One, blessed be He.” xb0 '“td nuip nn m p  nï xbx inxi inx bD 3b3 bDn p: xb 
:xin “|3“Q 03“ipn n0üü b3 nx mxn).
In a similar' vein, Sfot'no comments that God allows humankind a certain 
measure of knowledge which enables them to gain an overall pictur e of the world in 
which they live. Yet God withholds, or humanity is unable to grasp, the details 
which would make sense of the whole: “He placed in their hearts basic knowledge, 
with which to master general principles which are eternal...but the specifics cannot 
be grasped by any mortal, only by spiritual beings” (31330X1 3lb303D Dibn |33 
:D'bimn 33'0'0 333 3b303 a'0' xb 3'3isn b3x...3b3Pb on 10X D'bb33 ono r0nb).
Alshich’s coimnent on 3:1 is, however, the supreme expression of the 
possible deterministic reading of the passage under consideration:
b3n 3X 33 ibi3 oixn0 bî3n s  'v n3n oix '33 'ip33 '3'3r ox iipnb X3 n3b0 n3n 
X13 ÎX3 X3i1 "[X 3T 3X Hî 1.33' Xbl 33X 33 3T '3  3b033 3 ' bp3 3X3 3'31S 33.3033 
b33 D1 i n  3333 01X3 30Ü' 10X b3 "]133' 3'32b 'lb: 3'33 03'b'03 O'303 0'3bX 
1133'3 133) 3b3133 333333 ÎX33 3'0i)3 'Sb ]'13D' 3X 3333 VbSJ X'33b '3X1 3 '3 ' 10X 
bX 33X'3' xb '3  3'0i)3 'Sb 3'bX '3X13 'Sb p i  01X3 b:) 3320' xb ]23X3 O'30 ]p'33 
bob X33 3IJ3...]3Î bob 333333 33b0 13X' 3Î3 Tb '3X13 lbî3 3320' 3i)3 p i Ob3!)3 
f233 '2b 3]p33 31)3 '3  X33 13X ^2333 bî33 3!) '3  D'303 333 01X3 31'333 ^23
Solomon speculates whether the things which happen to a man are the result of the 
planet under which he was bom or whether they are the result of individual 
guidance from the Holy One, blessed be He. He accounts botli to be tme; they are 
not in opposition to one another. When God, may he be blessed, created the 
heavens and thefr constellations, it was revealed to hhn everything that Man was 
going to do, be it good or evil, and what was proper to befall them, be it good or 
evil, according to their deeds. With His great wisdom, he stood and measiu'ed and 
fixed the heavens so that they would judge a man only according to what is proper 
to befall him according to his deeds. He does not bring a man into the world except
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at the time when his constellation will judge him according to what he deserves.
This is what Solomon says in his wisdom: “Everything has an appointed season,
...and there is a thne for every desire and choice that man makes under the 
heavens,” for the time of tlie planet and the deshe are one, for tlie time was 
designated according to the desh e...”
This approach to the passage also features in the commentaiy of Ibn Ezra, 
who discusses the viewpoint that the passage concerns “the times which are strong 
upon humankind, for a human being is bound to do eveiything in its appointed time, 
and the beginning of the appointed times and their end restrain him” (an0 o'nrn 
DS1D3 nbnm inrn b3 m0pb d i x  3 " n 'd  d i x  p b  niDiQo).
Thus it would appear that partial or fully deterministic readings of 3:1-11 
were well known and accepted by the Mediæval Jewish exegetes. Metzudath David 
is in a minority when he understands this passage as emphasising human free will. 
For him (as for Alshich), fan in 3:1 means not “business”, but “desire.” Thus he 
states: “For everything that a person desires there is also a time, for a person does 
not desire the same thing at all times, but at one time he desires one thing, and at 
another time he desires its opposite, as is delineated in the following verses...” (bab 
no “1313 I'lsn ' DJJS '3 in x  1313 fian ' np b33 xb '3  n:; 0' ib D3 33 yan d ix i0  d '1 3 ii 
3'inxb0 ri3xipD3 01a' 10x33 laibna orai).
Again, it is the human element of free will in events which is emphasized as 
decisive in 3:11 when he remarks on this verse: “Eveiything that the Holy One, 
blessed be He, created and made in His world, is all beautiful, but it should be used 
by them in its designated time, not in any other time.” (7313 03ipD 10^3 X130 ID b3 
nb3T 3D3 xb Dnb inron Dn%3 di3 0on0nb b3x na' b3i 3Db3r3 xin). This is a 
reading which is broadly similar to one modern interpretation, that 3:1-11 deals with 
the subject of opportuneness. That is, Qohelet plays on the idea in Israelite wisdom
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of finding the fitting moment for an action to enhance its effect. Prov 25:11, which is 
usually adduced to illustrate this point however, uses the noun |sx “condition.” 
Whereas the NEB’s “in season” suggests a temporal aspect to the proverb in 
question, the AV’s “fitly” is probably a more accurate translation.
Metzudath David’s interpretation of 3:11 runs into contextual difficulties, 
however, when he attempts to deal with Qohelet’s comment that God has put übi) 
into the hearts of humanity. He states: “Also all the ways of the world and its 
benefits he has placed in the hearts of human beings, in order that they might 
understand them thoroughly if they delve into them profoundly” (Dbipn "cnt b3 D3 
TDibD'm 31 bD0H3 ip'DiT' DX iD'bDn i r  D3'3hb DIX '33 3^3 ]ri3). This is enthely 
consistent with Metzudath David’s earlier comments emphasising the importance of 
humanity in shaping the events which happen in the world. Yet it is the direct 
opposite to the intepretations of most of his contemporaries, and all modern 
commentators. Whether one argues for a deteiministic reading of 3:1-11, or one in 
which Qohelet considers the need for opportuneness in one’s actions, the vast 
majority of past and present scholais agree that Qohelet’s comments in 3:11 
preclude the attainment of the required knowledge.
Those commentators who understand 3:1-8 deterministically and who have 
recourse to the concept of bïQ to explain Qohelet’s thought in this passage, would 
appear to be influenced by the interpretation of the Targum. Whether this be 
admitted or not, however, it is evident that by the seventh century C.E.-there was a 
tradition of reading Ecclesiastes with a strong deteiministic slant. 31 Although 
Qohelet himself shows no interest in astrology, the ease with which Ecclesiastes
31 Following Knobel, The Targums o f Job, Proverbs, Qohelet, 13. The dating of Tg. Qohelet is, 
however, notoriously problematic. M. Ginsbiu*ger (“Review of Das Targum zu Koheleth nach 
sudarabischen Handschriften herausgegeben von Alfred Levy,” ZDMG 59 [1905] 717) argues for a 
date in the time of the Crusades (i.e. after 1099). This, however, appears unlikely, since Tg. Qohelet 
is mentioned in Nathan ben Yehiel’s dictionaiy, the 'Arukh, which was completed in 1101.
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lends itself to such readings is suggestive that Qohelet was expressing some concept 
of deteiminism. Exegetes of a later age have merely adapted those passages which 
already show evidence of this idea to the beliefs of their own time.
(c) Modem Commentators 
The term ns) has been viewed by commentators in a number of ways. In 3:1- 
8, it is seen by some commentators as exemplifying the ideal of doing the right thing 
at the right time, which pervaded wisdom literature,3 2 and which also occui’s in 
Greek thought. 3 3 Others understand it in a sense halfway towards determinism and 
have seen in this passage the Stoic concept of living according to reason, or the 
logos.34 This is not dissimilar to Whybray, who argues concerning 3:1-8 that “the 
things which happen to a man (for example birth and death) and the oppoitunities 
which are given to him (for example, planting and uprooting, keeping and thi’owing 
away) occur at the time...which God has determined.”35
The majority of commentators, however, argue that 3:1-11 should be 
understood in a deterministic sense. Thus Fox comments: “The rightness or 
opportuneness of a particular' time is not at issue here. The teaching of 3:1-9 is rather 
that the occurrence of all human events is beyond human control, for God makes 
everything happen in its proper time (proper, that is, from his viewpoint).”3 6
32 O. Loretz, Qohelet tmd der Alte Orient, 252-53. Cf. also Podechard, L Ecclésiaste, 285.
33 Ranston, {Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature, 43) citing Theognis 402. 
Plumptre {Ecclesiastes,121) also mentions the maxim of Pittacus in this connection: Kaipov yivwOi 
“Know the right season for everything”, and the fact tliat Demetrius Phalerus, the librarian of 
Ptolemy Philadelphus wrote a treatise entitled Trepl xaipoO “O f opportuneness” (DL 1.4.6).
34 Gammie (“Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism m Qohelet,” 175) treads a middles path, stating that “Fate, 
is comparable to Qoheleth’s understanding of divine causation (Qoh 3:11; 7:13)”, but argues that the 
catalogue of seasons shows that there are some things over which human beings do have free will, an 
idea which is also expressed by Blenkinsopp (“Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: Another Interpretation,” 58-59). 
This view ultimately goes back as far as Tyler {Ecclesiastes, 11-12) and Siegfried {Der Prediger, 39) 
however.
35 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher o f Joy,” 89. A similar view is suggested by Devine {Ecclesiastes, 
56), arguing specifically against a full deterministic rendering.
36 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictiom,\92.
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Jastrow reads similarly, stating that “Koheleth’s thought is, that everything is 
preordained and the time for its occurrence fixed. Why then toil and worry: Things 
will happen anyway at the appointed time.”37 Yet while many commentators will 
agree with the first part of this reading, the force of the rhetorical question in 3:9 
seems to be rather: “what do human beings get out of all the toil (denoted by 3:1-8) 
which the deity forces them to do”?
The same position is taken by Delitzsch, who sees 3:1-8 as essentially 
deterministic in character: “...all happens when and how God wills, according to a 
world plan, comprehending all things which man can neither wholly understand, nor 
in any respect change...All that is done here below is ordered by God at a time 
appointed, and is done without any dependence on man’s approbation.”3 8 This line 
of thought is also followed by Ginsberg, Scott and Murphy.3 9
Podechard mentions such deterministic readings of 3:1-8 and other paits of 
Ecclesiastes. However, he is also quick to point out that many other parts of the 
Hebrew Bible “contiennent des affirmations tout aussi inquiétantes pour la liberté 
humaine” and that human fiee will is presupposed in many parts of Ecclesiastes 
(3:16; 4:1; 7:15-17; 8:10-15; 9 :2 - 3).40  Podechaid’s argument in these passages about 
the problem of fiee will in Ecclesiastes centres on the fi'eedom of humankind to 
commit actions which Qohelet views as wicked or evil. Human beings appeal’ from 
Qohelet’s experience to be given free rein to oppress their fellows and God appears 
to have no predictable system to mete out just reward and retribution.
Although God’s system for reward and retribution may not be predictable, 
this is not the same as saying that such a system does not exist. God punishes the
37 Jastrow, A Gentle Cynic (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919) 210 n. 41.
38 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 254-55.
39 Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth, 37-38; Qoheleth, 73-74; Scott, Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 221; 
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
40 Podechard, L ’Ecclésiaste, 192.
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sinner and rewards the good (2:26), though Qohelet is unable to predict what makes 
the individual “good before God.”4i God would appear to be the missing comforter 
for the oppressed in 4:1.42 God’s attitude towards the righteous individual may be 
one of love or hatred—which of the two it is cannot be predicted (9 :1). 43 Good 
times and bad follow hard upon each other in the life of the individual at the behest 
of God, without reference to the individual’s morality or piety (7:14). Qohelet’s God 
is far from absent in the world, despite Qohelet’s statement that “God is in Heaven 
and you upon earth” (5:1 [Eng. 3]). Here Qohelet emphasises God’s power, 
manifested precisely in his ability to punish those who displease Him (5:5 [Eng. 6]).
In fact, for many commentators, it is in the arbitrary nature of God’s actions 
that Qohelet comes closest to an assertion of determinism. 44 Fate is an 
unpredictable force. Although Qohelet’s Jewish cultuie tells him that there is a God 
who cares for the righteous and punishes the wicked (3:17; 8:12-13), his own 
observations tell him that frequently the innocent suffer and the wicked triumph 
(3:16; 4:1; 5:7 [Eng. 8]; 7:15; 8:9-11). The logical conclusion to be drawn from this 
discrepancy would therefore be that either God does not exist, or that God does not 
take part in the world’s affairs. Qohelet, however, draws no such conclusion: he 
concludes that there is a God, but that he distributes his gifts in a random, 
unpredictable way (2:26; 5:18 [Eng. 19]; 6:2).
Thus far, this section has demonstrated only that from the very earliest times
41 Scholars such as Siegfried (Der Prediger, 38), McNeile {An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 24), 
Barton {Ecclesiastes, 84), Podechard {L Ecclésiaste, 284), Lauha {Kohelet, 58) and Whybray 
{Ecclesiastes, 64) have for various reasons (usually involvmg the attribution o f the verse to a 
glossator) understood 2:26 to have a moral content. The majority of recent commentators, however, 
assign the verse to Qohelet and understand the terms in the sense o f “pleasing to God” and 
“displeasing” (so Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 82-83; Zimmerli, Der Prediger, 161-62; Fox, Qohelet 
and His Contradictions, 188-90; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 90; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 27).
42 Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 74.
43 McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 19; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 157-58; Gordis, Koheleth: 
The Man and His World, 289.
44 Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, 136.
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the passage 3:1-11 has been understood in a number of ways. Indeed, it may almost 
be said even now that no two commentators agree completely on all aspects of its 
interpretation. Under such circumstances, how can one decide which, if any, of the 
interpretations offered is the correct one? CuiTently, a general consensus exists that 
the catalogue of seasons gives expression to some form of determinism. This modem 
consensus is itself a reflection of a veiy ancient interpretative tradition. The 
arguments in favom of this position aie given by Fox: in 3:11 the text states that God 
makes everything happen “in its time”, while 3:14 suggests that God is the cause of 
everything that happens. In 3:17, the action occuiTing at a certain “time” is clearly 
that of God’s judgement. Here again, the focus is not on the opportunness or 
otherwise of human actions, but on a specific activity canied out by the deity.45
Qohelet’s usage of the term ni? in the wider context will now be considered in 
order to see whether he is consistent in his usage of the term and whether its 
appaient reference to divinely appointed times in 3:1-11 holds true elsewhere.
The Wider Context (7:7: 8:9: 9:8: 9:12: 10:17)
If the wider context is considered with reference to Qohelet’s usage of the 
term nv, it is possible to come to some provisional conclusions about Qohelet’s 
usage of this term in the catalogue of seasons. It has been demonstrated that a range 
of views exist on the interpretation of this passage, each of which hinges on he 
meaning of the term nr. On the one hand, it may refer to an ideal time for each human 
activity in accordance with which human beings are unable to act. On the other, it 
may refer to the divinity’s imposition of his will on human affairs, making humanity 
act in a certain way at the time which he has deteimined.
7:17
45 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 192.
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In 7:17, Qohelet advises against being “overly wicked” with the rhetorical 
question “why should you die before your time?” Qohelet’s thinking here is that 
human wickedness will lead to the ultimate punishment of death from the divinity 46 
In this situation, nr cannot refer to an impossible ideal. Rather, it is to the 
termination of the span of time which the deity has allotted to the individual for his 
life. The implication is that God chooses the “time” at which one dies, but that this 
may be revised in the light of subsequent behaviour.47 The idea that one’s death has 
an “(appointed) time” is also evident in the phrase niDb nr in the catalogue of 
seasons (3:2). The timing of one’s death is not usually considered as something over 
which human beings have any control, and indeed this idea is reflected in Qohelet’s 
statement in 8:8: “No-one has power over the spirit to retain the spirit, nor can one 
exercise proprietorship in the day of death. There is no substitution in that wai'...”
As shall be demonstrated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the thought of 8:9-10 is 
intimately bound up with the usage of VtDb0. Recently, Seow has pointed out that 
Qohelet typically uses this root in its technical legal/economic sense of delegated 
authority.4 8 It is God who gives to the individual pDb0 (proprietorship, 
authorisation) over goods in 5:18 (Eng. 19); 6:2. Thus, Qohelet’s remark in 8:9 that 
“there is a time (n#) in which one man exercises proprietorship (üb0) over another to 
his detriment” can be understood as an expression of the inscmtability of the deity’s
46 Barton (Ecclesiastes, 144) and Jastrow {A Gentle Cynic, 225) imply acceptance of a certain amount 
of wickedness on Qohelet’s pai*t: it is excess which leads to punishment. Strange (Jhe Question o f 
Moderation in Eccl 7:15-18, 90-92) on the other hand, argues that 7:16 reflects the “lesser” 
wickedness of being self-righteous and corresponding lesser punishment of being “stunned.”
47 This indeed is the idea in Job 22:16, cited by Crenshaw (Ecclesiastes, 141), although he sees the 
death of the wicked individual as the result of action by “angry fellows” or the “authorities” ratlier 
than God as such.
48 Seow (Ecclesiastes, 284) sees the term in 8:9 in its technical sense but makes the comiection with 
human authorities as givers of rather than God.
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mie. The nature of Qohelet’s complaint is that God allows one individual to oppress 
another, so that the deity becomes implicated in human wrongdoing. Thus it is that 
Qohelet can say in 8:10 that he saw “wicked people approaching and even entering 
the holy place and they went about the city priding themselves on having done 
right.”49
9i8
The context of 9:8 is on the face of it not overtly deterministic, for it is one in 
which Qohelet offers advice to the disciple: “at all times (riD bD3) let your garments 
be white and let your head lack no oil.” (On the other hand, it is the deity who gives 
the opportunity for joy to human beings. In 3:13, for example, “the gift of God” is 
the ability “to eat and to drink and to experience the good of all one’s toil”).5o 
However, the real idea of this verse is that one should utilise the means for having 
pleasure whatever happens in one’s life. 51 The “times” which together make up the 
life of the individual are beyond human control. The deity alone determines what 
happens to us, and, by and large, the actions which we perform. However, this text 
implies that at least some of humanity are given enough freedom to make a choice as 
to whether to find pleasure (cf. 5:18 [Eng. 19] and 6:2 in which this freedom is 
denoted by the use of Vtûb0 in its technical sense. This will be dealt with more fully 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis).
9:12
The thought of 9:12 has been considered to some extent in the context of
49 So NEB, based on a suggested emendation by G. R. Driver (“Problems and Solutions,” FT 4 
[1954] 230-31). The question of the meaning o f 8:9 and its relationship to 8:10 will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
50 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 90; R. K. Johnston, “Confessions of a Workaholic: A 
Reappraisal of Qoheleth,” CBQ 38 (1976) 25.
51 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 144.
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Qohelet’s usage of the phrase 0321 nr in 9:11, but it is worth recapitulating briefly 
the ideas contained in this passage. The text of 9:12 may be translated “No man 
knows his time (inr), like fishes caught in an evil net and like birds caught in the 
snare, so are human beings trapped by the evil time ( n n  nr) when it falls upon them 
suddenly.” The tenn nr in this context cannot possibly refer to an ideal time in 
accordance with which human beings cannot act. The point of this passage is that 
“time” seeks out and finds human beings rather than vice versa. A s  such, the use 
of the term nr has a clearly deterministic flavoui*: it catches (Vmx) and ensnares 
(V0p') human beings. The entrapment imagery of 9:12 captures perfectly how the 
divinely appointed “time” restricts human freedom (cf. the imagery of binding used 
by Ibn Ezra in his comment on nr in 3:1).
The deterministic flavour' of this passage is brought out still further by the 
use o f the term which is typically used of the divine net which is wielded by 
Yahweh and by means of which he executes judgement upon the human world (Ps 
66:11; Ezek 12:13; 17:20, cf. nüiD in Job 19:6). 53 Gordis rightly points out that the 
adjective n n  applied to the “net” and the “time” has no moral content. Rather, both 
are “evil” from the standpoint of the victim, which Qohelet adopts.54
10:17
The use of the term nr in 10:17 does not appear to have deterministic 
overtones. The text, which may be translated, “Happy the land when its king is 
nobly bom, and its princes feast at the appointed time (nrn), for strength and not for 
drunkenness” nevertheless does not express the wisdom ideal of acting at an “ideal
52 J. A. Montgomery (“Notes on Ecclesiastes,” JBL 43 [1924] 243) in fact translates nw here as “fate” 
and makes specific reference to 3:1 in this context- Cf. McNeile (An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 79) 
who calls the passage 9:11-12 “a poetical expression o f the thought of iii 1-9.”
53 Rudman, “Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes,” JBL 116 (1997) 417.
54 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 298.
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time.” If one considers this concept in the wisdom tradition, the idea of perfoiming 
an action at the right time is to maximise its effect. Here, the “appointed time” for 
the action of his subjects is imposed by the king who rules wisely. In this respect, 
there is a clear* parallel to the action of God who enforces “appointed times” for all 
actions on his human subjects.
(d) Conclusion
Although the thoughts of commentators as to the meaning of 3:1-11 have 
differed significantly over the centuries, it is possible to reach some conclusions 
about the passage based on Qohelef s use of the term nr elsewhere. Qohelet never 
uses this word elsewhere to denote the idea of an ideal time in accordance with which 
human beings should act. Rather, it occurs in the sense of an “appointed time” which 
is imposed from without, in accordance with which the object must act. Many of the 
passages in which the term occurs imply the role of the deity in the imposition of 
these times, although 10:17 forms an exception to this rule. Even here, however, the 
sense of a time which is enforced is paramount.
This would therefore appear to suggest that the catalogue of seasons 
represented by 3:1-8 should be interpreted as expressing the idea of a wideranging 
deteiministic influence in human affairs. Evidence from the wider context therefore 
supports a deterministic reading of 3:1-11 which, as well as being accepted by the 
majority of moder*n commentators, can be traced through some of the Mediæval 
Jewish exegetes such as Ibn Ezra and Alshich to the Tar gum.
One way in which this conclusion about the nature of 3:1-8 might be refuted 
is by the suggestion that the catalogue of times and seasons is a text which is quoted 
by Qohelet and reinterpreted in 3:9ff. Thus one might argue that the sense in which 
ni) occurs in 3:1-8 differs fi*om Qohelet’s own usage elsewhere. The idea that 3:1-8
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may not be the work of Qohelet is a relatively old one. However, Blenkinsopp has 
recently used it to argue against the idea that Qohelet’s deterministic worldview is as 
wideranging as this passage would appear to suggest (although he does accept the 
idea that Qohelet advances the concept of a limited form of determinism 
e l s e w h e r e ) .5 5  This view, and the arguments against it, will be considered in Chapter 
3 of this thesis.
55 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 55-64.
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4. ÜB0D
The noun cûsüq occurs 6 times in Ecclesiastes (3:16; 5:7 [Eng. 5:8]; 8:5, 6; 
11:9; 12:14). Of these usages, two clearly refer to examples of human injustice (3:16; 
5:7 [Eng. 5:8]), one forms part of the final editorial addition to the book, asserting a 
traditional view of divine judgement (12:14),56 and another is probably a gloss 
influenced by this editorial addition (11:9).57 Whereas broad agreement exists on the 
meaning of all these examples, Qohelet’s usage of the term DB0& in 8:5, 6 has failed to 
attract a similai' c o n s e n s u s .   ^8 it is notable, however, that Qohelet uses the term 
parallel ton# (“appointed time”) in both verses. Having argued in this chapter that 
the latter term is indicative of a belief in determinism on the part of Qohelet, an 
examination of 8:5, 6 is therefore necessary to consider whether Qohelet’s use of the 
noun BQtSQ in these locations may also have deterministic overtones.
The Hebraic concept of judgement in which punishment or rewai’d are meted 
out by the deity is in some respects similar to fate. This resemblance becomes more 
pronounced in the work of Qohelet, who considers that divine justice is ineffable and 
that God rewards whoever pleases him without respect to moral worth. This is a 
theme upon which Crenshaw r e m a r k s : 59
If we cannot determine our future, no matter how hard we try, God’s disposition 
towards us becomes a matter of life and death....Men and women possessed no 
control over the goods which God dispensed in his own time and manner. Not 
even morality purchased the best gifts, and often good people waited in vain for
56 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 192. Lauha (Kohelet, 223) suggests in fact that the reference in 12:14 is 
to a judgement after death.
57 Siegfried, Der Prediger, 73; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 185; VLcHeiSe, An Introditction to Ecclesiastes, 
26; Podechard, L ’Ecclesiaste, 452. More recently, some commentators have argued for the retention 
o f 11:9b, including Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 336) and Wliybray (Ecclesiastes, 
162).
58 Siegfried (Ibid., 63), McNeile (Ibid., 25) and Barton (Ibid., 150) also attribute 8:5-6a to the same 
T’en glossator as 11:9b.
59 Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, 136.
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signs of divine favour, while rich rewards speedily greeted evil acts. In short, the 
trouble with gifts was that God retained control over them. In a sense then, God 
forced men and women to rely on him for everything...The inevitable course of 
such thinking would seem to be some form o f determinism.
Many commentators recognise, for example, that when Qohelet speaks of the one 
who is “good before God” (D'’n*7Xn 'B*? nitD) and the sinner (Kîûin) in Eccl 2:26, he 
does not use these terms in a conventional moral sense. Rather, the situation which 
Qohelet describes is illustrative of God’s inscrutable judgement^o As Murphy 
remarks, “the import of the verse is to claim sovereign freedom for God in imparting 
gifts.”61 Those, such as Podechard, who would seek to retain a moral dimension to 
these terms, are forced to to recognise a gloss in 2:26a (by a I ’on seeking to tone 
down the content of Qohelet’s assertions).62
Can the difficult passage 8:5-6 be understood in the light of such a 
detenninistic concept of judgement, or should the phiuse BBDüi n# (“time and 
judgement”) occurring in both be applied to the courtly wise man’s savoir faire^ his 
ability to act in the proper time and manner and hence to escape the wrath of the 
despotic king depicted in 8:2-4? In order to determine this, these two verses will now 
be considered and then related to the wider contexts of the preceding verses and 
Qohelet’s thought elsewhere in Ecclesiastes.
8i5
The keeper of a commandment shall know no evil thing.
60 Ginsberg (“The Structure and Contents o f the Book of Koheleth,” in M. Noth & D. W. Thomas 
[eds.]. Wisdom in Israel and the Ancient Near East [VTSup 3; Leiden: Brill, 1955] 13), states that 
these terms “mean respectively (as is today generally recognised) ‘pleasing to God’ or ‘displeasing’, 
or ‘lucky’ and ‘unluclQ^’ - not ‘righteous’ and ‘wicked’. This applies not only in ii 26, but also e.g. 
in vii 26.”
61 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 27.
62 Podechard, Z 'Ecc/éj/aiSte, 284.
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for a wise man’s mind knows time and judgement.
The Versions 
rn The Septuagint
This verse can be interpreted in two distinct ways, and much depends on 
how the versional evidence is understood. The LXX text reads: O <])uXdaowu
ePtoXfjp, où yywaetaL pf]|ia iroyripov, Kai Kaipov Kptoetoc yiywoKeL Kapôia 
oo(j>où (“He who keeps a commandment shall not know an evil thing: and the heart
of the wise knows the time of judgement.”
The argument advanced by Fox, that the MT’s bdîûqt n# ( “time and 
judgement”) in 8:5 is a hendiadys equivalent to üSïjq n# (“time of judgement”), is 
supported by the LXX’s Katpoy KpCoewç, and 15 M SS. 63 The interpretation which 
follows from such a reading is that the phrase Cûbîdût n# refers to divine judgements 
on human evil (possibly connected with the despotic king depicted in the preceding 
verses).64 The wise man knows that “God will judge the righteous and the wicked” 
(3:17). This interpretation is therefore in line with Qohelet’s thought in 3:17, but 
also retains the idea of n# as a time appointed by God for a purpose.
tiil The Vulgate
The Vulgate text of this verse reads. Qui custodit prœceptum, non experietur 
quidquam malt Tempus et responsionem cor sapientis intellegit (“He who keeps a 
commandment shall experience no evil. The heart of the wise man understands time 
and the reply”). On the question of whether the phrase n# in 8:5 should be
translated as a hendiadys, Crenshaw points to the LXX translation o f the same
63 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 247-48.
64 So Lauha, Kohelet, 149.
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phrase in 8:6 (Kaipôç Kal Kpiatc) as evidence that the MT is correct. 65 This 
conclusion and the naturally following interpretation is supported by the Vulgate’s 
translation, tempus et responsionem (“time and the reply”) which understands tûBîüD 
in its rare sense of “proper procedure” (Isa 28:26; 1 Kgs 5:8; Isa 40:14). This is the 
approach adopted by Gordis, who refers it to the wise man’s ability to respond 
appropriately to external events. 66 Such an inteipretation is consistent with 
Qohelet’s advice in 8:2-4 on how to react (or rather, how not to react) to the actions 
of one’s ruler, even when they are questionable.
(iii) The Targum
The Targum reads, ]T#i TiKi SDbub tbn xt» "n xmpB n  nm
S'’D’Dn nbn #T)Dn0X ]m (“A man who keeps the commandments of the 
Lord will know no evil thing in the world to come and the time of prayer and 
judgement and righteousness, are made known in the heart of the wise”). The Targum 
to some extent supports the position of Fox on this question since it appears to 
understand îosüdt n# as a hendiadys and translates with a genitive construction. 
However, it also supports the MT in that it has the conjunction before the 
equivalent of Bsdn.
(iv) The Peshitta
The Peshitta’s tianslation of 8:5 reads, r^ .xooâ
cnnX r<xsi\a (“He who keeps a commandment
will not know any evil thing, and the wise man’s heail knows time and judgement”). 
This translation is a fairly literal one and supports the MT.
65 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 151. Fox (Ibid., 248) takes tlie evidence o f 8:6 in quite the opposite 
sense, arguing that tasüDi in 8:6 should be omitted, since it may have been added under the influence 
o f the word in the previous line.
66 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 289-90.
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(v) The Arabic Version 
The Arabic Version also supports the MT, reading: Vwsy/i F ysT  ù^mr
s"q wqJb "l/ikm y T f  'iwqt w/1^ X7?? (“He who observes the commandment will not 
know a troublesome matter, and the heart of the wise man knows the time and the 
judgement”).
From the above, it may be seen that the versional evidence appears to be split as to 
whether or not the MT’s BStDDi n# should be translated as a hendiadys. As we have 
seen, the answer to this question does make a material difference to the possible 
interpretation of this verse, and so it will be necessary to consider the views of later 
commentators and the evidence of the wider context in some depth. Before 
proceeding with this enquiry, however, it is worth noting that the MT’s DDn 3b is 
taken as a construct by all of the Versions cited here and consequently translated 
“the heart of the wise man”, although Gordis reads DDn as an adjective rather than a 
noun, and translates “a wise heart.” 6 7 No material difference to the exegesis is made 
whichever option is followed. Since Qohelet’s use of the definite article is fai' from 
consistent, my own translation also understands the phrase as a construct, following 
that of the Versions.
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis 
Unfortunately, the interpretations of the Mediæval Jewish exegetes differ 
considerably, reflecting the difficulty of the passage. Rashi on one hand comments: 
“The wise man knows that there is a time ordained for the punishment of the 
wicked, and there are judgements before the Holy One, blessed be He, with which he 
will recompense them in the end” (CBBtDOi nnpsb #np n# DDnn
67 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 289. Followed by Crenshaw (Ecclesiastes, 151).
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DHQ #nsnb B102) n”3pn •’Bb td"»). This particular interpretation appears to recognise 
the possibility of the hendiadys for which Fox ar gues based on the evidence of the 
LXX and some manuscripts.
However, Metzudath David expresses a different view of the passage: 
“Although it is true that one may not obey [a king] to break one of God’s 
commandments, not all times ar e the same. There are times when one must break a 
commandment in order to obey a king’s command, to make a fence and a safeguard. 
Likewise there is sometimes a ruling, which the kingdom decrees upon all its people, 
which it is proper to obey although it is to break a commandment” (px D]DX dx 
]#Qb niKDn b#...iB#b n# b  b3 px □•’nbxn nnx b# m3#b #B0b
"ixnnûo id]x bD b# in :n  niDbon 3hb  cf" p i rnom i n i: ni0#b -(bon m i #idü 
nmon b# im#b X’l  ix i nb #iOK)b). Interestingly, Metzudath David relates the term 
n# to its use in 3:1-8: there the times of which Qohelet speaks are enumerated in 
opposites, as when Metzudath David speaks of the time to keep and to transgress 
God’s commandments. Thereby he continues his insistance on human free will as the 
defining force in life which was evident in his exegesis of 3:1-11. The term OB0O in 
this context refers to the ruling which is instituted by the kingdom, the necessary 
observance of which will result in such a transgression.
Sforno’s interpretation of the passage is in some respects similar' to that of 
Metzudath David. He explains: “One who keeps and studies a commandment will 
not find anything bad in it, that is; no lack of purpose, and a wise man’s heart knows 
the time and the judgement. He knows and understands the time the commandment is 
to be observed and the reason it was given” (#1 13 Xî^ û*' xb nmo3 (33131 iDit# 
n#D11 352)31 niH31 13 IBB 1#1 ('31 #1' .331 3b #1' 332)31 D#1.. .D'bDH (1101 X112) 
IB] 13b).
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Thus the views of the Mediæval Jewish commentators in general anticipate 
the conflicting views of modem commentators on the exegesis of 8:5. On the one 
hand, Rashi sees ‘^ ime and judgement” as unalterable defined by the will of God in 
much the same way as Fox and Mmphy. On the other, Metzudath David and Sforno 
agree in seeing “time and judgement” as being ultimately subject to the will of human 
beings as do Gordis and Whybray, although they divorce the commandment of 8:5 
from the context of court wisdom to that of divine law.
(c) Modem Commentators 
The opinions of modern commentators, as has already been illustrated, vary 
as widely as those of the more distant past. Fox’s position, that 8:5-6 expresses the 
idea that human evil will be judged by God, has already been noted.68 Gordis, like 
Fox, suggests the possibility that 3S2)D1 n# is a hendiadys, but interprets it to mean 
“the time of propriety = the proper time.” However, n# alone could be equally well 
rendered thus (Deut 11:14; Jer 5:24; 2 Kgs 5:26; Ps 119:126), whilst 3S2)D could be 
rendered “the proper procedure” (Isa 28:26; 1 Kgs 5:8; Isa 40:14).69
Gordis’s translation of 8:5-6 is an unusual one, though it illustiates the fact 
that he favours the second translation for 332)31 n#: “He who keeps his command 
will experience no trouble, for a wise mind will know the proper time and procedure. 
For everything has a proper time and procedure, man’s evil being so widespread.”7o 
Nevertheless, his understanding of the way that 8:5 is linked to 8:6 has not gained 
acceptance among recent commentators.
Crenshaw’s interpretation of the verse is broadly similai': “The basis for such
68 The suggestion was also made by Plumptre (Ecclesiastes, 176-77). Plumptre (unlike Fox), 
however, retains MT.
69 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 289. This idea, as we have seen, is the idea 
expressed in the Vulgate’s translation.
to  Ibid., 182.
Qohelet and Fate 69
confidence (i.e. that those who obey a command will not suffer by so doing) rests in 
the intelligence of one who understands the proper time and manner for action.”? i 
However, he argues that the viewpoint of Qohelet in this verse does not represent 
his true understanding of reality since he immediately contradicts his apparent 
confidence in 8:5 when in 8:6b-7 he makes the statement that humankind cannot 
know what will be. Whybray agrees with this viewpoint, stating that 8:5a is a 
“commonplace of traditional wisdom, cited by Qohelet as a dictum to be attacked”, 
although he also lists the possible interpretations of this verse: “(i) that the obedient 
man will steer clear of involvement in intrigue because, as a wise man, he will be 
aware of the probable penalty, (ii) that he will be afraid of divine retribution if he 
does wrong, or (iii) that he may take comfort in the knowledge that even tyrants have 
only a time to rule and must face God’s judgment.” Whybray nevertheless argues 
that none of these alternative inteipretations do full justice to the context of the 
verse, which is strongly linked to the previous verses by vocabulary such as and
“ 131.72
Thus fai' then, there seems to be no clear consensus on the meaning of 8:5, 
although all are agreed that it is connected in some way with 8:6-7 and with the 
preceding verses. This consideration of the passage will therefore seek to address the 
question of whether Qohelet’s statements in 8:5 can be reconciled with those in 8:6- 
7, and if so, how this can be done.
8:6-7
Because to every purpose there is time and judgement, therefore the 
miseiy of man is great upon him.
71 So also Murphy (Ecclesiastes, 83).
72 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 131-32.
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(a) The Versions 
The Septuagint
The text of the LXX reads, "Otl TTavrl npdypaTL èoTi Katpôç Kal KpioLC, 
ÔTL yvwŒLç TOÙ dvGpcuTTOU TToXXfj c tt’ ttUTov (“For to everything there is time and 
judgement, for the knowledge of a man is great to him”). The different LXX 
renderings of the expression 332)31 n# and the possible reasons for them have already 
been discussed. The LXX is, however, also unique in its rendering, o tl yvûoiç Toi) 
dy0p(j5TTou TToXXf) € tt’ aÛTÔy, which evidently reads n#i “knowledge” for the MT’s 
n#i “evil.” The context indicates that the MT in this case is to be preferred, and as 
we shall see presently, this is confirmed by the interpretations of modern 
commentators.
fiif The Vulgate
The Vulgate reads, Omni negotio tempus est et opportunitas et multa hominis 
afflictio (“For eveiy business there is a time and appropriate moment, and great is the 
distress of man”). The MT’s }*3n b3b would seem to be an obvious echo of 3:1, 
suggesting a similar interpretation of the noun n# should be made in this passage, and 
in fact the Vulgate’s translation of the term 332)3 by opportunitas would appear to be 
an attempt to link this verse with both its interpretation of 8:5 as indicative of the 
wise man’s ability to know the right time and appropriate response to external 
events, and with the catalogue of times and seasons in 3:1-8. However, it should also 
be noted that the translator of the Vulgate has been forced to translate the tenn 332)3 
in two different ways in order to maintain a coherent exegesis. Whereas 
responsionem in 8:5 refers to the wise man’s reaction to events, his own subjective 
“judgement” as it were, opportunitas in 8:6 refers objectively to the fixed time itself. 
Thus, either the translator does not translate “judgement” in 8:6 or he understands it
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as God’s judgement which establishes the fixed time, in accordance with which the 
wise man should act.
(iii) The Targum
The Tai’gum reads, xûb# bD (inx 3Bpi p i b#i ü'di D3 (T# n'x xpo# bDb nnx 
pii'ib# px'B i X2)'D 'ID# ]'2)]x HDin b# xûb#D xni]#iB 'inab " Dip ]d itb x  idi 
(“For to eveiy business is a good and evil time and by Justice and Righteousness the 
whole world is judged and when it is decreed from before the Lord that there will be 
punishment in the world on account of the people, the doers of evil which is great 
against him...”). The midrashic material within the text demonstrates that the 
translator made a contextual connection with 3:1 and the list of opposites in 3:2-8 
(“to every business is a good and evil time”). However, this translation is also 
indicative of the Targumist’s view that the noun 3DDQ refers to divine judgement 
occurring in the here and now, punishing sinners. The limitation of the Targumist’s 
interpretation is that it disconnects “time” and “judgement” when Qohelet 
apparently sees them as interrelated, perhaps one and the same.
(iv) The Peshitta
The Peshitta reads, roàueuun.t àur^ cua^ AaA.t .X.^ y’sa
(“Because to eveiy business there is time and
judgement, therefore the evil of man is great upon him”). Again, this is a literal 
translation which des not offer significant help in interpreting the passage, although it 
bears witness, as do all the versions to the conjunction in the MT’s 332)31 n#.
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis
Rashi inteiprets this verse, understanding the tenn 332)3 to refer to the
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punishment of the sinner (though he also interprets pan “business” in the sense of 
“desire”): “When a person acts out his desire and transgresses the law, there is a time 
to punish him, and justice and punishment are ready” (b# nm# oixnK)
niDiD 332)31 #“i3nb n# 2)' ni). Likewise, he states, “When the evil of man is
great and his measure is heaped up, then his punishment anives” (n#“i riD“i “12)XD 
imip3 nxD ÏX n2)n] inxoi mxn). Rashi’s interpretation of this verse is pietistic but 
his insight that the term 332)3 refers to divine judgement should not be dismissed. 
the term has, after all, a legalistic overtone throughout the rest of Ecclesiastes and 
God is the subject of the verb elsewhere in phraseology which is closely related 
(3:17).
the position of many modem commentators on 8:6 is exemplified by 
Metzudath David: n#i ]#3b ninnxb n'n'2) n3 b'D2)nb '“iv nnxn ]'x nD2)n3n nbnriD 
332)3ni n#n 1133 (“When beginning to think, no man knows how to consider what 
will happen in the end in order to know from it the time and the judgement”). this 
understanding clearly links “time and judgement” to the thought processes of the 
sage: since one cannot say for sure how one’s actions will turn out, it is impossible 
to make a correct decision on how to act and when to act. Once again, one can see the 
debate as to the meaning of this passage polarised between those who link “time and 
judgement” with God’s activity and those who would place it within the human 
sphere of operations.
(c) Modern Commentators
the foui' instances of 'D in this verse and the next cause an interpretive 
problem. Crenshaw favours a reading of 8:6 in which the first '3 is taken 
asseveratively, and the second adversatively, i.e. “Indeed, for everything there is a 
time and a procedure, but the evil of human beings is heavy on them.” However, as
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Crenshaw himself points out, other interpretations aie possible and indeed, have 
been offered. 7 3
It is also possible that 8; 6a is a restatement of the viewpoint of traditional 
wisdom. Certainly, the language of this section is reminiscent of 3:1. Gordis argues 
that the language of this verse, which speaks of “human evil” being too heavy for 
humankind, refers to the inherent weaknesses of humankind. Thus, a wise courtier, 
who knows the coiTect time and proceduie, will always find an opening which will 
allow him to use his skills.74 Such an interpretation is problematic however, since 
the term D"tx must presumably include the wise man, and in fact, the wise man is 
portrayed as being powerless before the king (8:2-4). It is not the wise man who 
instructs in this situation which Qohelet describes, but his ruler.
Murphy and Fox both deal with the interpretation that even for a king, there 
is “time and judgement.” In other words, a king may indeed do as he pleases in the 
present, but he is not excluded from the judgement of God, who will punish his sins 
(however unknowable the future is to humankind—v. 7)75
fdJ Svnthesis: Text and Context
Most commentators recognise some form of relationship between 8:5, 6 and 
3:1-8 and/or 3:17 regarding Qohelet’s use of the term n# “time.” As we have seen, 
however, the term 332)3 has been interpreted in a number of ways; as being indicative 
of the judgement of the wise regarding the correct procedure to follow at court 
(especially when faced with a despotic king), or of the judgement of God over the 
king or over wickedness in general.
73 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 148-50.
74 Gordis, Koheleth, the Man and his World, 290; Scott, Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 240.
75 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 84; Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 247-48. Seow (Ecclesiastes, 
281) also understands ûSüûi nr as a reference to God’s judgement, but divorces 8:5bff. from the 
preceding courtly verses.
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Fox’s assertion, that these verses consciously pick up on the language of 3:17 
is the most convincing of the arguments that have been advanced about the 
interpretation of this p a s s a g e .  7 6  Qohelet states in 3:17: “I said to myself (lit. ‘in my 
heart’), ‘the righteous and the wicked, God will judge’, for there is a time for every 
puipose and concerning every work there” (330' #0"in nxi nx 'Dbn ']X 'ni3X
30 n0#3rr bD b#i p3n bDb n# 'd D'nbxn). Thus we see the use in one verse of the 
four significant terms psn “puipose”, n# “time”, V330 “judge” and Db “heart” which 
feature in the verse under consideration. In 3:17, Qohelet demonstrates the truth of 
his statement in 8:5 that “the wise man’s heart knows time and judgement.” 
However, the essence of Qohelet’s concept of n# is that the point at which an 
appointed time for action will occur is unknowable. This is explicitly stated in 9:12, 
but is also reflected in 8:7, “for he knows not that which shall be, for who can tell 
him when it shall be.”
(i) 33031 n# as “Proper Time and Manner of Procedure”
If one understands with Whybray the term n# to mean an ideal time for 
action in line with which human beings cannot act, it is difficult to see a convincing 
link between 8:6-7:
Because to eveiy matter there is time and judgement, therefore man’s misery is 
great. For he does not know what will happen, for who will tell him when it wiU 
happen?
Even though one may not act in accordance with an “ideal time”, one usually knows 
what will happen as a result of one’s actions. Of course, one could object at this 
point with Metzudath David that this is true only in a general sense. One cannot 
foresee in detail the consequences of a given action with any certainty. However, the
76 Fox, Ibid., 247.
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problem with this reading becomes more pronounced when one considers Qohelet’s 
avowal that human beings do not know ^^hen it will be.” If human beings have free 
will, then they know when they will act. The only way both parts of 8:7 can be 
interpreted in line with the concept of n# as an ideal time is to refer each part to 
different things, the “what” to the outcome of human actions not in line with the 
“ideal time” and the “when” to the arrival of the ideal time itself. Perhaps more 
seriously, Qohelet only uses ^330 outside this passage in a legal sense (3:16; 5:7 
[Eng. 5:8]). Both of these considerations argue against the understanding that 33031 
n# means “Proper Time and Manner of of Procedure.”
(ii) 33031 n# as “Time of Judgement”
Fox’s understanding of the phiase 33031 n# in 8:5 as a hendiadys meaning 
“time of judgement” cannot be transfeiTed to 8:6. The resultant translation, “Because 
to every business there is a time of judgement, therefore human misery is great”, 
makes little sense. The idea that God might judge all human action in the traditional 
way would be rather comforting to Qohelet, who complains elsewhere on the 
tardiness or even lack of such action on God’s part (8:11).
It is for this reason that Fox, following Ginsberg, is forced to emend the text 
of 8:6 by deleting 33031 as an addition added under the influence of 8:5.77 This is a 
rather desperate measure: the more so since Fox has already suggested a quasi­
emendation to 8:5 in order to harmonize with his view of what Qohelet ought to be 
saying. Certainly, the resultant text of 8:6-7, “Because to every matter there is a 
time, humanity’s miseiy is great: for he knows not what shall be, nor when it shall 
be” makes perfect sense, and is entirely in keeping with Qohelet’s thought as it is 
expressed in the catalogue of times in 3:1-8. However, the term 3303 in 8:6 provides
77 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 248; Ginsberg, Qoheleth, 106-7.
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an important link with the thought of 8:5. If it is deleted, then 8:6-7 is left in 
isolation and without context. Before taking such drastic action, it is as well to 
consider whether the term 3S0n can be retained in 8:6 and understood in a way 
consonant with Qohelet’s thought elsewhere.
(iii) 33031 n# as Deteiminism
What does Qohelet mean when he makes God the subject of V330 elsewhere 
in Ecclesiastes? Almost all commentators would agree that he refers to the divine 
intervention in the here and now (as opposed to a judgement after death).78 This 
judgement is considered to be of the familiar form in which a specific human action is 
met with a corresponding response of reward or retribution from God. However, if 
all (or nearly all) human actions aie controlled by the deity, then the rationale for 
such a system falls away. One might reasonably argue that a belief in detenninism 
and a traditional judgement is simply one more of Qohelet’s contradictions, yet 
Qohelet in 8:5-6 juxtaposes the teims 3303 and n#, thereby emphasizing the 
connection between the concept of judgement and the key word which expresses his 
deteiministic thought.
We have seen that one way of understanding these verses is to connect them 
with the catalogue of times and seasons in 3:1-8 and to understand them 
deterministically (as Fox does). The form of 8:6, 33031 n# 0' pDn bDb 'D would 
appear to be a simple restatement of 3:1, p3n bDb n#. Thus, one might paraphrase 
the thought of 8:6-7, “Because all human business is predetermined by God, human 
beings are in a distressing position: for they do not know what will happen or when 
anything will happen.”
78 Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 235) sees an ironic reference to a judgement in the 
afterlife in 3:17. Lauha (Kohelet, 223) similarly construes the editor’s reference to a judgement in 
12:14.
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One may object that this interpretation does not interpret the term 
“judgement” and that therefore Fox is correct in deleting 33031 in 8:6. This is in fact 
unnecessary, however, for the imposition of “appointed times” is based on God’s 
inscrutable judgement of the individual. In 2:26, Qohelet speaks of God giving 
“wisdom, and knowledge and joy” to “the one who is good before God”, while God 
“gives to the sinner toil: to gather and to heap up to give to one who is good before 
God.” It is perhaps no accident that this passage, with its series of infinitives 
denoting the divinely determined ]']# given to the sinner, immediately precedes the 
]']# (3:9) represented by the catalogue of times (3:1-8). Likewise, in 7:26, whether 
the individual male is trapped by Woman is determined by whether he is “good 
before God” or a “sinner.” Whether one loves or not (cf. 3:8 “a time to love”) is a 
consequence of how one is viewed and judged by the deity in this passage. The 
activities which human beings aie made to perform (and their outcome) are a direct 
consequence of whether we are viewed by him as 313 or X3in. Thus, “to every 
business there is time adjudgement.”
What of the preceding passage, 8:2-4? Can this view clarify the advice offered 
by Qohelet in a couitly context? Since I have ai’gued that the statement “to every 
business there is time and judgement” refers in a general way to God’s activity in the 
world and is expressing the idea that one’s position and the activity one carries out is 
a reflection of divine favour or disfavour, it is interesting to note that God is 
mentioned in connection with the king in the very first verse of this passage (8:2): “I 
counsel you to keep the king’s commandment, in regard to the oath of God” ('3 'ix 
D'nbx n#i30 niDi b#i ni30 *]b3). This passage will in fact be considered in more 
depth in Chapter 5, which explores Qohelet’s conception of free will. For now, it is 
worth noting that both Tyler and Hertzberg have advanced an interpretation of the
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verse in which Qohelet advises obedience to the king because of God’s oath 
concerning k i n g s h i p  79 that is, the king has a specially favoured status with respect 
to God, thus one should “keep” (1130) the king’s law. In 8:5, Qohelet says “one who 
keeps (1130) (the king’s) commandment will not experience problems: the heart of a 
wise man knows ‘time and judgement.’” In the light of the king’s special position 
with God and Qohelet’s consequent advice to be obedient in 8:2, one can interpret 
8:5 as saying “a wise man will obey the king because his situation, like everyone 
else’s, is divinely ordained.” In effect then, 8:5 would be a restatement of the thought 
of 8:2, and 8:6-7 would be not so much a contradiction of the thought of 8:5 as a 
coda based on the term “time and judgement”, widening its application from a 
couifly situation to existence in general.
(q ) Conclusion
this section has sought to demonstrate that Qohelet’s use of the phrase 
33031 n# has deterministic overtones and that the ideas expressed in 8:5-6 are in line 
with the deterministic meaning claimed for the catalogue of seasons in 3:1-8. In doing 
so, the two main cunent inteipretations of 8:5-6 have been examined.
the idea that 35031 n# in these verses refers to the sage’s ability to determine 
the proper method and procedure ignores the context of 3:17 where similai' 
phraseology is used of God’s judgement. Moreover, a problem occurs in that there 
appears to be no causal relationship between this understanding of the phiase and 
the thought of 8:7 in which Qohelet clearly laments humanity’s inability to know 
what the future holds for them.
Fox’s solution to the problem represented by these verses, in which 33031 n#
79 Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 141-43. The essential details of Tyler’s reading (Ecclesiastes, 101-2, 
139-40) are the same as mine: (i) that the King is a divine viceregent and symbol of law (ii) that this 
provides the rationale for Qohelet’s advice to obey the king, and (iii) tiiat the phrase oatoûl n# 
“Season and Law” refers in a general way to God’s detemimative activity in existence.
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in 8:5 is translated as a hendiadys with the “judgement” being understood in a 
traditional way, and the phrase 35031 in 8:6 then deleted, is, however, somewhat 
arbitrary. As far* as possible, the text as we have it should be retained and an attempt 
made to understand it against the background of Qohelet’s thought elsewhere.
Thus, it is best to understand 35031 n# almost as synonyms: God’s 
inscrutable judgement unfolds in the actions which the individual is made to perform 
and the course of their life. Human distress (8:6b) is a natural concomitant for they 
have no control over the course of their own lives: they do not know what will 
happen or when things will change (8:7 cf. 7:14). In many ways, the situation of 
humanity is a larger scale reflection of the sage at court, continually at the mercy of 
the despotic king in 8:2-5. By juxtaposing both pictures, he succeeds in drawing a 
lesson for humanity in general from the rarified atmosphere of the court wisdom 
genre.
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5. pbn
Another way in which Qohelet’s detenninistic worldview can be seen is in 
the concept of pbn, or “portion.” This term occurs 8 times in Ecclesiastes (2:10, 21;
3:22; 5:17, 18; 9:6, 9; 11:2) but is also common throughout the Hebrew Bible.
However Qohelet again, as shall be demonstrated, uses this term with a nuance of 
meaning and in contexts different to those in which it is found in the rest of the 
Hebrew Bible.
The term pbn is used in the Hebrew Bible in a number of ways. M. Tsevat 
describes the primary meaning as ‘“ ...the portion coming to one by law and custom.’
From this meaning develops the meaning ‘the portion in life determined by God,’
‘destiny.’”80 Primarily, the term pbn is connected with the organisation of the 
community or the family (Prov 17:2; Neh 13:13; 2 Sam 19:30 [29]). However, j
sometimes it can refer to the division of land. Since Yahweh is depicted as the
original owner of Palestine (e.g. Deut 12:10), someone who receives a portion of this I
Iland (Num 26:53; Josh 18:5; 19:51) is said to have a portion in Yahweh’s own j
property. Similarly, one who renounces his portion of the land may be said to have )
no portion in Yahweh (Josh 22:25, 27). 81 By way of contrast, the Levites, are said |
to have no portion (pbn) in Palestine, since they are not entitled to own land (Num |
18:20; Deut 10:9; 12:12; 14:27, 29; 18:1; Josh 14:4; 18:7). Rather, their portion is j
Yahweh himself (Num 18:20), an idea which is expressed in the personal name |
Hilkiah “Yahweh is my portion” (2 Kgs 18:18; Isa 22:20; Jer 1:1; 29:3).82
The term pbn may be used of a preordained lot in Hab 1:16 (food); Job 39:17 i
(wisdom), and more generally as the lot of individuals or nations in Job 20:29; Isa i
80 m. Tsevat, “p'pn (II) ” TDOT 4.448.
81 Von Rad, “The Promised Land and Yahweh’s Land in the Hexateuch,” ZDPV66 (1943) 191-92, 
also in The Problem o f the Hexateuch and Other Essays (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 
1966) 79-93, esp. 87.
82 Tsevat, “p^ pn (H),” 449-50
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17:14; Jer 10:16. However, often this “lot” is brought about by the conduct of the 
recipient. As a rule, pbn in the Hebrew Bible appears to be incompatible with the 
idea of determinism, or “fate.”83
Having given consideration to this background matter, Tsevat points out with 
some justification that Qohelet’s usage of the term pbn is “peculiar' to 
Ecclesiastes.”84 Elsewhere in the Old Testament, it is unusual for God to be ovei’tly 
made the subject of the action (though he may be the object). Exceptions to this l'aie 
occur in Deut 4:19; 29:25 [26] in which Yahweh apportions other gods to the 
nations. However, nowhere in the Hebrew Bible other than in the book of 
Ecclesiastes does God appear to grant to the individual human being a “portion.”
(a) The Versions 
til The Septuagint
Of the 8 occurrences of the noun pbn in the book of Ecclesiastes, the LXX 
translates seven times with the term gepLC (2:10, 21; 3:22; 5:17; 9:6, 9; 11:2) and 
once by (jiepoc (5:18). Both of these terms have the basic meanings “part”, 
“portion”, “share”, and thus serve as theologically neutral but nevertheless literal 
translations in keeping with the LXX’s Aquilan character.
an  The Vulgate
Generally speaking, the same may also be said of the Vulgate which translates 
ever'ywhere with the neutral term pars (“portion”, “part”). However, in 2:21 it is 
striking that it renders pbn with the term quaesita (“acquisition”, “gain”). In this 
case, the translator may be guilty of exegesis: if the contexts in which the term pars 
is used is considered, it would appear that it denotes either “portion” in a neutral
00Ibid, 451 
84 Ibid., 450-51.
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sense (11:2), or in the sense of the rightful reward for one’s labour (2:10; 3:22; 5:17, 
18; 9:6, 9). The term quaesita appears in the sense of a “portion” of which the 
individual is undeserving. This distinction may be intended to preserve the deity to 
some extent against accusations of injustice.
tiiil The Targum
The Targum translates the tenn p b n  with its Aramaic cognate pbm  in all 
locations. The passages in which the term occurs are subject to heavy midrashic 
interpretation, but do not provide any indication that the Targumist understood 
Qohelet to have a consistent system in his usage of the term. On the one hand, one’s 
portion is allotted by the planets. Thus, the Targumist in 5:17 speaks of “the 
number of days of his life which the Lord gave to him by Fate for it is his portion” 
(n 'pb in  xin m ix  n 'bm n  "  n 'b  i n '  ' i  i n n  'n r n  'd v  ] " b ) .  Likewise in 9:9 , the 
Targumist makes mention of “your vain life which the Lord gave you by Fate” 
(xb ïïB  -|b "  31 ' ' 1  -jm b3n "n ) .
One’s portion may have the sense of “duty, obligation” given by God in the 
present life in order that the recipient may receive a “complete reward” in the world 
to come. Thus in 2:10 the Targumist depicts Qohelet/Solomon labouring in the Torah 
and elucidating difficult points of religious law for the Sanhédrin. Qohelet then goes 
on to state “and this was my good portion which was allotted to me in order that I 
may obtain a complete reward in the world to come” ('b p i ï x i  33 'pbin mn ]'n  
'n x i  X3b#b D'b0 13X 'm b #  xb3pb). The same interpretation of the term pbn may be 
seen in Tg. Qoh 3:22.
One’s reward after death is also termed “portion” by the Targumist. Thus in 
9:6, he states concerning the wicked: “they no longer have a good portion with the 
righteous in the world to come” ( 'n x i  XQb#b xipimi □# m # ]*inb mb 33 pbim). Again,
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this particular interpretation of the meaning of pbn is also evident in Tg. Qoh 5:18. 
However, the term pbin is used in a more neutral sense in Tg. Qoh. 11:2 referring to 
the “portions” of seed to be sown in the seventh and eighth months and in Tg. Qoh 
2:21 simply to what one has acquired in life (though once again this would be the 
result of Fate, or the planets, according to the Targumist’s worldview).
The connection between pbn and the divine will for human beings is therefore 
made either explicitly or implicitly by the Targum in the majority of locations where 
it occurs in Ecclesiastes. Although the Targumist may read considerably more into 
Qohelet’s usage of the term than the author of Ecclesiastes intended, he nevertheless 
demonstrates his understanding that one’s “portion” is imposed from without. In 
this respect, he supports more modern views in which the deity is seen as 
responsible for the allocation of “portion” to human beings.
tivl The Peshitta
The Peshitta translates the MT’s pbn with in all locations. The term
is a loanword derived from the Latin: moneta. As such, it is most often used
in the financial sphere and has the basic meaning of “money” or “cash.” A 
development from this meaning is the sense of “ r e w a r d ” ,85 which is most 
appropriate to the context of most its usages in Ecclesiastes.
Certainly, the use of the tenn r^àujsjo cannot be said to offer a literal
translation of the Hebrew pbn. However, it does have a semantic range broad enough 
to cope with both 2:10 where pbn may indeed be construed as “reward” and 2:21, in 
which pbn may simply refer to the material goods acquired during one’s lifetime (Cf. 
Vulgate). The term in the sense of “rewai'd”, may also caiTy the implication
85 Brockelman, Lexicon, 395.
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that one’s pbn may be allotted by God in exchange for laboui'.
(b) Mediæval Jewish Exegesis
The view of the Targumist, that Qohelet often uses the term pbn in the sense 
of something allotted to human beings by the deity, also finds expression in the work 
of some of the Mediæval Jewish commentators. Thus in 3:22, Rashi comments on 
the phiase ipbn xin 'd “The toil of his hands is the portion granted to him from 
Heaven, and by means of it he will rejoice” (m  ü'û0Q ib (H'B pbnn xin VSD
Rashi’s position is to some extent contradicted by Metzudath David’s 
comments on 5:17; 9:9. In the former, he states, “all the wealth which God 
apportioned to him from above is his portion” (lb pbn 10X ip bn xin i 0 i#n bD 
b#33 n'bx) and in the latter, “in all the toil and all the laboui' you undertake in this 
world you have no portion...but this alone (enjoyment of life)” (mi#ni b3#n bDD 
nnb nî pn...pbn ]b px Qbi#n no b3# nnx0). Although Rashi and Metzudath David 
agree that “portion” is granted by God, they disagree as to whether it consists of toil, 
wealth or enjoyment.
Metzudath David’s implication in his comment on 9:9, that one’s “portion” 
is a good which is limited in some way is also expressed in that of Ibn Ezra on 3:22, 
“There is no good but to rejoice in their lives, for there is no other portion for them” 
(nnx pbn mb px 'D o^nD 1130' n0X3 onb did ]'x). Likewise, Rashi commenting on 
5:17 (and following Qohelet Rabbah) states that it is good for the individual “to 
engage in Torah...and he should not gather much wealth but rejoice in the portion 
granted to him, for it is his portion” (lb ]mr\ pbnD xbx Di pn pDp' bxi...nmnD pio#b 
ipbn X'n 'D 130'). Once more, Rashi understands the term pbn as a reference to toil 
(this time in the Torah). Nevertheless, the role of God in allotting this portion to the
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individual is highlighted, as well as the fact that this portion is of a limited nature.
Although some confusion therefore exists in the Mediæval souices, the teim 
pbn is generally seen as referring to joy or wealth (Ibn Ezra, Metzudath David) or to 
some form of toil, whether physical or intellectual ( R a s h i ) .8 6  All commentators 
emphasise the divine origin of one’s portion and also stress its limitations. In this 
respect, they anticipate the work of modern commentators.
(c) Modem Commentators 
Crenshaw argues concerning Qohelet’s use of the term pbn that “its essential 
meaning for him is limitation, a part of something rather than the whole thing. One’s 
portion in life is the shai'e of desirable or undesirable experiences which come along, 
not as the direct result of good or bad conduct but purely by chance.”^? Crenshaw’s 
view here is a reasonable one, yet, as we have seen, what Crenshaw views as pure 
chance is often revealed to be something more akin to determinism. Few 
commentators indeed would argue that “portion” is a chance thing, for it is God- 
given as the lot of humanity.
Galling also sees “portion” as intimately linked with human life and 
ultimately defined by the deity. For him, it is “gerade zu terminus technicus fur den 
der menschlichen Existenz zugeweisenen Raum.”88 Not all locations in which pbn is 
used, however, permit Galling’s general interpretation of it as “the space allotted to 
human existence”, as Fox points out.89 Glasser in a footnote on 2:10, remarks on
66 Rashi also connects one’s “portion” in this world and in the world to come with physical labour 
and Torah study respectively m his comment on 9:9 (following Eccl Rah. on 9:9).
87 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 82. Crenshaw also gives expression to this idea of limitation in “The 
Eternal Gospel (Eccl 3:11),” inEway^ in Old Testament Ethics (New York: Ktav, 1974) 48-49. In 
contrast, V%ybray (Ecclesiastes, 55) emphasises the often positive nature of pbn. Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, Ix, points out tliat any positive meaning of portion is limited strictly to this world.
88 Galling, Prediger, 89. Cited also by Tsevat, ‘pbn (ft),” 451. Most recently. Galling has been 
followed by Seow (Ecclesiastes, 151).
89 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 58.
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the resemblance of pbn to certain ideas of fate. For him, it is “le bonheui' limité que 
Dieu distribue à sa guise aux hommes. On serait tenté de parler d’un ‘lot’, car le 
bonheur, constate Qohelet, est une loterie.” 9o This view approaches the definition 
offered by Crenshaw, whilst at the same time taking account of the deterministic 
nature of the term pbn as we find it in Ecclesiastes.
Classer’s understanding of the term pbn as refening to “le bonheur limité” in 
2:10 is well founded. The text in question states: “And whatsoever my eyes desired,
I kept not from them. I did not withhold my heait from any joy, for my heart 
rejoiced in all my labour, and this was my portion Cpbn) of all my labour.” It is 
noteworthy that in this verse, no overt reference is made to the material possessions 
which Qohelet has accumulated in the couise of the “Royal Experiment.” 91 Rather, 
the subject of this verse is the joy which Qohelet has derived from his labour, 
emphasised by the repetition of as the verbal fonn nûto and the noun nnato.
Joy, rather than material possessions per se, is the due reward for Qohelet’s hard
work.92 i
Î
This conception of pbn is also reflected by Qohelet’s words in 3:22: “So I j
saw that there is nothing better than that a person should rejoice in their own works, j
for that is his portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?” Here 
the “portion” of humankind, that they should rejoice in their labour, is reaffiiined.
This is perhaps the only positive conclusion of Qohelet as a result of his sear ch, yet 
it is also shown here to be a “second best” option. It is the alternative to the 
knowledge of existence which Qohelet seeks: the ability “to see what shall be after 
him.” This therefore illustrates the definition of pbn as the “limited good” of which
90 Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 48.
91 It could be argued that here the term refers to “goods obtamed by laboiu” rather than laboiu 
itself (so Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 181). If so, however, this would only emphasize the 
position o f joy as “my portion horn all my bbJJ.”
92 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 242-3.
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both Crenshaw and Glasser speak.93
Again, in 5:17 (Eng. 18) the same link between joy and “portion” is made by 
Qohelet: “Behold what I have seen: it is good and comely to eat and to drink, and to 
enjoy the good of all his laboui’ which one takes under the sun all the days of his life 
which God has given him, for it is his portion.” In this passage, the tenn pbn is 
specifically pinned down as “the enjoyment of the good in one’s labour.” It is also, 
perhaps, worthy of note that the term ns*' is used to describe the taking of one’s 
portion, the only other occurrence outside 3:11 in which it is used to describe the 
UTesistible nature of Fate.94 The theme of “portion” as joy is made more explicit 
still in 5:18 (Eng. 19), where “to rejoice in one’s labour” (ibor^ riQtob) is parallel to 
the phrase “to take one’s portion” (ipbn tiK nxiob).
The Sitz im Leben of the term pbn therefore appear s to be in the realm of 
human emotions.95 This is also reflected in 9:6, in which Qohelet considers the 
situation of those who have died: “Their love, their hatred and their envy are now 
perished; neither have they any more a portion forever in anything which is done 
under the sun.” Thus far, the term “portion” has been considered merely as “joy” in 
one’s labour or the benefits derived therefrom. In this verse however, “portion” 
appears also to designate any human emotion, “love” and “hatred” certainly appear’ 
in the list of predetermined actions and emotions in 3 : 1 - 8 .9 6  “Envy” is intimately 
bound up with human toil in 4:4; so much so that it appears almost as if human 
progress is ultimately little more than a beneficial by-product of rivalry. Likewise in
93 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 82; Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 48. Delitzsch (Ibid., 
272) describes portion in the sense o f joy as “the best which (man) has of life in this world,”
94 Murphy, who to some extent understands 3:1-11 as a deterministic text, notes a parallel between 
God making an action “beautifiil in its tune” (man ns’) in 3:11 and the characterisation of portion as 
“beautifiil” in 5:18 (Eng. 19) {Ecclesiastes, 32-35, 53). In actual fact however, it it the action of 
taking one’s portion that is “beautiful.”
95 That such may be the case is partly suggested by Fox {Qohelet and His Contradictions, 59).
96 As I argue in a forthcoming article, love is an emotion which is conditioned by the deity 
(“Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes,” 418-19, 421).
Qohelet and Fate 8 8
9:9, the admonition to “experience life with the woman you love” is backed up by 
Qohelet’s assertion that such is one’s “portion.” Although VnDâ? does not appear in 
this verse, the verb nnx does. Once again, the location of the teim “portion” is to be 
found firmly in the realm of human emotions.
Apart from the neutral use of the tenn pbn in 11:2 (in which the giver of a 
portion is clearly intended to be the reader), the only significant departure from 
Qohelet’s usage of pbn in the context of human emotion occurs in 2:21: “For there is 
one whose earnings were acquired by wisdom and by knowledge and by s k i l l y e t  
he must give them as his portion to one who has not toiled for them (Cf. 2:22).”98 
Even here, the “portion” to which Qohelet refers might well be the pleasure arising 
from the use of the wealth accrued by the first man.99
(d) Conclusion
To conclude then: Qohelet uses the term pbn in a way fundamentally 
different to its usage elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. It is something which is given 
by God, and one can say with Crenshaw that it is indeed a “limited good” which is 
allotted to humankind in life. Being as it is a gift, it has little or nothing to do with the 
individual merit of the recipient. It may be granted freely or withheld, even 
transferred to another, at God’s discretion (cf. 2 :2 1 -2 6 ).ioo The term pbn refers to 
human emotions, primarily to the enjoyment of life. However, Eccl 9:6 suggests that 
pbn may apply in fact to the whole range of human emotions. Some evidence for this 
view is also provided by 9:9, where one’s portion is to love a woman. Although pbn 
cannot be defined as “Fate”, it is a concept which illustrates the deterministic nature
97 Translating the term pnob as “skill” with Wliitley {Koheleth: His Language and Thought, 27).
98 Understanding Ip bn as a predicate accusative with Hertzberg {Der Prediger, 80) and Podechard 
(Z ‘Ecclésiaste, 277-78).
99 So Crenshaw {Ecclesiastes, 88), who sums up the mood of the verse: “I earned the wages and 
therefore am entitled to derive satisfaction jfrom them.”
100 Cf. Whybray (“Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 89).
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of Qohelet’s worldview. If human feelings are subject to the will of God, then the 
whole concept of human free will is called into question.
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Chapter 3 
“A time to Give Birth, A time to Die”:
A Response to Blenkinsopp
I. Introduction
Ecclesiastes 3:1-15 is a key text for our understanding of Qohelet’s thought. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, it lends itself to a variety of interpretations. Until 
very recently commentators were divided into two camps as to the intent of this 
passage. While some see the text as enumerating a variety of “ideal” times for human 
activities which human beings are unable to, or prevented from, achieving,! others 
have argued that Qohelet is advancing the thesis of determinism. 2 Despite objections 
that several passages in Ecclesiastes presuppose a degree o f free will, the reasonably 
wide acceptance which the deterministic understanding of this passage enjoys is 
partly due to the fact that the first two actions cited in 3:2: mob mbb m), 
translated by RSV, NRSV, NEB, NAB and many commentators “a time to be bom, a 
time to die”, are not generally recognised as being under human control.^
In a recent article, Joseph Blenkinsopp has presented a series of arguments 
which call into question the legitimacy of this deterministic reading. His thesis is that 
Ecclesiastes 3:2-8 represents a quotation from a Stoicizing Jewish sage to which 
Qohelet prefaces a title (3:1) and a commentary refuting the content of this quotation
1 Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 126-131; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 67.
2 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 255; Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 229; Muiphy, 
Ecclesiastes, 33.
3 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 256; Ziinmerli, Der Prediger, 162; Scott, Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 220-21; 
Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 190, 192. The determined nature o f “time” is also implicit in 
Loader’s understanding of the actions in 3:2-8 as “desrirable” or “undesirable” (“Qohelet 3:2-8—A 
‘Sonnet’ in the Old Testament,” Z4fF81 (1969) 240-42),
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( 3 :9 - 1 5 ) 4  The observation that 3:2-8 may be an extended quotation is not new.5 
Previous commentators have also suggested that it expresses the Stoic ideal of living 
according to naturel Where Blenkinsopp diverges from earlier interpretations of this 
passage is in the suggestion that Qohelet specifically argues against the content of 
this passage in 3 :9 - 15 . 7  it is to this question there that attention shall first be 
directed.
II. Text and Context
The argument that 3:2-8 is most likely a quotation, rather than original to 
Qohelet, rests on two foundations. The first is that the language of this passage finds 
little or no echo in the rest of the book of Ecclesiastes. The second is that the idea of 
the passage does not reflect Qohelet’s thinking elsewhere in Ecclesiastes. 8 The 
former issue is one with which it is relatively simple to deal. The second is more 
difficult: there is no consensus as to the intent of 3:2-8. Its relationship (or not) to 
the rest of Qohelet’s work is therefore entirely dependent on how the individual 
commentator reads the passage.
Blenkinsopp does not state outright his reasons for rejecting the idea that 3:2- 
8 advances a deterministic thesis. It cannot be that he rejects determinism in 
Ecclesiastes generally, for he ai’gues that Qohelet puts forward this idea in 3:9-15 to 
counter the content of 3:2-8.9 The problem appears to lie in the extent to which
4 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: Another Inteipretation,” 55-64.
5 A. G. Wright, “Tor Everything There is a Season’: The Structure and Meaning of the Fourteen 
Opposites (Ecclesiastes 3, 2-8),” in J. Doré et a/.(eds.). De la Tôrah au Messie. Mélanges Henri 
Cazelles (Paris: Gabalda, 1981) 321-28; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 69-70; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
6 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 13; Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 175.
7 Wliybray {Ecclesiastes, 69-70, 72) comes close to suggesting tliat Qohelet argues against the 
content of 3:2-8 in 3:9-15 when he hypothesizes that Qohelet reinterprets the passage which he has 
just quoted. Cf. also W. J. Fuerst, The Books o f  Ruth, Esther, Ecclesiastes, the Song o f  Songs, 
Lamentations {CaxDbridge: C.U.P., 1975) 113.
8 Whybray, Ibid., 70; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 57.
9 Blenkinsopp, Ibid., 61-63.
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reading 3:2-8 deterministically would subordinate human free will to the control of 
the deity.!9 Thus Blenkinsopp accepts a form of determinism in which God 
predisposes events to happen, while leaving humanity free to make the choice of 
how they respond to these events. This viewpoint is not without precedent in the 
work of Chrysippus (although it is a fundamentally illogical one, since all events 
presumably need human beings to enact them). Before considering the thought of this 
passage and its relation to the rest of Ecclesiastes, however, it is as well to to 
consider the language of 3:2-8.
(a) The Language of 3:2-8 
Although Blenkinsopp argues that the language of 3:2-8 is not characteristic 
of Qohelet, a closer study shows that this is not, in fact, the case. Purely on a lexical 
basis one can point to the fact that the word nr “appointed time”, whilst it occurs 29 
times in 3:2-8, is used a fiirther 11 times outside this passage (3:11, 17; 7:17; 8:5, 6, 
9; 9:8, 11, 12 [twice]; 10:17). The use of the term in 3:1, which although not 
strictly part of the passage according to Blenkinsopp, nevertheless summarises 
Qohelet’s understanding of it, finds its echo in the 7 uses of Vfsn in 3:17; 5:3, 7; 8:3, 
6; 12:1, 10. Although four of these citations occui* in a different context of desire or 
pleasure (and as such tianslated in the LXX by the verb 0eX« [8:3] or the related 
noun GeXqiia [5:3; 12:1, 10]),! i the usages in 3:17; 5:7; 8:6 retain the same sense as 
that in 3:1.! 2 Indeed in 3:17 and 8:6 Qohelet repeats a variation of the basic phrase 
in 3:1 that “there is an appointed time for every purpose” (yan bab pr). While not 
all of the actions in 3:2-8 featuie elsewhere in the book of Ecclesiastes, a significant
10 This also seems evident in the work of Gammie (“Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 
175), for he understands some actions as illustrative of Stoic determinism, and others as illustrative 
o f free will. Similar is Levine (“The Humor in Qohelet,” ZAW  109 [1997] 78-79) who also 
undestands 3:2-8 as a text emphasising tlie Stoic ideal of living according to nature.
11 W. Staples, “The meaning of /76’/?é?5in Ecclesiastes,” ÆYE5 24 (1965) 110-12.
12 Blenkinsopp himself points out this fact (“Ecclesiastes 3.1-15; Another Interpretation,” 60).
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proportion do. The verb lb"' occurs 4 times outside our passage (4:14; 5:13; 6:3; 7:1) 
whilst the verb niQ occurs 8 times (2:16; 4:2 [twice]; 7:17; 9:3, 4, 5 and the noun 6 
times (3:19 [twice]; 7:1, 26; 8:8; 10:1). The verb occurs outside this passage 3 
times (2:4; 2:5; 12:11), whilst the verbs pB  occurs in 10:8 and n n  in 2:4; 9:14. More 
significantly, Vpnto is used 4 times outside this passage (2:2; 7:3, 6; 10:19). The verbs 
TiBO occur in 12:5 and oi]B in 2:8, 26, whilst the verbs pnn occur in 4:5 and p m  in 
12:6. The verb tî?pD is more frequent in Ecclesiastes with 6 occurrences outwith this 
passage (3:15; 7:25, 28, 29; 8:17; 12:10) and verbal forms of ViBK occurring 5 tunes 
(5:13; 7:7, 15; 9:6, 18). The verb is repeated 8 times outside this passage (4:17; 
5:7, 12; 8:2, 5; 11:4; 12:3, 13). The verb nm  occurs in 1:8, 16; 3:7; 7:21 with the 
derived noun p i  occurring a total of 24 times. The verb BiK occurs in 5:9 [twice]; 
9:9 and its derived noun m ix  in 9:1, 6, whilst its opposite X30 occurs twice (2:17, 
18) with its derived noun also in 9:1, 6. Finally, the noun nanba occurs twice outside 
this passage (8:8; 9:11).
tbl The Ideas of 3:2-8 
There seems little reason not to suppose on a lexical basis that Qohelet might 
have written this passage. While none of the terms contained therein are unique to 
Qohelet, he nevertheless uses most of them on a régulai’ basis throughout 
Ecclesiastes. However, Blenkinsopp’s arguments concerning the meaning of 3:2-8 
also demand closer examination. Blenkinsopp rightly points out the fact that the 
infinitive in nibb ni; in 3:2 is Qal and therefore has an active sense (i.e., it should be 
best translated “a time to give birth”). Where Qohelet does speak of “being born”, he 
follows standard Hebrew usage with a Niphal form, as in 7:1 nbin DVQ mnrr on  “the
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day of death (is better) than the day of birth.” 13 Blenkinsopp’s translation of 3:2 is 
apparently supported by the LXX’s K aipoc tob reKelv (“a time of birth”),! 4 and 
by the Targum’s pnmbopb pmoi ponoo y n  xbopb m o  jTDi pn  Tno
x n  bv pnxo pnmboob (“A time chosen to bear sons and a time chosen to kill 
rebellious and blaspheming sons, to kill them with stones by order of the judges”). 
This reading is also supported by the Peshitta’s .lArteik (“a time to bear”),
although the Vulgate’s tempus nascendi (“a time to be born”) has attempted to 
harmonize with mob niJ by rendering the phrase in a passive sense.
Since the phiase mbb nv is active and to be tianslated “a time to give birth”, 
this, claims Blenkinsopp, leaves the expression, mob ni) “a time to die”, as the only 
one of 28 human actions or events not under human contiol. The context of the 
passage therefore demands an interpretation of mnb in which human beings choose to 
die. Thus, it may be explained as an exhortation to suicide in line with contemporaiy 
Stoic thought.
It is tme that there seems to have been no prohibition in Jewish law against 
suicide.!5 One could therefore understand (as Blenkinsopp does) niDb nr as refemng 
to the rational, planned suicide of the Stoic sage. Can its opposite, however, giving 
birth, really be said to be an activity under human control? Blenkinsopp’s statement 
that “it...makes sense to speak of deciding to have a child and choosing the best time 
to do it”! 6 essentially understands 3:2 as a text extolling the virtues not only of 
euthanasia, but also of of family planning: yet, children aie never depicted in the
13 Ibid, 56-57. Blenkinsopp follows in a line of commentators including Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 124; 
Podechard, TEcclésiaste, 286-87; Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 58-59; Crenshaw, 
Ecclesiastes, 91, 93; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 28-29.
14 The Arabic version of Ecclesiastes, dependent on the LXX, translates w s ç t  IiJw}Jadatf?i time 
for childbearing”).
15 A. J. Droge & J. D. Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Jews and Christians 
in Antiquity (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1992), 53-84; cf. Droge, “Suicide,” in ABD 6.227-30. 
The idea that mob may refer to suicide is mentioned but rejected by Plumptie {Ecclesiastes, 127).
16 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 60.
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Hebrew Bible as anything other than a b l e s s i n g .  ! 7 On a strictly literal level, 
moreover, the time at which one gives birth once pregnant is something over which 
the individual has no control: ! 8 Qohelet indeed speaks of the “untimely birth” 
(bS3n—6:3) in a passage that vividly illustrates the inability of human beings to find 
happiness by their own efforts.
Whether Stoic or no, it would in fact be rather strange if a Jewish sage claimed 
that human beings had contiol over either birth or death. Not only do these two 
actions encompass the whole of human l i f e , ! 9 they are also the two single actions 
that an ordinary Jew could accept without hesitation to be in the hands of God rather 
than those of humanity.
As an illusti'atioii of this, God is often said in the Hebrew Bible to “give” or 
to “add” a son (Gen 17:16; 29:33; 30:6, 24; 1 Kgs 3:6; 5:7; Isa 9:6), cf. Gen 4:1; Judg 
13:3; 2 Kgs 4:16; Isa 7:14. Moreover, God is said to enable or prevent the bearing of 
children by opening or closing the womb (Gen 20:18; 29:31; 30:22; 1 Sam 1:5), 
indeed the role of God was essential in the creation of new life since he formed it in 
the womb and brought it forth from there (Job 10:18; 31:15; Isa 44:2; 66:8). Qohelet 
himself in Eccl 11:5 compares the “way of the spirit” and the foimation of the foetus 
in the womb to “the works of God who makes everything.” Conversely, Qohelet 
also speaks in Eccl 12:7 of God’s role at the moment of death when “the spirit 
returns to God who gave it.” Human beings are arbiters neither of the time of 
conception, nor or birth: these mysteries are fimily in the control of God.
Likewise, the Qal of niB is often used of death inflicted by God in the 
Hebrew Bible (albeit as a penalty for disobedience or sin): Gen 3:3; 20:3,19; Ex 11:5;
17 J. A. Grassi, “Child, Children,” in. ABD 1.904-5.
18 Tyler {Ecclesiastes, 124) took Hi) to refer to the nine-month period of gestation in human 
beings, indicative o f the general law of Nature rather than o f a determinism which applies to 
individuals.
19 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 93; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
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12:33; 28:35; 30:22; Lev 8:35; 10:2, 6, 7, 9; 16:1, 2, 13; Num 3:4; 4:19, 20; 14:35; 
17:14, 28, 35; 18:3, 32; 26:11, 61; Dent 5:22; 18:16; Josh 10:11; Judg 6:23; 1 Sam 
5:12; 12:19; 25:17, 38, 39; 2 Sam 6:7; 12:13; 1 Kgs 19:4; 2 Kgs 14:6=2 Chr 25:4; 1 
Chi’ 24:2; 2 Chr 13:20; 2 Kgs 19:35=Isa 37:36; Ezek 3:20; 18:4, 20, 21, 28; 33:15. 
The specific expression mo occurs in Gen 2:17; 3:4; 20:7; Num 26:65 Judg 
13:21, 22; 2 Sam 12:14; 14:14; 2 Kgs 1:4, 6, 16; Ezek 3:18; 33:8, 14. Naturally these 
may be argued to be exceptions, examples in which God cuts short life for a specific 
act on the pai’t of the sinner. One might also argue on this basis that God has vei’y 
little to do with determining the time of death under normal circumstances, and 
moreover that none of the texts cited above have veiy much to do with the wisdom 
tradition of which Qohelet was a part. However, the determination of the time of 
one’s death by God is a question expressly considered by the wisdom tradition: for 
whilst those who follow the path of the simple aie promised an early death, those 
who follow the dictates of wisdom are said simultaneously to enjoy “length of days, 
long life and peace” (Prov 3:2) and “favour and good understanding in the sight of the 
Lord” (Prov 3:4). Likewise, personified Wisdom is said to offer “length of days in 
her right hand, and in her left hand riches and honour” (Prov 3:16) and states that 
“whoever finds me finds life” (Prov 8:35). Implicit in Eccl 7:17 is the idea that it is 
God who determines the time (ni)) of one’s death, and God who can change this time 
if he so wills. For the Israelite therefore, there was no theoretical problem in 
accepting a limited foim of determinism, so long as it was emphasised that this 
determinism was God-driven rather than simply an impersonal mational force. The 
appeal of Stoicism for some thinking Jews lay precisely in the fact that it identified 
God (i.e. Zeus) and the deterministic mechanism controlling the universe as one and 
the same.20
20 H. A. Fischel, “Stoicism,” EncJud 15.410.
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The location of these two actions, birth and death, at the head of the list in 
3:2-8 seems therefore rather to be intended as a preparation for what comes after. In 
other words, acceptance that birth and death are in the hands of God paves the way 
for the acceptance of the idea that all other events and actions on earth are likewise in 
the hands of God. This is further underlined by the last pair of opposites, "a time of 
wai’, a time of peace” (3:8) which have also attracted attention from commentators.^ i 
No human action whatsoever is implied here: Qohelet does not claim that there is “a 
time to make wai', a time to make peace.” Again, these are also actions which any 
Jew would have accepted without question to be within God’s power (2 Kgs 24:2; 1 
Chr 5:22; 22:9; Hag 2:9). The predetermined actions and emotions in human life 
which might be more questionable to a Jew are sandwiched between these two 
absolutes. They serve as the sugai’ coating to the bitter pill of determinism.
(c) The Thought of 3:9-15 
What is the relationship between 3:1-8 and the thought of 3:9-15 immediately 
following? Having effectively argued against a deteiministic reading of the former, 
Blenkinsopp suggests that 3:9-15 is intended to reftite the thesis of 3:2-8 that 
everything has its appropriate time, in accordance with which human beings can 
act.22 In many ways, this suggestion owes something to the work of commentators 
such as Tyler and Lohfihk, who have argued that Qohelet makes use of the Stoic 
diatribe.23 The similarity with the work of Whybray, who has suggested that some 
portions of Ecclesiastes contain quotations which Qohelet subsequently refutes, is
21 Jastrow {A Gentle Cynic, 209-10 n. 40) in fact deletes all of 3:3-8. However, Delitzsch sees as 
significant the fact tliat the list of activities ends in “peace” (Ecclesiastes, 259), and Crenshaw 
(Ecclesiastes, 96) suggests that the change in syntax and structure in 3:8 allows the poem to come to 
a forceful conclusion.
22 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 59, 61.
23 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 48; Lohfink, Kohelet, 10.
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even more p r o n o u n c e d .2 4  To this extent, the thought of 3:9-15 will now be 
considered with reference to the preceding section.
rn 3:9-10
Generally speaking, commentators seem to be somewhat puzzled by 
Qohelet’s introductory question in 3:9, “What profit has the worker at that wherein 
he labour’s?” Several suggestions as to the interpretation of this verse in the light of 
3:1-8 have been offered. Murphy argues that the rhetorical question, essentially a 
restatement of 1:3, judges human activity as profitless because it cannot change what 
God has determined. 2 5 This is possible from the immediate context, but why should 
Qohelet advocate that God’s work be changed! Qohelet’s ambitions seem directed 
rather at finding “the work of God/the work which is done under the sun” (3:11; 
8:17). Conversely, Whybray (followed by Blenkinsopp) suggests that activity is 
profitless because human beings are unable to act at the appropi'iate moment which 
God has determined for each work. 26 One could certainly argue that this would make 
human activity profitless for God, but whether it is so for human beings is less clear: 
implicit in Qohelet’s question in 1:3; 3:9 is the idea that there is no profit for 
humanity in any activity. This is despite the fact that some actions (e.g. joy/toil 
[2:26]; love [9:9]) are explicitly stated to be determined by God (and hence would 
occur at the “appropriate time” according to Whybray and Blenkinsopp’s 
understanding of 3:2-8).
Crenshaw’s interpretation is that human activity is profitless because each 
opposite in 3:2-8 cancels the other out: labour thus produces nothing in the long
24 Whybray, Ecclesiastes (OTG; Sheffield; JSOT, 1989) 35-40. This view was also to some extent 
advanced by Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 95-108).
25 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 34.
26 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 72-73; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 61. 
Broadly similar- is the approach o f Plumptre (Ecclesiastes, 131) and Podechard (L Ecclésiaste, 291).
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t e m i .2 7  One could perhaps argue this for humanity as a whole, but not for the 
individual. Thus, Delitzsch’s suggestion seems best to fit the context: Qohelet’s 
claim is that activity is without profit for human beings because everything is 
determined by God as 3:1-8 i m p l i e s .2 8
This viewpoint may be illustrated with the hypothetical case of a slave 
working on the estate of a lar ge landowner. The slave is not an autonomous being in 
his own right, but a tool, an extension of the master’s will. The actions of the slave 
are entirely determined by the will of this master and works not for himself but for 
another. Well might this slave ask himself “what benefit do I get from all my work?” 
Such is the situation in which humanity finds itself in a world where all 
human activity is determined by an inscrutable deity: this interpretation is supported 
moreover in 3:10, in which Qohelet states: “I have seen the toil (p]:)) which God has 
given to humanity to be occupied with.” The overall pii) in life in 3:10 is reflected by 
the times and seasons determined by God for every human action, thought and 
emotion in 3:1-8—but Qohelet has not merely seen this divinely determined toil, he 
has shown it to the reader.
fin 3:11
The exegesis of 3:11 has already been discussed in some depth in Chapter 2 
of this thesis. The theme of deteiminism evident in 3:1-8 and continued in 3:9-10 
supports the reading given therein, that the phrase “he (i.e. God) has made 
everything beautiful in its time” refers to the irresistible nature of the times 
determined by God. To put it another way: human beings have no choice or control 
over the actions which they perform: they are simply drawn to act when and how
27 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 96.
28 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 259. Followed to some extent by Barton (Ecclesiastes, 101).
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God wills.29
Muiphy, following Podechard, is most likely correct in his assessment of the 
phrase, “God has put in their (i.e. humanity’s) minds” as refemng to God’s 
placing of an eternity o f times in human minds. 3 o This too ties the verse in with the 
deterministic context of 3:1-8, for nbun is the whole of which each individual ru) is a 
part: thus Qohelet envisions God programming humanity with all the actions which 
they will perform in their lives. Since it is this Dbi) controls human action, the action 
of placing it in the human mind thereby ensui es that “humankind may not find out 
the work of God from beginning to end.”
It is perhaps significant that Blenkinsopp gives little consideration of this 
verse, which, after all, is crucial in the interpretation of the preceding catalogue of 
seasons. Apparently, he understands the expression ini)3 ns" in the sense 
“appropriate to its time”: that is, while God makes eveiything happen, the proper 
fulfilment of the activities listed in 3:2-8 (and presumably the success of the overall 
divine plan for the world) are dependent solely on humanity’s ability to determine 
these times and to act in accordance with them. Yet no clear explanation is given for 
3:11b which ought to provide fuither evidence for this view: human beings, according 
to Blenkinsopp, lack the knowledge to align their actions with the divine activity 
(understanding obrn as “ignorance”?).31 Yet what of God’s role and its implications? 
If the divine plan requires human beings to act in accordance with the “times” which 
he has set, why does he deprive human beings of the necessary knowledge to do so 
(for it is God who places in human minds)? Another difficulty with this view is 
that Qohelet cleaiiy uses the phrase Dbi)b in 3:14 in the sense of “eternal”, 
potentially undeiinining Blenkinsopp’s understanding of the meaning of this term in
29 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 193.
30 Mmphy, Ecclesiastes, 34; Podechard, L ’Ecclésiaste, 295.
31 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 59, 61.
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3:11.
mi) 3:12-13
A full discussion of the implications of Qohelet’s recommendation to joy 
may be found in Chapter 7 of this thesis. For now, however, it is worth giving 
consideration to these verses in the light of Qohelet’s advocacy of a deterministic 
God. Firstly, Qohelet’s comment in 3:12, “I know that there is no good for them 
(db) except to rejoice and to fare well in life”, may require emendation, and indeed 
some commentators follow BHS and emend D3 to mxn (translating: “I know that 
there is no good for humankind but to rejoice...”) in order to provide an antecedent 
for the pronominal suffix on vtt.32 With this position I, tentatively, concui*. Qohelet 
appears to comment that the only good actions (which I take to mean the only 
activities over which human beings have some foim of control) among the “all” of 3:1 
which God determines are “to rejoice” (mQ^b) and similarly, “to fai’e well” (mto 
ni^rb) (note the infinitives, which pick up on and extend the range of those of 3:2-8). 
Unfortunately, the ability to do even this much is detennined by God, for it is 
termed by Qohelet in 3:13 “the gift of God” (D'-nbx nno) that one may “eat and drink 
and experience good in all one’s labour ('ibDi)).”33 Again, the term ibQi) picks up on 
the participial form bûP in Qohelet’s rhetorical question in 3:9. There is no clear 
profit (pin") in labour, but there is some good (db).34 This, however, is entirely 
subject the the goodwill of the deity.
fiv) 3:14-15
32 Among those who emend aie Podechard ( i  'Ecclésiaste, 296-97); Zimmerli (Der Prediger, 163), 
Fox (Qohelet and his Contradictions, 194). Others explain by referring the plural suffix back to 01X2 
in the precedmg verse (Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 30; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 74).
33 Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 65; Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 89-90.
34 Wliybray (Ecclesiastes, 74) lays particular emphasis on the threefold repetition of the term Oiû in 
3:12-13.
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The conclusions which Qohelet draws from the fact of determinism in 3:12- 
13 (that the only good activities are to eat, drink and enjoy life, but that even this 
much is dependent on the deity) are heralded by Ms use of the phrase "D "ni)T (“I 
know that”). In 3:14, Qohelet makes another point introduced by this phiase: “I 
know that all which God does is eternal: there is no adding to it, nor is there any 
taking away from it.” Murphy notes the unusual nature of Qohelet’s comment on 
the immutability of the divine deed as opposed to the divine word h e r e ,3 5 but 
Qohelet does not mean that the results of God’s actions lasts forever. Nor does nbDb 
mean that God’s actions cannot be changed by human beings (though Qohelet would 
certainly agree that God’s actions aie u n c h a n g e a b l e ) .36  The text states that human 
beings cannot add to or take away from what God does. In the context of 
determinism this would mean that human beings cannot add to God’s work by acting 
under their own initiative, nor subtract from it by refusing to perform the actions 
which God has allotted them. By making all human activity dependent on himself, 
God ensures respect from humanity (V3abQ 1XT0).37
TMs deterministic reading of 3:14 is in fact supported by Blenkinsopp, 
although it is not necessary to posit the idea of written “tablets of destiny” for 
individuals to make sense of Qohelet’s words therein. 3 8 Yet if one cannot add to or 
take away from God’s work, what are we to make of the all-embracing advocacy of 
human free will which underlies Qohelet’s supposed quotation of 3:2-8? His reading 
of 3:11 underlines the ability of human beings to make the divine plan go awiy (albeit 
unintentionally), since they are unable thi’ough lack of knowledge to fulfil their part
35 Mmphy, Ecclesiastes, 35.
36 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 263; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 99.
37 This understanding is not far removed from that of Glasser (JLe procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 
65) who suggests the meaning “définitif’ for Dbî)‘7. Shnilar is Fox (Qohelet and His Contradictions, 
195), who says that Qohelet means to express the idea that “it is always the case that what happens is 
only what God has made happen.”
38 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Inteipretation,” 62.
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in the divine plan: how then can God’s work be “eternal” (or indeed, find any 
expression whatsoever)?
The idea that Qohelet offers a deterministic commentary on the text of 3:2-8 
finds further support in the next verse: “What is has already been, and what is to be 
already is. God seeks out the pursued.” Human beings are unable to change the 
course of events in the world by their own initiative: all is controlled by God. 
Whatever the meaning of the difficult phrase pjil] nx dp no □"nbxm (and most 
commentators take it as illustrative of God’s control over histoiy as a whole), the 
section 3:14-15 would appear to reiterate the deterministic theme which is evident in 
the catalogue of times and seasons and the commentary which Qohelet offers on it. 3 9
(v) Concluding Remarks on 3:9-15 
Thus far, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that 3:1-15 can be read as a 
unity, with determinism the central linking theme between the two subsections 3:1-8 
and 3:9-15, of which it is composed. Yet the fact that 3:1-15 can be read in this way 
does not necessarily mean that it should be read thus, or that Qohelet’s intent was 
that it should be read thus.
As we have seen, Blenkinsopp’s reading of 3:1-15 creates as many problems 
as it seeks to solve. The simplest solution, that 3:1-8 reflects a deterministic 
worldview severely limiting human free will, and that Qohelet offers a positive 
commentary upon this in 3:9-15, offers a logical development of thought in the 
passage. As shall be demonstrated presently, moreover, considerations arising from 
an examination of the wider context of Qohelet’s thought in Ecclesiastes also 
supports this interpretation and contradicts that of Blenkinsopp.
39 e.g. McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 63; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 102-3; Gordis, Koheleth: 
The Man and His World, 233-34. Cf. Salters (“A Note on the Exegesis of Ecclesiastes 3 15b,” ZAW  
88 [1976] 419-20) for the history of interpretation of this difficult passage.
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III. The Wider Context 
Blenkinsopp’s understanding of Eccl 3:1-15 does not rest entirely on internal 
evidence from the passage itself, but also on the wider context of Qohelet’s thought. 
This section will therefore consider whether this extra evidence truly supports the 
thesis that Qohelet engages in a dialogue in 3:1-15 about human attempts “to live 
according to nature”, or whether it supports the thesis that 3:1-8 is expressive of 
God’s imposition of his “times” on humanity.
ta) Time and Judgement 13:17: 8:5-6)
Blenkinsopp in fact argues that the whole of 3:9-22 serves as Qohelet’s 
commentary on the catalogue of times and seasons but restricts his article to an 
examination of the passage 3:9-15.40 This response has been similar restiicted so far, 
but it is at this point that Qohelet’s connection between “time” (ru;) and judgement 
(VtDBî») (3:17; 8:5-6) will come into consideration. Blenkinsopp briefly considers 
both passages in which the phrase occurs: on 3:17, he remarks “the allusion in 3:17 
to the time appointed for every matter and work, in this case the punishment of the 
wicked, suggests that vv. 16-22 are also part of the commentary on the poem.”4i
There is good reason for Blenkinsopp’s claim here. The text of 3:17 states: 
DO ntüUD bD bi)i ysn bob ni) "d □"nbxn dso" jjonn nxi nx "DbD ]x "max (“I said 
to myself, ‘God will judge the righteous and the wicked, for there is a time for eveiy 
business and for every work there.’” O f particular interest are two aspects of this 
passage.
Firstly, the phrase DO nOt?a ba bn ysn bob dd in 3:17 clearly echoes the 
comment D"Don nnn fan bob nn  ]dî bob which Qohelet made earlier in 3:1 (accepted
40 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 57.
41 Ibid. By way of contrast, Crenshaw (“The Eternal Gospel,” 25), sees the unit as endmg in 3:15 
and thus understands 3:16-4:3 as a separate unit.
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by Blenkinsopp as a title outlining Qohelet’s understanding of the times and seasons 
in 3 :2 -8) 42 Secondly, the fact that “there is an (appointed) time for every business” 
is given as a reason for Qohelet’s statement that God will judge the righteous and the 
wicked.
This creates a serious problem for Blenkinsopp’s reading of 3:2-8 (and 
indeed, that of any commentator who understands the passage as an expression of 
the Wisdom belief in an “ideal” time for human action). For if it is God who acts at 
the “appointed time” in 3:17, surely it is also God whose action (through human 
beings) is being catalogued in 3:1-8.43 Moreover, it is “the work of God” which is 
the putative subject of human investigation in 3:11.
Blenkinsopp also considers briefly Eccl 8:5-6 in this context: here Qohelet 
links the two concepts of “time” and “judgement” more overtly. Blenkinsopp adopts 
the position that in 8:5, the phiase nan nb nsKjai ru) (“the heart of the wise man 
knows time and judgement”) refers to the ability of the wise man to tailor his actions 
to act at the appropriate time. In a courtly context, such as we find in 8:2-6, this may 
appear a not umeasonable understanding. 44 However, Blenkinsopp has suggested in 
3:9-15 that human beings are unable to act in accordance with “time.”45 Thus, one 
must argue that the wise mind in 8:5 is an exception to the general rule, or that 
simply another of those contradictions which some commentators see in Qohelet’s 
work.
However, in Chapter 2 ,1 have argued that Qohelet introduces this section in 
8:2 with a reference to the special status of the king with respect to God: Qohelet 
adjures loyalty to the king on the basis of “the oath of God” (which I take to be the
42 Ibid., 60.
43 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 36.
44 Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 289) translates “the proper time and manner of 
procedure.”
45 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 59.
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oath the God has sworn conceniing kingship). 4 6 This passage, and the relationship 
between king and God, will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
However, if one understands the king as God’s subordinate, as 8:2 would appear to 
suggest, then one can explain the statement: “the heart of the wise man knows time 
and judgement” as a recognition of the fact that the king is placed there by God and 
that to obey the king’s will is ultimately to obey that of God. Thus, the wise mind 
recognises “time” and God’s will behind it when it occurs, rather than being able to 
recognise the “time” to act appropriately. 47 This reading has the added advantage 
that it harmonizes with the context of 3:1-15, if one also understands this 
deterministically.
In the same context, it is significant that Qohelet again echoes the thought of 
3:1 in his statement in 8:6: vbi) nm Dixn n^n "a m m )  nr 25" ysn bab "d (“Because 
to every matter there is time and judgement, the misery of humankind is great”). A 
variation of the same formula, as we have seen, is found in 3:17: “God shall judge the 
righteous and the wicked because there is a time for every matter (f sn bab nr) and 
concerning every work there.”48 In that passage, it referred to God’s action at the 
“appointed time.” Here too, it must mean the same, for in 8:7 additional reasons are 
given for humankind’s sorry situation: “for he does not know what will happen, for 
who can tell him when it will happen?”
If “time” refers to an ideal moment for action (which human beings are unable 
to acheive), then 8:6 would mean “human beings aie wretched because they are 
unable to act at the correct time.” There is, however, no causal connection between
46 Hertzberg, Z)er Prediger, Ecclesiastes, 101.
47 Hertzberg (Ib id , 144), Ginsberg (Qohelet, 106) and Fox (Qohelet and His Contradictions, 247) 
following the LXX, all understand aacDi nr as a hendiadys equivalent to £D22jQ nr “tiine of 
judgement” although “judgement” is understood by Fox in the traditional sense of God judging the 
human evil which the despotic ruler of 8:2-5 is said to represent.
48 Lauha, Kohelet, 149-50; Fox, Ibid.
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this reading and the fact that human beings are ignorant of the future. Though human 
beings may fail to act at the correct time, they retain some control over their own 
destiny. Only by understanding “time” as referring to divinely imposed action (i.e. 
determinism) can one retain the causal link between 8:6 and 8:7 (i.e. human beings are 
wretched because all their actions are controlled by the deity [8:6]; as a result they 
have no control over their own future, nor do they even know what will happen to
them).49
Thus, from both 3:17 and 8:5-6, two things may be inferred: (i) that Qohelet 
agrees with his statement in 3:1 outlining the theme of 3:2-8 (contrary to what one 
would expect if he were arguing against it) and (ii), that nv is, or can be, linked with 
God’s judgement. Thus, evidence not only from the immediate context of 3:1-15, but 
also from the wider context in Ecclesiastes refutes Blenkinsopp’s thesis that Qohelet 
is engaged in a dialogue in this text.
(b) Concluding Remarks: The Question of Free Will
The problem with understanding Ecclesiastes as a deterministic text is that 
Qohelet presupposes a certain amount of free will in life. 50 As I suggested earlier in 
this chapter, it is most likely this fact that underlies non-deterministic readings of 
3:2-8. However, even commentators such as Blenkinsopp and Whybray understand 
Qohelet as advocating in Ecclesiastes a mixure of necessity and free will; it is simply 
that this necessity is understood to be limited. Occurrences in life are “predisposed” 
rather than “preordained.” What if  it is free will rather than necessity which is 
restricted? Does Qohelet have any kind of system which explains how human free 
will can exist and what aie the things over which humanity has control? If it can be
49 Murphy (Ecclesiastes, 84) avoids the problem but translating ’D in 8:6 adversatively and 
understanding 8:6b-7 as an attack on the “traditional” wisdom of 8:5-6a.
50 Podechard, L 'Ecclésiaste, 192.
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shown that Qohelet does indeed have a rational system of free will which fits in with 
the deterministic world view in Ecclesiastes, this will do much to relieve the tensions 
which exist in our current understanding of Qohelet’s work.
This problem will in fact be considered in Chapter 5 of this thesis. For now, 
however, the evidence so far adduced in this thesis would appear to support the idea 
that Qohelet views events in life as largely determined by God, and that though there 
may be some instances in which human beings have a degree of control over their 
destinies, these are seemingly limited. There is after all, “a time for eveiything; an 
appointed time for every purpose under heaven.”
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Chapter 4 
the Work of God
I. Introduction 
a. Modem Commentators 
In Eccl 8:17a, most commentators understand the particle "D as initiating an 
object clause (GKC §157b, 117h), and English-speaking scholars accordingly 
translate the Hebrew:
ntoDDH nx XBob m xn bar xb "d o^nbxn ntypQ ba nx "n^ xn
dadn nnn n^x 
“Then I saw all the work of God: that no-one can find out the work
which is done under the sun.”!
The same approach can be seen in the work of French commentators such as 
Podechard and Glasser, who translate "D with que, although Podechard’s translation, 
alors, j ’ai reconnu (au sujet de) toute l ’oeuvre de Dieu, que l ’homme ne peut 
découvrir l ’oeuvre qui se fait sous le soleil, implies a recognition that the human 
inability to discover wisdom is just one aspect of “the work of God.”2 Banicq also 
sees a problem with this usage, and omits an equivalent for "a from his translation of 
the passage: alors j ’ai considéré l ’oeuvre de Dieu. L ’homme ne peut saisir l ’oeuvre 
qui s ’accomplit sous le soleil, rightly going on to remark about Qohelet’s 
consideration of “the work of God” in this passage, il ne dit pas ce qu ’est cette action, 
en quoi elle consiste.'^
Gernian commentators take their cue from Luther who tianslates, Und ich
1 Fox (Qohelet and His Contradictions, 253-5), following F. Ellemieier (Qohelet [Herzberg: Erwin 
Jungfer, 1967] 295-300), appears to be alone among English-speaking authors, translating “that is.”
2 Podechard, L ‘Ecclésiaste, 406; Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 136 n. c.
^'Qqx\ic(\, Ecclésiaste, 153, 156.
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sah alle Werke Gottes, dafi ein Mensch das Werk nicht finden kann, das unter der 
Sonne geschieht. The translation of "a by dafi is evident, for example, in the work of 
Strobel,4 although Ellermeier’s special epexegetical rendering of the subordinate 
clause in 8:17a is demonstrated in his translation of "a by nûmlîch.^ Lohfink’s 
translation, ...da sah ich ein, dafi der Mensch..das Tun Gottes in seiner Ganzheit 
nicht wiederfinden kann, das Tun, das unter der Sonne getan wurde also translates "D 
with dafi but removes das Tun Gottes (D'nbxn ntoua) from the main clause to the 
subordinate clause, equating it with das Tun, das unter der Sonne getan wurde 
(2?D2?n aox nton).6
With few exceptions therefore, the translations of modem commentators 
suggest that Qohelet’s meaning in Eccl 8:17a is that “all the work of God” is entirely 
taken up with preventing human beings from discovering wisdom. If such were 
Qohelet’s thought, then he expresses it rather clumsily: nevertheless, those few 
commentators such as Barucq and Lohfink, who see contextual problems with this 
idea are forced into a position in which they must rearrange the passage, or leave the 
crucial word "D untranslated.
(b) The Versions
Although the translation of "D as “that” in this passage is supported by the 
LXX’s ÔtL, the Peshitta’s .t “because” implies that the Syriac translator
understood the paiticle "a causally (GKC §148b). This is tme also of the Targum, 
which adds extra material to the Hebrew of 8:17 in order to clarify the meaning of the 
verse:
2)]xb 12)1 n"b n"bi xin xb"ni onx xmina laix ba n" x:x rr-ïm
4 A. Strobel, Das Buck Prediger (Kohelet) (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1967) 134.
5 Ellenneier, Qohelet, 299.
6 Lohfink, Kohelet, 63.
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X0 DD mnn ]nn ■’n  xm n 3 ln^v n*’ xnsüxy
“I saw eveiy mighty work of the Lord for it is awesome, and a human 
being is not permitted to find out the mighty work of the Lord which 
is done in this world under the sun.”
Part of the reason for the causal rendering of "D by Dnx is contextual, for the 
translation of the Targumist demonstiates that he equates “the work of God” with 
“the work which is done under the sun.”
The Vulgate’s, et intellexi quod omnium operum Dei nullam possit homo 
invenire rationem eorum quae fiunt sub sole (“And this I understood of all the works 
of God: that a human being can find no reckoning of those things which are done 
under the sun”) is suggestive of a similar contextual problem which this translator 
had in equating “all the work of God” with the prevention of human beings from 
attaining knowledge. Rather, the prohibition is portrayed as a single aspect of God’s 
work. Although c  is not concretely represented, being rather implicit in the relative 
pronoun quod (i.e. “this I understood...[that]”), it seems clear that the translator of 
the Vulgate attempted to balance contextual considerations with his desire to follow 
the LXX in understanding ’D as the beginning of an object clause.
Of the versions, only the LXX both retains something approaching the 
original stiucture of the Hebrew and inteiprets "3 as the beginning of an object clause: 
most likely, this has more to do with the Aquilan character of the LXX translation of 
Ecclesiastes than with hermeneutical accuiacy. The translators of the Vulgate, 
Peshitta and Targum appear to be, to a greater or lesser extent, baffled by the 
structure and sense of the Hebrew o f this passage. At the very least, a contextual 
problem is implied by the approaches of the Vulgate and Targum, and the causal 
renderings of'D by the Peshitta and Targum (the Semitic versions) may be suggestive
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of a grammatical problem with the modem understanding of 'D as introducing an 
object clause.
II. Contextual Evidence 
In Eccl 1:14, Qohelet makes the surprising claim, “I have seen (nxi) all the 
works which are done under the sun, and behold, all is absuidity and shepherding the 
wind.” At first sight, this appears to contradict his statement in 8:17 that “Nobody 
can find out (XiSQ) the work which is done under the sun.”7 That Qohelet’s original 
statement is not simply a vain boast which he revises in the light of his investigations 
is suggested by his comment in 8:9, in which he states, “All have I seen (nxn), and 
applied my mind to every work which is done under the sun.”
Qohelet thus appears to make a fundamental distinction between “seeing” 
and “finding” the events which go to make up existence: Qohelet first observes 
events, and then applies his mind to interpret, or “find out” their meaning, thereby 
hoping to gain an insight into the workings of the world. This distinction is 
underlined if 1:13, “I applied my mind to seek and to search out by wisdom, 
concerning all which is done under heaven” is compared with the statement,”I have 
seen all the work which is done under the sun,” in 1:14, which underlines his 
qualifications for the investigation which he proposes.
The language of seeking and finding is largely restricted to a few passages in 
which Qohelet alludes to the intent of his search (cf. esp. 1:13; 3:11; 7:23-29; 8:17). 
The verb (dm occurs only in 1:13, but mn occurs in 1:13; 7:25. More common terms 
aretdpn (3:6, 15; 7:25, 28, 29; 8:17; 12:10) andxiSD (3:11; 7:14, 24,26, 27 [twice], 28 
[thrice], 29; 8:17 [thrice]; 9:10, 15; 11:1; 12:10). From the contexts in which these 
terms appear, it seems that very often they have to do with the acquisition of
7 Whybray (Ecclesiastes^ 49) suggests Üiat “all the works which are done under the sun” in 1:14 may 
simply refer to the actions which Qohelet perfonns in the course of his investigation. This is a 
mhiority view, however.
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knowledge, particularly when the object of the verb is the term ]i3(dn (“the sum of 
things”—7:25, 27, 29) or formulaic phrases involving the term n&üo (“work”), such 
as cnbxn nüüo “the work of God” (3:11) or M n  nnn r\mi mx n t o  “the work 
which is done under the sun” (8:17). This link between these verbs and the 
acquisition of knowledge is reflected in Whybray’s understanding of the verb xiiQ as 
having the meaning “find out”, Crenshaw’s translation “fathom”, or that of Gordis, 
“discover.”®
This connection is also evident in the parallel usage of the verbs tdpn/mn and 
i?!'’ in 7:25 and îdpn/x^û and in 8:17. Qohelet plays on this theme in 9:10: 
“Whatever your hand finds to do, do mightily; for there is no work, nor device, nor 
knowledge (ri3"i), nor wisdom in Sheol where you are going.” Likewise, Qohelet’s 
statement in 3:11, “also (God) has put eternity in their minds so that no-one finds 
out the work which God does from beginning to end” is followed by a positive 
statement of what knowledge is available to Qohelet despite his failure to “find out” 
the work of God: “I know (i?t ) that there is nothing better than to rejoice and to fare 
well during life” (3:12).
Thus, Qohelet is able to “see” all the events which go to make up existence 
(1:14; 8:9), but though he may apply his mind to their interpretation (1:13; 8:9), he 
confesses “nobody can find out the work which is done under the sun...even if a wise 
man claims to know it, he is not able to find it” (8:17).
Gordis, Fox and Murphy point out that for Qohelet, “the work of God” 
(D’nbxn n(yi^ D/D’nbxn ntyr; nm n&wa—3:11; 7:13; 8:17; 11:5) is identical with “the 
work(s) which is/ar*e done under the sun” (D’tüPû/nto];]{:j ntoi;Bn/nÊ;3] ndx m  n&ro
nnn — 1:14; 2:17; 4:3; 8:17).9 As we have seen, this too was the
8 Whybray, Ibid., 74; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 91, 153; Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 
156, 186.
9 Gordis, Ibid., 298-9; Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 175; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 13.
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conclusion of the Taigumist. Qohelet views “all the work of God” (8:17) and can 
order the reader to do likewise (7:13), but this work cannot be “found out” 
(Xîiû—3:11) or “known” (m""— 11:5). Likewise, Qohelet and others can “see the 
work which is done under the sun” (1:14; 2:17; 4:3), but it cannot be “found out”, i.e. 
interpreted to give a meaningful pattern to existence (8:17).
If this is the case, the translations of 8:17a offered by these commentators,
n&won nx xiiJDb cnxn b3v xb *’3 D'nbxn n&WB b3 nx "n^ xm 
down nnn n&33 ntdx
“then I saw all the work of God, that no-one can find out the work which is 
done under the sun”, must be erroneous. Although God eveidently restrains human 
beings from discovering the “works which aie done under the sun” in 8:17, the act of 
prevention itself is not “all the work of God”: rather, this phiase refers to the 
multitude of individual actions which go to make up existence.
III. Grammatical Evidence
There aie, in addition, sound grammatical reasons for rejecting the notion that 
o  in 8:17a is used epexegetically, or that it inti'oduces an objective clause. While it is 
true that an objective clause governed by a transitive verb such as nxn may be 
introduced by the particle "3 (GKC §157b), in such cases the subordinate clause is 
the sole object of the verb, e.g. Gen 6:5, cnxn nun ran a  mn" xnn “and the Lord 
saw that the wickedness o f humankind was greatT Sometimes a second object is 
expressed by such a clause (GKC §117h): the essential feature of these constructions 
is that the object of the main clause becomes the subject of the subordinate clause.
In order to illustrate this pattern, the examples of this phenomenon cited in 
GKC §117h are given below, with the object of the main clause underlined and the 
subject of the subordinate clause italicised. Thus, Gen 1:4, 313 a  mxn nx cnbx xnn
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“and God saw the light, that it was good” or Exod 32:22, K'n um 3  Dun nuT nnx 
“You know the people. that they aie set on evil.” Examples of the same phenomenon 
with the verb UT are cited for 2 Sam 3:25; 17:8; 1 Kgs 5:17. Examples involving the 
verb nxn are cited for Gen 6:2; 12:14; 13:10; 49:15; Exod 2:2; Ps 25:19; Prov 23:31; 
Job 22:12; Eccl 2:24; 8:17.io
This pattern is followed without fail in all of the examples cited, except in 
Eccl 8:17:
ntyuBH nx xiKob cnxn bcr xb a  cabxn ntouo be nx 'n'xm 
îOB^ n nnn ntoui n(ux
“Then I saw all the work of God, that humankind cannot find 
out the work which is done under the sun.”
If a  were to mean “that”, initiating an objective clause, we should expect the 
subject of the clause to be cnbxn nSouB, WB0n nnn n&U] nîUx n&uon, or more likely 
xin, referring to cnbxn n&UB bo nx in the main clause. Instead, the subject is cnxn.
Another possibility has been proposed by Fox, building on the detailed 
treatment of the syntax of this verse by Ellenneier. 11 In this argument, a  is a special 
usage, introducing an epexegesis by Qohelet of the expression cnbxn n&UB. As 
support for this hypothesis, Fox cites as a direct parallel a use of the term a  in Jon 
3:10, nunn connn a  on'tuuB nx cnbxn xnn “God saw their works, that they 
repented of their evil way.” To suggest that this is simple epexegesis, however, may 
be a false argument, since we have seen that constructions involving a  appear to be 
subject to rigid mles. Again, in order to illustrate how a  is used in this passage, (part 
of) the object of the main clause is underlined and the subject of the main clause
10 Gordis {Ibid., 298) specifically cites Gen 1:4 as a usage o f ’3 paiallel to that in Eccl 8:17a.
11 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 255; Ellermeier, Qohelet, 295-300.
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italicised “God saw the works-of-them. that they had repented of their evil way.” On 
the analogy of this example, we should expect Eccl 8:17a to say something along the 
lines of “Then I saw all the work of God, that he,.T
Although the usage of a  in Jon 3:10 is unique, it is not entirely dissimilar to 
occuitences introducing an objective clause: e.g.:
nn  H33 a  cnxn mn nx o’nbxn nn ixm
“And the sons of God saw the daughters-of-men, that
they were fair” (Gen 6:2).
Here it is the nomen regens of a genitive construction which becomes the 
subject of the subordinate clause. In Jon 3:10, it is what would be the nomen rectum 
in an equivalent construction.
The probable reason for this strange use of a  in Jon 3:10 is that it seems to 
seiwe as a substitute for the relative pronoun 10X, since the thought of this verse 
would more normally be expressed in Hebrew:
nunn DDmo n o  on nox mrj du '&UD nx oabxn xnn 
“And God saw the works of the people of Nineveh, who had 
repented of their evil way.”
Since the putative rmn DU ’toun is condensed to Drr'bUB, the relative pronoun
ntux cannot be used since it would then refer to the actions which had been
performed, rather than to their doers. The use of a  here resolves that problem with a 
simple circumlocution. nsUx and a  frequently have the same sense in object clauses 
(GKC §157a).
If we compare Eccl 8:17a, XBob cnxn bur xb a  oabxn n&UD be nx "n^xm,
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it is clear that Dixn as the subject of what is thought to be the subordinate clause 
bears no relation to the object of the main clause, conti'aiy to every other usage o f ’D 
in this sense in the Hebrew Bible. One is forced to conclude therefore that a  should 
be translated in a different way.
The grammatical and contextual difficulties involved in understanding a  as 
initiating an object clause in 8:17a underly the loose translation of this verse by the 
Vulgate and the causative renderings (“because”) of a  by the Peshitta and Targum. It 
is, however, difficult to see how a causative rendering can help to clarify the meaning 
of the verse as we have it in Hebrew. Nor can a  in Eccl 8:17a be rendered 
adversatively by translating as “but”, since c  can be used in this sense only after a 
negative clause (GKC §163). The best solution is therefore to understand the particle 
affirmatively (GKC §159ee). Such an inteipretation is in keeping with Qohelet’s own 
usage, since most commentators understand a  as used in this manner by Qohelet in 
one or all of 4:16; 7:7,20.12 Thus, Eccl 8:16-17 should be translated:
When I applied my mind to know wisdom, and to see tlie business which is done 
upon the earth (my eyes seeing sleep neither by day nor by night), then I saw all 
the work of God. Surely no-one can find out the work which is done under the sun: 
for though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it. Moreover, though a 
sage claim to know it, yet he shall not be able to find it.
The affiimative a  in 8:17a serves to underline Qohelet’s findings about the
unattainability of wisdom previously made in 7:23-25. Thus it is entirely consonant
with the emphatic tone of 8:17 as a whole. Introducing the results of Qohelet’s
observation, it paves the way for his veiy definite conclusions about humanity’s 
inability to discover true knowledge, further emphasised by the appear ance of such
12 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 112, 132, 140; Fox, Ibid., 209; Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His 
World, 162; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 41.
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phrases as ntüx bm  “for though”, DX o: “moreover”, the double use of the noun cnxn 
and the phrase bDT xb, and the threefold repetition of the verb xkd which occurs in 
this verse.
IV. Implications for Determinism
This chapter has now considered the question of whether “the work of God” 
can be said to be coextensive with “the work which is done under the sun” in 
Ecclesiastes as Gordis, Fox and Murphy have suggested. 13 The contextual evidence 
adduced in this chapter certainly bears out such an assertion. A problem with this 
view has been the traditional translation of 8:17a, “Then I saw all the work of God, 
that no-one can find out the work which is done under the sun” which appears to 
differentiate between the two concepts. This tension has now been to some extent 
resolved by demonstrating the difficulties (not least grammatical) associated with 
understanding 8:17 in this way: these difficulties are also reflected in the evidence of 
the versions which provide no real consensus as to an appropriate translation for the 
verse.
The case for understanding “the work of God” and “the work which is done 
under the sun” as essentially one has been strengthened, but some questions remain 
unanswered: what implications does this identification have for understanding 
Qohelet’s overall theory of determinism? Why does Qohelet use two different 
phr ases to express the same idea?
The difference between the two concepts is simply one of emphasis: “the 
work which is done under the sun” refers to human action and thought (cf. 4:1, 3). 
The par allel phrase “the work of God” refers to divine activity. Yet, because Qohelet 
is a determinist, human action and thought is controlled by the deity. Any real
13 See n. 9 above.
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distinction between human and divine actions therefore disappears. This, then, 
explains why Qohelet uses the same language when speaking of both, makes both the 
goal of his search, and thereby identifies both as one and the same thing.
Qohelet’s conclusion regarding the search for “the work of God/the work 
which is done under the sun” is that a successful outcome is impossible. By contrast, 
Qohelet advises humanity that they should “find pleasure in their own works” 
(T0UB3 cnxn ncD'—3:22). Though God may act to prevent human beings from 
finding out “the work of God”, Qohelet bases his advice to find pleasure on the fact 
that “God has already approved j/ow works” {ymQ  nx Dabxn ni^ n “QD—9:7). This 
same emphasis on concerning oneself with one’s own actions (as opposed to those 
of God or the rest of humanity) is also implicit in the tone of the Royal Experiment:
I  made great my works (’OUD Tibian).../ made myself gardens and orchards (’b 
’n’tou),../ made myself pools of water (’b TTÈ?!)).../ got myself male and female 
singers ( ’b ’n’(DU)...then I looked on all the works which my hands had done (b33 
’T ’toaD) and on the labour which I  had laboured to do (mtCiJb bDUni),
and behold all was vanity... (2:4-11)
The impossibility of human attempts to break free of divine control is only 
underlined by Qohelet’s remark that “I know that whatever God does will be eternal: 
nothing can be added to it nor anything taken from it , . f  (px iDBBi px rbu
Ui3b—3:14). The divine plan cannot be altered by human actions. 14 More 
importantly, because “the work of God” is expressed in human actions, this verse 
suggests that human beings are unable to “add to” the work of God by acting on their 
own initiative, nor can they “take away from” God’s work by failing to perform the 
actions which he has determined for them.
14 Miu'phy {Ecclesiastes, 35) notes the unusual nature of Qohelet’s reference to the divine deed rather 
than the divine word.
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The equivalence of “the work of God” with “the work which is done under 
the sun” is of great importance in understanding the nature of Qohelet’s deterministic 
worldview. In this context, Qohelet’s use of Vntuu refenmg to the actions of 
individuals is also significant, for Qohelet’s conclusion is that since one cannot 
understand “the work of God” or break free from its power, one should allow oneself 
to find pleasure in “one’s own works” (3:22). This indeed is the essence of Qohelet’s 
message.
Qohelet and the Problem o f Free Will 121
Chapter 5 
Qohelet and the Problem of Free Will
I. Introduction
In a recent stiidy of the language of the book of Ecclesiastes, Seow has linked 
Qohelet’s usage of Vob# with those of Aramaic legal documents dating from the 
Persian period. i It is clear* from biblical and extrabiblical texts of this time that the 
root can have a “technical” legal/economic nuance, usually refeiTing to the legal rights 
which an individual may be gr anted to impose taxes, dispose of goods or slaves, or to 
perform certain actions specified in the document concerned. 2 Moreover, Qohelet 
does indeed appear to use Vübü in this sense, particularly in 2:19; 5:18 (Eng. 19); 
6:2, and perhaps 7:19.3
Several commentators have in the past argued that Ecclesiastes is a 
composition dating from the fourth century, pointing out its lack of Grecisms or of 
concrete evidence to connect the thought of Qohelet with that of the main Greek 
philosophies of the third century B.C.E..4 However, Seow’s suggestion that
1 Seow, “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” 653-4. Seow follows D. S. Margolioutli 
(“Ecclesiastes” in Jewish Encyclopaedia [New York/London: Funk & Wagnalls, 1901-7] 5.32-33) in 
ascribhig a fourth centmy date to Ecclesiastes on this basis, making use of an extensive study of the
technical sense of Vtûbü by D. M. Gropp (“The Origin and Development of the Aiamaic S a lIT t  
clause,’ 52 [1993] 34).
2 Three apparent technical usages of Vtûbü occur in biblical texts from the Persian period (Ezra 4:20; 
7:24; Neh 5:15). An extensive list of the extrabiblical literatuie is to be found in Gropp S a l  l i t  
Clause,” 34 mi. 28, 29) with additional citations by Seow (“Linguistic Evidence,” 653 nn. 57, 59),
3 Whereas Seow (Ibid., 653) takes D’ts'bD in Eccl 7:19 in the economic sense of “proprietor” (i.e. 
landowner), Crenshaw (Ecclesiastes, 142) understands it in a political sense and translates 
“administrative officials.” Crenshaw to some extent in his political rendering follows Lohfink 
Q MeJek, sa/IitrxnA mÔSë/ki€\ Kohelet und die Aufassungzeit des Buchs,” Bib 62 [1981] 541-43), 
who understands tlie term to refer to local governors (although whether one would expect to find ten 
in one place is doubtful). I incline towards Seow’s translation here for the sake of consistency with 
the clear economic sense with which Qohelet invests the term in 2:19; 5:18 (Eng. 19); 6:2. 
Crenshaw’s reading remains plausible however, paiticularly in view of the possibly political usage of 
■Nfebcj in 8:4; 10:5.
4 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 214; Kugel, “Qohelet and Money,” 45-49. Scott (Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 
198) has argued for a dating towards the end of the Persian period, although he does not rule out the 
possibility of a dating m the early third centmy.
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Qohelet’s use of Vübd is characteristic only of Persian times presents a significant 
challenge to the current consensus that the book of Ecclesiastes is a product of the 
Hellenistic period.^ For this reason alone, it deserves closer scrutiny.
Before continuing further, it is as well to consider some of Gropp’s 
conclusions concerning the use of VabtD in Aramaic. His argument is that the 
Akkadian root s/t, “mle”, “have power” also had a limited legal sense in the seventh 
century. This sense is then passed into Aramaic (where it is attested from the fifth 
century on). Its legal applications in this language are extended as the Persian period 
progresses.6
The most significant part of Gropp’s paper as fai* as Seow is concerned, 
however, is his statement that “After the Persian period, the meaning of sa//Tfis 
increasingly restricted (my italics) to the political sphere, with the meaning “to rule, 
have dominion”; “ruler, commander.”? Yet the latter commentator appear s to argue 
that the technical sense of Vüb# does not occur at all in the Hellenistic period, and 
uses this argument to date Ecclesiastes fairly conclusively to the fourth century.
II. The ypbo in the Persian Period
The book of Ecclesiastes is a notoriously difficult text to date with any 
certainty, and Seow presents a persuasive case for a Persian setting. His arguments 
derive fiom socioeconomic as well as linguistic sources.® Yet almost all could equally 
well apply to the Hellenistic period. The notable exception to this is his assertion 
that Qohelet uses Vûbty in the same technical sense which is found in the Persian
5 Most commentators currently argue for a mid-to-late thii’d century date (e.g. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 
4-12). Others, among them Lohfink (Kohelet, 7) and Whitley (Koheleth: His Language and 
Thought, 132-46), have suggested an early- or mid-second-centmy background.
6 Gropp, “ ^^///Z'Clause,” 35-36.
7 Ibid., 34.
8 Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context o f ‘Tlie Preacher’s’ Henneneutic,” 159-195.
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period and that this root is replaced in legal contexts during and after the third 
century B.C.E. by Vnoi.
As well as some usages in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah (Ezra 4:20; 7:24; 
Neh 5:15), the legal sense of Vûbtü is attested as early as the fifth century B .C .E . in 
the Aramaic Papyri from Elephantine.^ It is also found in the Samaria Papyri from 
the fourth centmy B .C .E ..10  Significantly, the latter documents a re  dated to the very 
end of the Persian period; it would seem reasonable to assmne therefore that Vabaj 
might retain a legal sense at least into the early Hellenistic era. Unfortunately, the 
lingua franca of this period for most legal documents was Greek and not Ai amaic. 11 
It is correspondingly difficult to prove that the use of the technical sense of in 
legal contiacts was discontinued in favour of Vntdl before the mid-to-late third 
centmy date assigned to Ecclesiastes by most commentators.
III. The VtabP in the Hellenistic Period 
tal The Book of Daniel 
In order to support his dating of Ecclesiastes to the Persian period, Seow 
cites the lack of any technical usage of in the book of Daniel, a work generally
9 See Gropp (“ Clause,” 31 n.2) for a fiill bibliography. Some of the more recent material
cited includes E. Y. Kutscher, “New Aramaic Texts,” JAOS 74 (1954) 239; R. Yaron, “Aramaic 
Marriage Contracts from Elephantine,” JSS 3 (1958) 9-10; “Aramaic Deeds of Conveyance,” Bib 41 
(1960) 248-74; Y. Muffs, Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri from Elephantine, Studia et 
Documenta ad luiu Orientis Antiqui Pertinenta, vol. 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1969) 6, nn. 23 and 24; 39, n. 
3; 41, n. 2 134; 151, n. 3; 152-53; 176-78; 204; 206; 208.
10 F. M. Cross, “Samaria Papyrus 1: An Aramaic Slave Conveyance of 335 B.C.E. Found in Üie 
Wadi ed-Daliyeh,” Nahman Avigad Volume, Erlsr 18 (Jerusalem, 1985) 7-17; “A Report on the 
Samaiia Papyri,” in J. A. Emerton (ed.). Congress Volume, Jerusalem, 1986 (VTSup 40; Leiden: 
Brill, 1988) 17-26; Gropp also considers the use of in the Samaria papyri in some detail
C‘ .^ ////C la u se ,” 32).
11 J. J. Rabinowitz (Jewish Law: Its Influence on the Development o f Legal Institutions [New York: 
Bloch, 1956] 124-40), studying the Greek legal papyri from the Hellenistic period, appears to show 
tliat the successor to the classic Aramaic sa//Ttc\&mQ was an equivalent Greek kyrieia clause.
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ascribed to the third and late second centuries. 12 However, a close examination of 
the relevant texts in Daniel reveals several clear examples of the technical usage of 
Vüb#. In 2:38, Daniel tells Nebuchadnezzar, “Wheresoever humankind dwells, the 
beasts of the field and the birds of the heavens has He (i.e. God) placed in your 
power and has given you right of disposal (]üb#ni "]T3 3H') over them all.” One 
does not exercise political power over animals, but one may be granted 
proprietorship. This paiticular image demands that VDb0 be understood in its 
legal/economic sense. A parallel is made between the everyday world of business 
transactions and kingship. It is as if God has signed a deed giving Nebuchadnezzar an 
estate complete with its livestock, or the hunting and trapping rights over the whole 
eaith.
In the same context, Rabinowitz has drawn attention to the striking parallels 
between the legal terminology of papyrus Brooklyn 12 and the text of Daniel 4:14 
(Eng. 17), 22 (Eng. 25), 29 (Eng. 32) stating that the formula used in the latter “was 
adopted from the phiaseology of the legal document which was current in his day.”i3 
In these particular examples, the phiase in question reads: xdux mubBD X’bu n  
HDrT’ n  ]Qbi (“That the Most High rules in the kingdom of humankind, and 
gives it to whomsoever he will”) The context therefore makes it clear that the tenn 
3"b(£? in these locations refers not merely to “power” but to a legal “right of disposal.” 
A modified version of this legal formula also occurs in Dan 5:21.
(b) The Book of Ben Sira
Two further usages of Vcibo occur in the book of Ben Sira (4:7; 9:13). Due to
12 Seow, “Linguistic Evidence,” 654. Elsewhere, I have argued that Qohelet was probably familiar
with the court stories in Daniel (“A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4:13-16,” JBL 116 [1997] 57- 
73, esp. 61-63, 65-69, 72).
13 Rabinowitz, Jewish Law, 128-29 (cf. also pp. 131-33 for a shnilar usage of legal terminology in 
Dan 4:31 [Eng. 34]-32 [Eng. 35]). The full text of the document may be foimd in Kraeliug, The 
Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri, 268-69.
Qohelet and the Problem o f Free Will 125
constrictions of space, I have attempted to avoid citations of VtûbçU where there is 
some ambiguity as to whether it is being used in a technical or nontechnical sense. 
There is, however, no ambiguity when VtûbîU occurs in a specific clause establishing 
one’s legal right to perform certain actions. In Gropp’s definition of such a clause, 
“...it is probably best to understand the term [i.e. Vübü] in the positive fonnulation 
as stating some legal right(s) in general teiins which must be further specified by 
context. This specification is most unambiguously achieved by means of one or more 
complementary infinitives.”! 4
This specific construction of Vobd + infinitive occurs in Eccl 5:18 (Eng. 
5:19); 6:2; 8:9, but it also occurs in Sir 9:13, where Seow claims a nontechnical use of 
Vtûba?. Yet the expression, “Keep far from a man with the power to kill (nnb pDbto), 
and you will not be worried by the fear of death...” must suiely be a technical usage 
of the root. Ben Sira warns not against being the companion of a man psychologically 
able to kill, nor even of a man with the money to hire assassins. Rather he warns 
against working for a powerful man with the legal right to put people to death if 
they displease him (cf. Prov 23:1-2 for a similai* thought).
Although “permit” occurs in Sir 3:22, the use of this root is by no 
means characteristic only of the Hellenistic period. The term “permission” is 
attested in Ezra 3:7 (in which book Vtûbïï?, as we have seen, also retains its technical 
sense). Thus there is no reason to think that Vnon is being used in Ben Sira in 
preference to the technical sense of Vüb0. Humanity’s access to different types of 
wisdom is the topic of discussion in this particular text, so that n‘’{U“!intD (“has been 
permitted”) in Sir 3:22 cannot reasonably be construed in the sense of “right of 
disposal.” The term nnno] (“that which is hidden”) to which it is in opposition, 
conveys impossibility, rather than illegality. The evidence therefore suggests that
14 Gropp, “ 51?//VClause,” 34, citing Miifits (Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri, 41 n. 2).
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Vüb# retained its technical sense into the second century, and that Vndn in Ben Sira 
has much the same general meaning as in the Persian period.
(c) Later Texts
While evidence from later writings shows that may somethnes be used 
in place of Vcûbtu in legal contexts, the validity of these sources in dating Ecclesiastes
to the Persian period is limited. The Murabba at and Nahal Hever documents, for
example, are from the time of Bar Kokhba (early second century C.E.). Likewise, the 
Nabatean tomb inscriptions utilising Vndn aie of late date, coming mainly from the 
1st century C.E..15
Significantly, the economic/legal sense of VtûbtD seems never to have died out 
entirely: a Syriac bill of sale dated 243 c.E . containing an elaborate s a //ftclause 
remains extant, This technical usage also appears in the Talmud Yerushalmi. For 
example, y. Naz IV 53b speaks of a woman having legal authority over her husband’s 
property (ro3] bu nübmn). Similarly, y. Kethub IX 33a concerns a woman 
authorized to manage her husband’s property during his lifetime (]nn ntDbna?]5U □■’033). 
Both use Vob# in its legal/economic sense, specifically in the context of property 
(□’’033). The same context occurs in Eccl 5:18 (Eng. 5:19); 6:2, in which people are 
given authorization (Vobiu) to make use of “wealth and property” (□’’0333 n(Du).i? 
Medieval Jewish deeds of conveyance also makes use of the 5^:?//;^ clause, as 
Rabinowitz has demonstrated, i®
IV. Consequences for the Dating of Ecclesiastes
15 The relevant literature is cited in full by Gropp {Ibid., 34 nn. 28, 29).
15 J. A. Goldstein, “The Syriac Bill of Sale from Dura-Europos,” JNES 25 (1966) 11-12.
17 Cf. the Yiddish proverb: “The miser has no right of disposal (nîa’bs?) over his possessions” cited 
by Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 255.
18 Rabinowitz, Jewish Law, 132.
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To conclude then, Qohelet’s use of the technical sense of VcûbîU finds several 
parallels in documents from the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., but this meaning of 
the root evidently survived throughout the Hellenistic period and well into the 
Christian era. Indeed, it might even be argued that the figurative way in which Vob# 
is used in Daniel, with the deity issuing property grants to favoured human subjects, 
has more in common with the thought of Qohelet than do the purely literal uses of 
this root in the legal papyri from the Persian period, or in Ezra-Nehemiah. For the 
time being, the debate as to the date of composition of the book of Ecclesiastes 
cannot be considered closed.
V. The Book of Ecclesiastes: Text and Context 
Many commentators have argued that the catalogue of times in 3:1-8 
represent Qohelet’s expression of the divinely detennined nature not merely of 
human actions, but even of human thought and f e e l in g .  19 This alleged deterministic 
worldview has biblical antecedents, as Fox and Murphy have pointed out.20 For the 
most part, however, deteiminism in Jewish thought is associated with the 
apocalyptic literature of the Hellenistic era, or with the contemporaiy wisdom 
literature.2 i
A parallel also exists between Qohelet and the Stoic school who refoiinulated 
the work of earlier Greek philosophy in order to combine the concept of determinism 
with that of free will. 22 A similar outlook on the nature of existence, however, is not
19 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 255-9; Scott, Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 220-1; Fox, Qohelet and his 
Contradictions, 192. Recently, Blenkinsopp has taken a different tack in arguing tliat 3:2-8 is a text 
stressing opportuneness against which Qohelet takes issue with a detenninistic commentary in 3:9-15 
(“Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 55-64).
20 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 195; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
21 Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 264.
22 Among those who have posited dhect Stoic influence on Qohelet’s work are Tyler {Ecclesiastes, 
10-29), Plumptre {Ecclesiastes, 30-32), Bickemian {Four Strange Books o f the Bible, 141-49), and 
Ganunie (“Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 169-187).
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conclusive proof of cross fertilisation and in fact, commentators have been hard 
pressed to find convincing evidence of specific Greek influence, prefening to ascribe 
similarities between Qohelet and various Greek philosophies to a general Hellenistic 
Zeitgeist
Although Delitzsch dated Qohelet’s work firmly in the Persian period, he 
nevertheless saw evidence of deteiminism in Ecclesiastes, being followed in this 
position by Scott.24 While commentators may differ as to the dating of Qohelet’s 
work, most accept that it betrays a belief in some form of determinism, even if some 
are wary of ascribing such an idea to the well-known catalogue of times in chapter 
3.25
the single greatest problem associated with understanding 3:1-8 as a 
deterministic text, is that Qohelet appears elsewhere to presuppose a certain amount 
of free will in human existence. 26 if  all, including human thought, is predetermined, 
there would appear to be little point in producing a work of wisdom which offers 
advice on how to approach life. Moreover, Qohelet regularly uses the imperative 
form in his work (4:17 [Eng. 5:1]; 5:2 [Eng. 5:1], 4 [Eng. 3], 6 [Eng. 5]-8 [Eng. 7]; 
7:9, 10, 13, 14, 16-18, 21; 8:3; 9:7-10; 10:4, 20; 11:1, 2, 6, 9, 10; 12:1, 13), a rather 
futile exercise if we have no control over our actions.
The problem of free will and how Qohelet’s evident acceptance of such an 
idea might be reconciled with those texts in Ecclesiastes which appeal* to have 
deterministic tendencies is fundamental to our understanding of Qohelet’s 
worldview. Nevertheless, no work of which I am aware has attempted to consider 
the one in the light of the other. The tendency of commentators has been either to
23 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, xlv.
24 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 214.
25 Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 55-64; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 67.
26 PoAQchsxà, L ’Ecclésiaste, 192; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 62.
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ignore the problem completely, or to argue that contradictions in Qohelet’s work aie 
a deliberate reflection of the contradictoiy nature oflife.2?
(a) Humanity and God (5:18: 6:2:2:19)
Seow is the latest of a long line of commentators who have pointed to the 
strongly Aramaizing tendency of the Hebrew in the book of Ecclesiastes.2® If 
Qohelet’s use of Vob# can be linked to its legal/economic sense of “delegated 
authority”, “right of disposal” or “proprietorship” in Aramaic texts, then one of the 
ways in which the idea of free will can be combined with a concept of determinism 
becomes evident. The context in which Qohelet uses Vtabty usually makes it clear 
that he is speaking of some kind of delegated authority: indeed, it is a sine qua non in 
the argument of many commentators.
In 5:18; 6:2, God is depicted as a divine ruler who grants to certain of his 
human subjects “wealth and riches and authorisation to eat of them,” refusing this 
same authorisation to others. Ultimately the picture drawn of God and his 
relationship with humanity is very similar* to that of these Aramaic texts in which the 
tû*’bîü has authorisation from above to dispose of (other people’s) goods. In this case, 
the goods, “wealth and riches” (□’0333 “ityu—5:18; 6:2) are pail of the gift of God. 29 
That is to say, they are not earned but apportioned by God and the individual has no 
right to retain the goods or to treat them as his without the deity’s authorisation to 
do so. Indeed, the parallel becomes still closer when one considers passages such as 
2:26, “God gives wisdom, knowledge and joy to the one who pleases him, while to
27 The latter view has been expressed by Delitzsch (Ecclesiastes, 183) and more recently by Fox 
(Qohelet and His Contradictions, 19-28).
28 Seow, “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” 650. On this basis, others have argued 
that the Hebrew of Ecclesiastes represents a translation of an originally Aramaic text (F. C. Burkitt, 
“Is Ecclesiastes a Translation?” JTN 23 [1921-22] 22-27; F. Zimmerman, “The Aramaic Provenance 
of Qohelet,” JQR 36 [1945-6] 17-45; C. C. Torrey, “The Question of the Original Language of 
Qohelet,” 70/2 39 [1948-9] 151-60; H. L. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth,^ 16-39).
29 Whybray hints at the deterministic nature of such things (“Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 89).
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the sinner is given toil: to gather and to heap up and to give to one who pleases 
God.” The riches and wealth “given” by God then may come indirectly thiough 
another’s labour.3o
By way of contrast, the situation of the sinner in 2:26 is remarkably similai* 
to that of the one in 6:2 “to whom God grants wealth, riches and substance...but not 
given him authority to eat of these things: instead, a stranger eats of them.” The 
picture of God which begins to emerge is of a capricious king whose actions cannot 
be determined by his subjects.31 The terms DTrbxn ’JSb mto (“good before God”) and 
XBin (“sinner”) which aie devoid of moral content but which provide the reasons for 
some of his actions vis à vis his subjects only reinforce this view. 3 2
The use of Vob# in 2:19 remains close to the parallel usage in Aiamaic 
documentation. There the teim is specifically used of the inheritance of Qohelet’s 
wealth by another. A question mark remains over the source of the authorisation 
which VcDbsD denotes here. It may simply refer to the right of disposal given by 
(earthly) legal authorities to Qohelet’s heir. Yet Qohelet himself seems unawaie of 
who is to inherit (bDD nTi"' conn uiT •■Bi): in this case the hand of the inscmtable 
deity would seem once more to be at work.33
In a world in which all, or nearly all, is predeteimined, the meaning which 
VtûbîU has here of authority (delegated by God) to act in some way makes it
30 Most commentators understand 2:26 in the sense that the “skmer” has these activities inflicted on 
him as a punishment. Gordis is alone in claiming that “the man who misses God’s purpose, the 
enjoyment of life, is a sinner” (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 227). In other words, Gordis 
limits God’s determinism by claiming that “to gather and to heap up” is the sin itself rather than the 
consequence.
31 Crenshaw comments on the “element of aibitiaiiness” in God’s mle and the inability of human 
beings to perceive God’s actions in the present or futuie. Both ideas, in his opinion, are suggestive of 
“some form of detenninism” (Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, 136).
32 Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 82-3; Ginsberg, “The Stiucture and Contents of the Book of Koheleth,” 
139; Ziimnerli, Der Prediger, 161-2. The idea that both tenns aie devoid of moral content is now 
generally accepted.
33 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 186. This is paiticularly the case if Qohelet is still 
speaking in his kingly persona.
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equivalent to a limited form of free will.34 it is significant that here the tenn is 
used in the context of “eating” or utilising the material benefits which life has to 
offer, for this one area in which Qohelet uses imperative forms of the verb (9:7, 8, 9; 
11:9, 10).35 These, as I have pointed out, aie indicative of the idea that human 
beings have a degree of control over their actions. One may indeed be granted 
“authority” to enjoy life by God, but the individual may not exercise that authority: 
the aim of Qohelet’s investigation is to exploit those aieas in which human beings aie 
granted the power to act independently, “to see what is that good which humanity 
should do under the heavens” (2:3).36
rm Misuse of Free Will (8:9ff.l
The use of Vübiü is not restricted to the idea of having “right of disposal” over 
material goods however. Just as in the Aramaic texts which form the background to 
Qohelet’s thought (cf. esp. the Samaria Papyri), one may have “right of disposal” 
over other people.
Qohelet also speaks of “a time in which one person has authority over 
another to his hurt.” The meaning of the ambiguous ib unb has sometimes been 
understood to be that those who have power may injuie themselves (So Symmachus, 
elc KŒKOv éauToû and AV, “to his own hurt,” perhaps influenced by the similar 
idiom inuib in 5:12 [Eng. 5:13]). However, 8:9 may also be construed in the sense
34 Cf. Murphy on 5: 18; 6:2 who emphasises the role of the deity. The situation in which £û’‘p2? is 
not given to the rich person is seen as an active intervention by God (“[the] rich person...is prevented
by God from enjoying his riches” [Ecclesiastes, 53]). I
35 Whybray sees a sevenfold “joy” leitmotiv in which emphasis increases with each new affii*mation {
o f the worth of joy (“Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 87-8). Although the ability to enjoy life lies in |
God’s gift (p. 89), the responsibility lies with human beings to make use of this ability. {
36 In fact, the objective of Qohelet’s search is described in several different ways, connected in |
particular with finding “the work which is done under the sun” or “the work of God.” Both of these |
are equivalent (so Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 175; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 13), a necessaiy J
step before discovering the relevance o f his findings for human beings (Rudman, “The Translation & |
Interpretation o f Ecclesiastes 8:17a,” JiViSi 23 [1997] 1-9). i
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that one person has power over another to the detriment of the inferior party. This 
rendering is supported by the LXX, Peshitta, Vulgate and Targum as well as the vast 
majority of modem translations (cf. esp. RSV, “man lords it over man to his 
hurt”).37
Two things should be noted about this verse. The word nu “(appointed) 
time” is generally used in Ecclesiastes to denote those events which are deteimined 
by God (cf esp. 9:11, 12 in which the net cast over humanity is a divine weapon),^® 
so that God is ultimately the source of the authority which is enjoyed by the subject 
of this verse over his fellow. The second is that this is most likely a sa//Ttc\msQ as 
defined by Gropp with VabtU followed by an infinitive stating what legal powers the 
subject enjoys. The elision of n on a Hiphil Infinitive Constmct after a preposition is 
not uncommon in the Hebrew Bible (GKC §53q). In this case, one person apparently 
has the legal right to harm another (ib unb).
In this case, the subject which Qohelet is probing is one of theodicy. 3 9 in a 
predetermined world, how can wickedness and evil be explained? To follow the 
implications of deteiminism to its logical conclusion would be to say that God is not 
merely directly responsible for human wickedness, but actually acts wickedly 
himself through his creatures. Unconventional as his thought sometimes is, Qohelet 
remains a Jew, and such an idea would be as unacceptable to him as to his 
contemporaries.
Qohelet’s solution to this problem, and it is, he realises, a partial one, is that 
a person may be gianted licence (Vtobtu) by God to dominate his fellows. This licence 
empowers the individual to act to the detriment of his fellow. It does not follow that
37 The same meaniag is upheld by almost all commentators.
38 Rudman, “Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes,” 417-18.
39 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 121.
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God wishes or intends wickedness: a choice is presented to humanity and evil chosen 
rather than good. This is the negative side to free will. The deterministic God is not 
therefore directly the author of wickedness but he does bear a certain degree of 
responsibility in that is gianted to those who abuse it.
This is the idea explored in the succeeding verses, “and so I saw the wicked 
draw neai* and approach the place of the holy, walk about and boast in the city that 
they had done right (so Driver’s emended text: mpB o a ip  □"'Utoi '’n'-xn pm  
3bu p  i(DX iranîU’i iDbm oiip—8:10).”40 The wicked may indeed boast that 
their actions are morally rights or at least “legal”, because the deterministic God has 
shown his approval by allowing them to be carried out in the first place. 41 This 
problem of theodicy is explored fuilher in the next verse: “because sentence against 
an evil act is not carried out speedily, the mind of humanity is fully made up to do 
evil.”42 The fact that evil may be judged is a logical corolloiy of Qohelet’s belief that 
evil stems from an abuse of]iBb0 rather than from actions directly determined by the 
deity. However, Qohelet is perplexed by the fact that God appears not to judge the 
wicked nor to strip them of their authority to act as they do. It is this divine inaction 
that the wicked are able to construe as approval of their actions, giving fresh 
encouragement to further evil.
40 The emendations of G. R. Driver (“Problems and Solutions,” VT 4 [1954] 230-31) to the MT’s 
10U ]D “IÎDS Tua inunffl’i isbn' îü'np mpûüi nnnp cutün n-'xi py\ “so I saw the wicked buried, 
who had come and gone from the place of the holy, and they were forgotten in the city where they 
had done so,” partially dependent on an earlier suggestion by Burkitt (“Is Ecclesiastes a Translation?” 
25-6), are accepted by most commentators, though Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 295); 
Lohfink (Kohelet, 62), followed by Murphy (Ecclesiastes, 79) retain the MT’s Dnnp “buried.”
41 Cf. 9:7, “Go, eat you bread with pleasure...for God has already approved your works.” In Fox’s 
words on this verse, “If you are given the opportunity to enjoy life, that is in itself evidence that God 
has approved of the pleasurable activities you undertake” (Qohelet and his Contradictions, 259). The 
same view, however, equally applies to wickedness: the fact Üiat God allows the opportunity for it to 
be committed, means that God has approved it. The wicked have “done right.”
42 Fox in particular, emphasises God’s apparent injustice in this verse, “Since the punislnnent which 
Qohelet has in mind is a divinely imposed death sentence, delaying punishment is tantamount to not 
carrying it out” (Ibid., 249).
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(c) Limitations of Free Will: Death (8:8)
Qohelet’s deteiministic beliefs naturally mean that free will is limited: while 
much in life is determined by God, there are some things in life over which human 
beings are allowed no control under any circumstances. The example par excellence 
of this is death: “no-one has authorisation (□’bî») over the breath of life to retain the 
breath of life, no-one has authority (püblD) over the day of death.”43 Again, the final 
aititer of life and death is God (11:5; 12:7) and he alone determines the moment at 
which the life breath passes from the body and returns to its maker.
Death is associated with nu “appointed time” in the catalogue of divinely 
ordained times which limit and control human life (3:2), but Qohelet also speaks of 
the possibility of dying “before your tune” (“fnu xbn—7:17). The implication of this 
verse is that God may alter a previously appointed time as a response to the “overly 
foolish” or “overly wicked” behaviour of the in d iv id u a l.4 4  Commentators have 
generally been puzzled by the advice not to be “overly wicked.” Is Qohelet advising 
people to be somewhat wicked? The general consensus is that Qohelet is a realist 
who recognises that everyone does wrong at some point: he advises his reader not to 
abandon himself utterly to such practices.
The meaning of Vtûbtu which has been established in 8:9 and its implications 
for the interpretation of the succeeding verses again offers some explanation of this 
difficult passage. Wickedness is only possible as a result of the use/abuse of divinely 
granted pobtd and because it is “licensed”, may go unpunished in the short term. The 
thi'ust of 7:17 would suggest that in the case of a major act of wickedness, God will 
intervene with the ultimate sanction: the punishment of death in this verse is aimed
43 Murphy suggests the divinely determined nature of death m this verse, alluding to 3:2 “a time to 
give birth, a time to die” (Ecclesiastes, 84).
44 Strange, The Question o f Moderation in Eccl 7:15-18, 58ff. esp. 87.
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at those who are extreme in their behaviour. 45 Although God may be rebuked for 
being tardy in his punishment of the wicked, Qohelet clearly does believe in some 
foim of judgement.46
(d) The King as Supreme Expression of Free Will (8:4ff.: 10:5)
The king too in Qohelet is said to have ]3£ûbîî?. This is a significant remark 
because the king normally grants authority: he does not receive it. Should such a use 
of the term therefore be understood in a non-legal sense? This may be possible, 
but the fact that elsewhere Qohelet uses the tenn ro  for “power” or “force” (4:1), 
would appear to suggest that the idea behind the term in this paiticular context 
would again be one of authority delegated to the king by God.
The phraseology of 8:2 “I counsel you to obey the king’s command and that 
in respect of the oath of God” (aabx nuad m m  bui mDK? “[bo a  "DX) has again been 
something of a puzzle for commentators.4? The use of Vaba? by Qohelet as 
signifying authority delegated by God, “free will” as it were, lends substance to the 
arguments of those commentators who have in the past suggested that the oath 
mentioned here is God’s oath concerning kingship and not a human oath of loyalty to 
the king. The way in which Qohelet goes on to describe the king in 8:3 elucidates the 
idea of pcobd as free will: “he does what he chooses, for where the word of the king 
is, there is authority (]3BbtD “]bQ “im “ityXB niou" fsn*’ ntux bD).” The statement that
45 Whybray and Fox see the expression “do not be very wicked” not as recommending moderate 
wickedness but as a concession to human weakness (Wliybray, “Qoheleth the Immoralist? (Qoh 7:16- 
17)” in J. G. Gaminie et ah (eds.), Israelite Wisdom: Essays in Honor o f Samuel Terrien (Missoula: 
Scholai's, 1978) 197; Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 235-36).
46 Fredericks defends the idea that Qohelet has a traditional conception o f divine retribution (“Life’s 
Storms and Structural Unity in Qoheleth 11.1-12.8,” JSOT 52 [1991] 101).
47 Interpreters are divided as to whether the phrase D’nbK “oath of God” is a subjective or
objective genitive. Hertzberg understands the genitive as subjective, referring to God’s oath 
concernmg kingship (Der Prediger, 143), along with Tyler (Ecclesiastes, 101). Plumptre 
(Ecclesiastes, 175), Barton (Ecclesiastes, 149), Podechard (Ecclésiaste, 391) and most subsequent 
commentators understand the genitive as objective referring to a human oath o f loyalty to the king 
with God invoked as a witness (Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 288; Scott, Proverbs 
Ecclesiastes, 240; Galling, Der Prediger, 110; Lauha, Kohelet, 148).
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the king “does what he chooses” is a remarkable one in the light of Qohelet’s 
deterministic philosophy, for it suggests that the king enjoys a special relationship 
with God, acting as the deity’s viceregent (cf. Ps 2:7; Dan 4:14 [Eng. 17], 22 [Eng. 
25], 29 [Eng. 32]; 5:21).48
The suggestion that may retain its legal sense of (delegated) authority is 
lent support by the work of A. Hurvitz who has shown that the Hebrew expression 
nty:? 7^^  is used in a distinct legal s e n s e .4 9  Seow too has pointed out that
this expression elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible is used only o f God.^^ It would 
appear then, that Qohelet is being consistent in his usage of the technical legal sense 
of Voy# as referring to a delegated “authorisation.” In this case, however, the extent 
of the legal authority denoted by is not defined by the use of one or more 
infinitives. This is replaced by the legal phiase nor" p rr’ itdx to denote total 
freedom of action.
Where most of humankind is constricted by the actions which God has 
determined for them (D'’QîDn nnn y sn  bd~? nm ]Qî —3:1), the king is given legal
authority to act as he pleases (ncyr’ j'arT’ —8:3). He is, as it were, the supreme
embodiment of free will. The fact that the king has such authority from God also 
makes the command of the king almost a commandment.^ i
In 10:5ff. Qohelet goes on to consider some of the practical consequences of 
allotted to rulers by God. He observes “an error which goes forth from the ruler 
(ü't)t5).” Again, the term implies free will, for it suggests that the ruler has the
48 Hertzberg points to parallels in 2 Sam 7:14; Ps 2:7; 20; 21; 45 et al. {Prediger, 143) which 
suggest tlie special status of the king vis à vis God. Î
49 A. Hurvitz, “The History o f a Legal Formula: kol ’aser hâpês '^ âsâh (Psahns CXV 3, CXXXV I
6),” FT 32 (1982) 257-67. j
50 Seow (Ecclesiastes, 280), citing Pss 115:3; 135:6, and related expressions in Isa 46:10; Jon 1:14; j
Dan 4:14, 22, 29, 32 (Eng. 4:17, 25, 32, 35). Plumptre (Ecclesiastes, 176) makes the observation j
that a similar phrase is used of God in Job 34:13. Î
51 Hertzberg understands God’s oath having given the king almost a semi-divine status: “Gott hat ;
dem Konig geschworen..., er ist persona sacra, ‘von Gottes Gnaden’,” (Frediger, 143). |
Qohelet and the Problem o f Free Will 137
power not to act in the negative way which he does. 52 Just as wickedness and evil 
may be blamed on a misuse of granted by God, inequity in life may to some 
extent be assigned to the wrong application of pü^w by the ruler to whom God gives 
it. This is not to undermine the often ambivalent nature of God towards the 
individual: many passages in Ecclesiastes assert such a concept (2:26; 5:19 [Eng. 18]; 
6:2; 7:14, 26; 9:1). However, the misuse of ]iîû‘7îi7 or free will accounts for many of 
the problems obseiwed by Qohelet in life.
Qohelet apparently dwells on this problem in 10:16, although itself 
does not appear. The licence enjoyed by the king is wiongly extended to the court 
because the king is too weak to enforce proper rule as God’s subordinate: his princes 
“eat in the morning.” By contrast the king who is brought up to mle, rules wisely: 
the course of events deteimined by God is maintained. 53 The princes eat which 
on one level means “at the appropriate time,” but also has deterministic nuances. The 
king as divine agent has an obligation to rule as God envisions, despite the po^0 
granted to him.
(el Qohelet as King (1:12-2:121
Qohelet too proclaims himself as a king (1:12). Hitherto, his reason for so 
doing has been considered in the light of the material goods which he enjoys in the 
course of his investigation into existence. 54 A king has access to all possible
52 Whitley (Koheleth: His Language and Thought, 85) is probably correct in understanding 3 in
'labû nasmD as asseverative: “Indeed it is an error which goes forth from the ruler,” rather 
than comparative.
53 Glasser draws a parallel between the situation in 10:16 and the repercussions for a land in which 
the powerfiil are not answerable to the king in Eccl 3:16; 5:7-11 (Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 
158). If correct, this is one more illustration of wickedness which may be attributed to a human 
misuse o f pabo) rather than divLue injustice.
54 Kidner, A Time to Mourn, and a Time to Dance, 28. Crenshaw also cites the tradition o f kings 
dispensing wisdom as a factor in Qohelet’s adoption o f a royal persona (Ecclesiastes, 70). E. Jones 
suggests that tlie literary device of the Solomonic persona “was really a means of expressing 
Qohelet’s conviction that neither wealth nor wisdom provided Hie clue to the final meaning of life.” 
(Proverbs and Ecclesiastes [London: SCM, 1961] 282).
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pleasures and comforts in life. The so-called “Solomonic identity” may or may not 
be incidental, but what is certain is that Qohelet claims to have acquired more 
wisdom and more material possessions “than all who were before me in Jerusalem 
(1:16; 2:7,9).”55
As I have argued elsewhere, the expression rr’rr is attested in the Hebrew 
Bible in connection with kingship as an idiom meaning “to be subject to.” Qohelet 
therefore appeal’s to be claiming not that he has become wiser and wealthier than all 
his royal predecessors (assuming that Qohelet = Solomon, almost all interpreters 
have commented on the strangeness of this remai’k, since only David ruled in 
Jerusalem before Solomon), but that he has become wiser and wealthier than any of 
his subjects.56 Qohelet is ideally placed in the here and now to carry out his task of 
investigating existence, but his role as king rather than subject gives him an extra 
advantage: the one that is all important for a determinist—he is free to caii’y out his 
search without divine interference.57
The reason for Qohelet’s adoption of a kingly persona therefore is not 
simply that a king enjoys access to material wealth. Any wealthy persons can 
replicate Qohelet’s experiment by surrendering themselves to a life of pleasure. 
Indeed, Ginsberg argues that “1*70 in 1:12; 2:12 might just as well be, and indeed 
should be, repointed as *]‘7b “landowner.”58 It is that the king has — authority 
to act on his own initiative rather than being subject to the deterministic force which 
appears to control the life of the individual. As a free agent, only a king is fully 
qualified to investigate existence: Qohelet’s qualifications for the seai’ch aie not
55 Emending □bül'T’ by in 1:16 to abwn’n as in 2:7, 9. This reading is attested by all the Versions 
and many manuscripts.
56 Rudman, “Qohelet’s Use o f’3Qb.”
57 Murphy comments on the stt'angeness of the fact tliat Qohelet does not mention his own “kingly” 
status in 8:2-5 (Ecclesiastes, 83).
58 Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth, 12-15.
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merely wisdom and wealth, but wisdom, wealth and kingship. That is to say, the 
finances to allow access to material things, the wisdom to distinguish profitable from 
profitless activities and the freedom from divine interference to conceive and cariy 
out the search for what is good.
V. Conclusion
Although questions remain about Qohelet’s worldview, his coherent use of 
and the implied parallel between God and a human king whose commands have 
the force of law, but who grants certain subordinates authority to act on their own 
initiative is a sophisticated and relatively successful attempt to explain the problems 
of human wickedness and social inequality in terms of determinism. It also explains 
the reasons why Qohelet portrays himself as a king, why he attainment of wisdom is 
necessary, and why Qohelet can advise his audience to pursue certain courses of 
action when he apparently believes that God determines all or most of the events 
making up existence. The presupposition to all of these problems is that God has 
apportioned some individual which gives him the ability to act on his own 
authority. On another level, the apportiomnent or not of (cf. 5:18 [Eng. 19] and 
6:2) is another instance of the inscrutable nature of God’s gifts to humanity, 
underlining their dependence on the deity for everything.
Seow’s conclusion as to the chionological distribution of Vb'bü in this 
legal/economic sense requires some qualification, however. Linguistic usage is highly 
subjective, both from the point of view of the speaker and that of the interpreter, but 
it would seem that even in the third centuiy B.C.E., could still retain the sense 
of “right of disposal”, “delegated authority” or “proprietorship” which it had in the 
Persian period, and that in Hebrew this sense could not be applied to at that 
time, even though it may be true that this root occurs in some texts of the veiy late
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Hellenistic period (i.e. the Chiistian era) where we should expect to see On
linguistic giounds at least, the dating of the book of Ecclesiastes remains as 
problematic as ever, and Qohelet’s use of can be reconciled with a dating of 
that work to the third century B.C.E..
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Chapter 6 
Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes
I. Introduction
Qohelet’s attitude towaids women has perplexed modem commentators in 
that he appears to take diametrically opposing views of that sex in the two passages 
in which they are mentioned in Ecclesiastes. Traditionally, Qohelet’s assessment of 
women in Eccl 9:9 has been viewed as a positive one.i Over against this, most 
commentators would ai’gue that the depiction of women in 7:26, 28 is partially or 
wholly misogynistic,2 although a few scholars have attempted to mitigate the 
perceived misogyny of this latter passage by arguing that Qohelet refers in 7:26, 28 
only to a “certain type of woman” against whom the sages warned, typified by some 
of the ‘outsider’ feminine figures who appeal’ in the Book of Proverbs (Prov 2:16-19; 
5:3-14, 20-23; 6:24-26; 9:13-18).3
Others have put fomai’d solutions to this passage in which Qohelet quotes a 
negative view of women and then argues against it.4 Although such interpretations 
have the advantage that they resolve the dichotomy between this passage and 9:9, 
they present problems of their own and have not won full acceptance. The 
difficulties in the inteipretation of the figuie of the woman in 7:26, 28 are made still
1 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 363-4. Pliunptre, Ecclesiastes, 188.
2 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 238. Bamcq, Ecclésiaste, 137.
3 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 147; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 146.
4 Lohfink’s close analysis has been challenged on several counts: the meaning “bitter” (rather than 
“stronger”) for ID in 7:26 seems assured from 1 Sam 15:32. Nor do the sages, thougli undoubtedly 
androcentric, have been misogynistic in the way that Lohfink envisions. The comparison of the 
mortality of woman with the occasional innnortahty of man in 7:28 presents contextual problems in 
the light of Qohelet’s statements elsewhere (1:11; 2:16; 6:4) (“War Kohelet ein Frauenfeind? Bin 
Versuch, die Logik und den Gegenstand von Koh. 7:23-8:la  herausziifinden.” in La Sagesse de 
l ’Ancien Testament, 259-87). Murphy translates and interprets 7:28 as Qohelet’s refutation of a 
traditional saying that women are worse than men (Ecclesiastes, 75-7). I feel that Murphy is right to 
view this passage within the wider context of 9:9 but is the affirmation of the saying that women are 
worse Üian men really the tliesis that Qohelet has set out to prove (“that which I sought 
continually”)?
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greater by the fact that there exists no real consensus on the locations of the 
beginning and end of the section in which she appears.5
Although some would aigue that 7:23-24 are not connected with the verses 
which follow it, this article is written under the assumption that the passage in 
question extends from 7:23-29. The reasons for doing so are the reiteration of a 
variety of verbs denoting intellectual effort in 7:23, 25, and the contextual continuity 
provided by the repeated use of the verbs (Up3 and khd.6 The question of whether 
this section continues into 8:1 is not considered here since its inclusion or otherwise 
does not significantly affect the outcome of this investigation.
II. Translations
7:23.1 have tested all this by wisdom; I said, “I shall be wise”, but it was 
far fr om me.
24. That which is far off and very deep, who can find it out?
25. My heart and I turned to know, to search, and to seek out wisdom 
and the sum, and to know [the wickedness of folly and] foolishness 
and madness.7
26. And I find more bitter than death Woman, whose heart is snares and 
nets, whose hands are bonds; whoever God favours will escape her, 
but the ‘sinner’ will caught by her.
27. “Look, this I found,” says Qohelet, “One to one to find the sum
28. That w h ic h 8 I sought continually I have not found: one man in a 
thousand I found, but a woman in all these I did not find.
29. Only see what I found—that God made humankind upright, but
5 A few scholars maintain that 7:23-24 is to be related back to the section beginning in 7:15 (Gordis, 
Koheleth: the Man and His World, 280-2; Murphy, Ecclesiastes,11-2).
6 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 123. M. V. Fox & B. Porten, “Unsought Discoveries: Qohelet 7:23-8:la,” 
HS 19 (1978) 26.
7 I follow the LXX and Syriac versions in my reconstruction of 7:25 and delete bOD U2j"i as a 
secondary gloss.
8 I follow the translation o f Crenshaw here (Ecclesiastes, 144, 147) but relate “lüK back to in 
7:27. Fox’s argument for the emendation o f 10N to n0n although valid orthographically, depends on 
his assertion that Qohelet does discover a in 7:28. If  so, it can surely not be the same one 
which he intends in 7:25.
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they have sought many sums.”
9:9. Experience life with the woman you love, all the days of the life of 
your vanity which he has given you under the sun, all the days of 
your vanity: for that is your portion in this life and in your labour 
which you take under the sun.
III. Text and Context 
(al Eccl 7:26
In Eccl 7:23-29, Qohelet describes his search for Wisdom. His conclusion 
(7:23-24) is that it is unattainable. The parameters of his sear ch are then defined 
more precisely: ‘T and my heart turned to know and to search and to seek out 
wisdom and the sum, and to know wickedness and folly, foolishness and madness” 
(7:25). Qohelet says more about his search for the p3(un “sum” (7:27, 29), yet he also 
animadverts on a mysterious woman (7:26, 28). Whybray comments on the 
“unexpected introduction” of this subject in 7:26 and goes on to remark “If this verse 
is in fact part of the section which begins in 7:23 and not the beginning of an entirely 
new section, it can only be understood as being intended to be in some sense a 
particular illustration of some point which has been made in 7:23-25.”9
That such is indeed the case is accepted by most commentators: 7:23-25 and 
26-29 share a common vocabulary and conceptualisation. Qohelet continually uses 
the language of seeking and finding, the verbs tup3 (“seek”) occurring three times 
(7:25, 28, 29) and KüiQ (“find”) eight times (7:24, 26, 27 [twice], 28 [thrice], 29). The 
verb bin (“search”) also occurs (7:25). Qohelet denies the ability of any person to 
“find out” (xz^ b—7:24) wisdom and the sum, but he does “find” (x%b—7:26) that
9 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 125.
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woman is “more bitter than death.”i o Qohelet’s heart (3*7—7:25), the intellectual 
part of his character which is engaged in the search, makes a discovery about the 
equivalent part (3*7) of the opposite sex, that it is “snares and nets.”i i
Fox seems to echo the scholarly consensus when he paraphrases the thought 
of 7:26 in the context of the preceding verses: ‘“See where my painstaking research 
led me: to the knowledge that woman is a m e n a c e ! ” ’ 12 Whilst some have attempted 
to mitigate the harshness of modern accusations of misogyny by suggesting that 
Qohelet refers only to “a certain type of woman” (in which case we should 
presumably paraphrase “woman can be a menace” rather than “woman is a menace”), 
those such as N. Lohfink and K. Baltzer who attempt to refute all charges on 
Qohelet’s behalf are in a still smaller minority. 13
Qohelet aims his message at a male readership, for he advises his audience to 
“experience life with the woman you love” (9 :9 ).M The case of those who would 
assert that Qohelet in Eccl 7:26, 28 either refers only to some women, or that the 
apparently negative assessment of women in this section is a misinterpretation is 
strengthened by the fact that it does take into account the (largely) positive message 
of 9:9.1 believe that the intuition of such commentators is coiTect.
Whybray’s comment cited above, that 7:26 must illustrate some point made
10 Dahood appeals to the use of V liü in Aramaic and Ugaritic to posit the meaning “sti'onger” in this 
verse, a meaning also evident in Ezek 3:14 (“Qoheleth and Recent Discoveries,” 308-9). The meaning 
“bitter” is, however, assured in 1 Sam 15:32, the only other occurrence in the Hebrew Bible of the 
terms “IQ and mû together.
11 Delitzsch understands XTi in the expression D’mZiD X’n “lüK as a copula, hence: “who is a snare, 
whose heart is a net...” (Ecclesiastes, 331-2), followed by Crenshaw, (Ecclesiastes, 146). I have 
followed die Masoretes’ understanding o f this expression, although no material difference to the 
thesis of this article is made if  either is adopted.
12 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 242.
13 A summary of Lohfink’s position may be found in his commentary (Kohelet, 57-9). Cf. K. 
Baltzer, “Women and War in Qohelet 7:23-8:la” HTR 80 (1987) 127-32. Athalya Brenner devotes a 
brief paragraph to Qohelet’s treatment of the subject of women in a recent feminist study on Israelite 
wisdom literature, but the position taken is strongly negative (A. Bremier “Figurations of Woman in 
Wisdom Literature” in A. Brenner (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Wisdom Literature [Sheffield; 
Sheffield Academic, 1995] 59-60).
14 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 27.
Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes 145
in 7:23-25, is a crucial one for the understanding of the purpose of the introduction 
of the mysterious woman in this verse. Whilst Qohelet has already reached a 
conclusion that wisdom is unattainable by human efforts and goes on to speak in 
more detail about “the sum” which he mentions in 7:25, he appeal’s to say nothing 
concrete about “wickedness and folly, foolishness and madness.”
The Hebrew phraseology of this last clause in 7:25 (m*p*7in m*73Dm *703 3(U“i) 
is significant because part of it echoes the seaich which Qohelet undertakes in the so- 
called ‘Royal Experiment’ of 1:12-2:26. This is in addition to the verbs no] (“test”), 
and nn  (“search”), which aie shared only by these passages (noz occuis in 2:1; 7:23 
and bin in 1:13; 2:3; 7:25). Perhaps significantly, these two passages are the only 
places in which the term n‘7np(n) appears in the body of the book (1:13; 7:27) as 
opposed to the prologue or epilogue (1:1, 2; 12:8, 9, 10). The terms m*7DD 
(“foolishness”) and m*7*7in (“madness”) occui’ in such close proximity together 
elsewhere only in 1:17; 2:12,15 whilst in the same passage the related term ‘7*7'inQ 
“mad” occurs in 2:2 and m*730 on its own in 2:3, 13. In the Royal Experiment, 
Qohelet describes his personal quest for knowledge of the world around him, 
specifically to “see what was good for human beings to do under the heavens the few 
days of their lives” (2:3). In the context of this search, Qohelet specifically describes 
laughter as “madness” (2:2) and the suiTender of self to pleasure as “foolishness” 
(2:3). Couched among the many forms of enjoyment which he lists as experiencing 
are what he describes as “the delights of men”, followed by the mysterious 
expression nnm nitu (2:8), taken by most commentators to be a reference to the
15 Although both occur in 10:13 describing the speech of a fool, they ai*e not joined in the same 
catchphrase which is evident in 1:17; 2:12; 7:25.
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number of mistresses which Qohelet accumulated. 16 Other than Qohelet’s use of the 
noun nîux in 7:26,28; 9:9, this would be the only other explicit reference to women in 
Ecclesiastes. Unfortunately, as Seow has recently pointed out, this interpretation 
rests on a misreading of a cuneiform sign in the El Amama texts, i?
Whybray ai’gues that the text of this final clause in 7:25 is corrupt and that at 
least one of the words my*7in m*73om *703 iJîun is not part of the original text.is 
However, there seems no reason to doubt the authenticity of m*73D “foolishness” and 
*^7*713 “madness.” Both are part of Qohelet’s vocabulary. Indeed, Qohelet outlines 
the parameters of his search in 7:25 in a way veiy similar to his statement in 1:17: 
m*73(UT m*7‘7n ny“n no3n ni^ “i*7 n*7 nznxi “I applied my mind to know wisdom and to 
know madness and foolishness.”i 9
If doubt is cast on anything in 7:25b, it must be on the phrase *703 3(U1. 
Qohelet says nothing about wickedness anywhere in the royal experiment (the 
abstract noun is used elsewhere only in 3:16; 7:17). The noun *703 is not otherwise 
found at all in Ecclesiastes (the abstract noun “folly” is represented by *730 in 10:6). 
It is tempting to delete *703 riun as an exegetical gloss (inserted to link 7:25 with the 
“wicked” woman in 7:26). By doing so, n3i*7 in 7:25b would have two direct objects 
(which should read m*7‘7im m*73D on the basis of 1:17; 2:12) to balance poium riD3n as 
the two direct objects of ni?i*7 in 7:25a. The whole of 7:25 would then essentially be
16 The context, refeiTing to the “delights o f men”, suggests that the reference is to women (cf. Cant 
7:7). Most coimnentators therefore follow Dahood (“Qoheleth and Recent Discoveries,” 307) and 
typically translate mto “many concubines”, appealing to an apparent Akkadian gloss sad] turn 
in El Amama Tablet 369.8 and Ugaritic st; “mistress, lady”. Cf. Whitley, Koheleth: His Language 
and Thought, 21-22.
17 In fact, G. Dossin’s reading sa  dh tumtyxtne. Nouvelle Lettie d’el Amama,” RA?> \ [1934] 127, 
line 8) is erroneous, should be read s a  qh tu&nà interpreted “cupbearer.” Seow therefore links rtiW in 
Eccl 2:8 with the postbiblical n70, “chest, box” and the Akkadian 5t?(;?i7{y(“Linguistic Evidence and 
the dating of Qohelet,” 655.
‘^ ^^hyhxsy, Ecclesiastes, 124.
19 I follow the Masoretic punctuation of 1:17 and read HDll as an infinitive (so also RSV). The 
versions understand as an object o f rUJ7b but tliis creates an awkward tautology.
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a restatement of Qohelet’s intent which he sets out in 1:17.
Although *703 D(un is represented in all the versions (so that we would have to 
assume the gloss to have been added before Ecclesiastes was translated), the earliest 
versions bear out part of my reconstruction of the text. The LXX reads, kqI tou 
yv&vai doepouc dc))pocruvr|y kqI aKXripiav kqI TT€pLcj)opdy, presupposing a 
Hebrew text of m*7‘7im m*73DT *703 rtun n3i*7i. The Peshitta meanwhile reads 
r^d\cu f^ àiciXjXfloa rcXrxao.'i cnàvo \ . t.t , the only significant
difference to the Hebrew text underlying the rendering of the LXX being that it 
understands *703 as if it were *7"03.
Because of its painstakingly literal Aquilan character, the LXX of 
Ecclesiastes can be useful in reconstructing a difficult text. The evidence of the LXX 
supports the deletion of the definite article from (11*730 and the LXX, Peshitta and 
Targum all support the addition of the conjunction to m*7*7in. The Hebrew text 
underlying all of these also lends some credence to the hypothesis that *703 3(U“i and a 
conjunction may have been added before an original m*7*7im m*730, for all of them are 
witness to a strange text in which the verb is followed by a genitive construction, 
itself followed by the two direct objects which we should expect to find according to 
1:17. The deletion of the conjunction from m*7*7in which underlies the Vulgate’s 
rendering: impietatem stulti et errorem imprudentium, and the MT may be 
understood as subsequent attempts to make sense of this earlier Hebrew text by 
rendering the four nouns as double accusatives after a verb of cognition.
In addition to considerations stemming from the wider context and the 
versions, there is further evidence supporting the deletion of *703 fi’om 7:25, for 
the terms in which Qohelet describes the woman of 7:26 and her male victims 
precludes an understanding of either as “wicked.”
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(i) Qohelet’s VocabulaiT of Entrapment 
Three words suggesting entrapment are associated with the woman in Eccl 
7:26. The woman’s intellectual/emotional side (3*7) is characterised by the terms 
DniizJb and D’Dnn. Her physical side (T) by the teim nn.iox. Qohelet speaks using 
veiy similar entrapment vocabulaiy in 9:12. There, humankind are portrayed as 
fishes caught (tnx/tUp^ ) in the fisherman’s net (nnizip), or birds in the fowler’s net 
(ns). In the latter case, the hunter is divine, rather than human: Muiphy rightly 
points out the parallel between the “evil time” (33 nr) mentioned in 9:12 and the 
catalogue of tunes which are deteimined by God in 3:1-8.20
Some of these words are relatively rare in the Hebrew Bible, and an 
examination of the contexts in which they occur elsewhere yields some surprising 
results.
liHû/nilzîb
The term mlzsp “net, prey” occurs four times in the Hebrew Bible outside the 
Book of Ecclesiastes (Ps 66:11; Ezek 12:13; 13:21; 17:20). In thiee of these 
occasions (Ps 66:11; Ezek 12:13; 17:20), it has its primaiy meaning of “net”. In all 
three example, the usage is a figurative one, illustrative of Yahweh’s judgement. On 
the one occasion when it means “prey” (Ezek 13:21), it refers to the people of Judah 
as the prey of a foreign power through the acquiescence of Yahweh: again, it is a 
reflection of divine judgment.
The term lizzp “net” occuis only twice outside Ecclesiastes (Prov 12:12; Job 
19:6). Unfortunately, the text of the former is dubious, and its use there cannot be 
verified, but in Job 19:6, the context is once again of Yahweh as Job’s hunter. It 
would appear from the examples which we find that, outside Ecclesiastes, both terms
20 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 94,
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are used in a context in which God is the hunter of the (sinful) person.
bin
The term bin which appears in Eccl 7:26 refers to a fisherman’s dragnet (as 
opposed to a moDQ or casting net which is spread on the surface of the water—Isa 
19:8). Outside Ecclesiastes, the term bnn appears only in the prophets (Ezek 26:5, 
14; 32:3; 47:10; Mic 7:2; Hah 1:15,16, 17).
Of the eight times which this term is used outside Ecclesiastes, only one 
occurrence uses bin in a figurative sense of a weapon used by evil people to ensnare 
each other (Mic 7:2). Even here, it has been suggested that bin may be derived from 
Vb3rr (I) and mean “destmction.”21 Three other occuirences use bin in the phrase 
b’bin nb(Ub/b’bin*7 mbîub “place for the spreading of nets (to dry)” either as an image 
of divine judgment (Ezek 26:5, 14) or blessing (Ezek 47:10). The remaining four 
(Ezek 32:3; Hab 1:15, 16, 17) concern the use of the bin itself as a figure of divine 
judgement. G. Giesen comments concerning this usage that “the ‘divine’ net in the 
hand of Yahweh, or used by others at his behest is a symbol of power and 
sovereignty.”22 In Ezek 32:3 the term is illustrative of Yahweh’s power over 
Phai'oah, who is depicted as a crocodile hauled out of the water in Yahweh’s bin. In 
Hab 1:15, 16, 17, Yahweh has allowed the Babylonians to become so mighty that 
they can catch other nations like fish. In this example, the Babylonians effectively 
act as God’s viceregents, punishing the sins of the surrounding nations, including 
Judah.
nox
The term nox “fetter” is a more neutral one, generally used in a literal rather 
than figurative sense. In Judg 15:14 the pluial is used of the fetters binding Samson,
21 A. S. Van der Woude, Micah (Nijkerk: Callenback, 1976) 244.
22 G. Giesen, “Dnn (II),” TDOT 5.202,
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and in Jer 37:15 in the phi’ase iioxn m  “prison.” However, Vios can sometimes be 
used of divine chastisement (Job 36:13; Ezek 3:25; Ps 149:8). The Qal passive 
participle is also found in Eccl 4:14.
(ii) Woman as Divine Agent
Qohelet describes the times (ri3) which go to make up existence in terms of a 
divine fisheiman or fowler catching human beings in his nets in 9:12.1 follow Fox in 
linking this passage to the series of times enumerated in 3:1-15 and in reading that 
passage with a deteiministic slant. The terms in which the heart of the woman is 
described in 7:26 suggest that she is the agent of a deterministic force. Where nniJb 
occui’s in 9:12 for God’s nets with which he harvests human beings in order to 
impose the appropriate event in the individual’s life, the related term nziQ describes 
the nets with which the woman ensnares men. Outside Ecclesiastes, both aie 
predominantly used in the context of a divine, or divinely appointed, hunter 
ensnaring sinful human beings. The same applies to the tenn nnn, and although mox 
may be a more neutral term, the root from which it comes, as we have seen, can 
occasionally be used in this sense. If 3:1-15 is understood as a deterministic text as 
well as 9:12, the depiction of the woman as representative of an inescapable divine 
force would be consonant with Qohelet’s statement that there is “a time to love” 
(3:8).
Although Qohelet’s reaction to the woman in 7:26 is strongly negative, she 
cannot be deemed “wicked” as such since her whole raison d ’être is to perform 
God’s will by punishing those who have sinned. Her role as an instrument of divine 
judgment on humanity is emphasised in 7:26: “those who aie good before God will 
escape from her; the sinner will be caught by her.” Unlike Israelite Wisdom’s 
traditional portrait of the feminine outsider, the “sin” of her victim lies not in the act
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of following her (the woman of 7:26 appears to be morally neutral). Rather, it is 
preexistent in the man who encounters her. Moreover, the victim is unable to exercise 
free will in the face of the woman’s power. He is entirely dependent on God as to 
whether he is caught or whether he escapes.
The dragnets (□’□‘in) with which the woman is associated suggest the 
efficiency of the woman at the task which God has allotted her. Again, unlike 
Israelite Wisdom’s negative portraits of the feminine outsider, it is not the occasional 
stray who succumbs to her allure, but whole shoals of the sinful. In the previous 
section, Qohelet comments that “there is not a just man on earth that does good and 
does not sin” (xbir x*7i 3ib ntU3"—7:20), preparing us for Qohelet’s statement that 
one “who is good before God” (D’n'^xn nib) will escape her, whilst she will 
ensnare “the sinner” (Xbin). The ubiquity of sin among men (as suggested by 7:20 
and implicit in 7:29) as well as the scale of operations evident from her dragnets 
(D’Din) forces the conclusion that the image of the woman is intended universally: it 
is for this reason that 7:26 should not be translated, “More bitter than death is the 
(sort of) woman who...” as a foil to Qohelet’s apparently positive statement in 9:9. 
Rather, she seems representative of her gender and the role in God’s creation which 
Qohelet envisions for it.
(iii) 7:26 as Allusion?
Woman as Qohelet depicts her appeal’s remarkably dissimilar to the 
traditional Israelite poi’traits of the feminine outsider which appear in the Book of 
Proverbs (2:16-19; 5:3ff.; 7:5-23; 9:13-18). The woman of Eccl 7:26 is more a 
huntress of the masses than a temptress of the individual. She is an evei’ywoman 
figui’e who works for rather than against God in her enactment of judgement upon 
those who have sinned. Nothing suggests that she encouiages previously “good”
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people to sin.
The sole similaiity between Qohelet’s portrait of the woman in Eccl 7:26 and 
those in other Israelite Wisdom texts lies in the fact that all appeal* in the context of 
the search for wisdom. The m i woman and Dame Folly lure their victims from the 
path of wisdom to commit an act of folly which inevitably results in an early 
death.23 No such fate, however, is suggested for the consort of the woman of Eccl 
7:26. She herself is the punishment, though for what is not specified.
In Ecclesiastes, Vxbn “sin” occurs eight times (2:26; 5:5; 7:20; 7:26; 8:12; 9:2; 
9:18; 10:4). From these examples, it is evident that Qohelet very often uses terms 
derived from this root not so much to denote a simple moral transgression, but rather 
the act of displeasing God in some form, which may not be obvious to the doer of 
this action. 24 The majority of commentators hold that this is true particularly of 
2:26, in which the teim Xbin (“sinner”) occurs in opposition to the phrase •’35*7 31b 
□■’n*7xn (“good before God”).25 This opposition between Xbin and D'’n‘7xn '•32*7 3ib 
OCCUI’S elsewhere in Ecclesiastes only in 7:26 in the context of those who are fated to 
fall victim to the woman and those whom God will allow to escape her. This forces 
the conclusion not that the woman’s victims are immoral, but that they have 
displeased God.26 The woman’s victims therefore cannot be designated as “wicked” 
(although some may be). If neither the woman nor her victims have committed a
23 Death as a consequence of following the m i woman is mentioned in Prov 2:18; 5:5; 7:27. In 
Prov 9:18, the passage in which “Dame Folly” appeal’s, the plnaseology is much shai’per; the 
woman’s house itself is the coimtry o f the dead, an outlying annex of Sheol (C. H. Toy, Proverbs 
[Edinburgh: Clark, 1899] 191).
24 This idea is particularly evident in 4:17 (Eng. 5:1).
25 For a detailed treatment of this subject, cf. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 227-28.
26 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 76; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 146. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 125. Most 
recently, this position has been adopted by de Jong (“God in the Book o f Qohelet: A Reappraisal of 
Qohelet’s Place in Old Testament Theology,” FT 47 [1997] 157). As of this writing, Whybray 
appears to have retreated from the position which he takes up in his commenatary and now does 
assign a moral meaning to the two expressions (“Qoheletli as Theologian,” in A. Schoors (ed.), j
Qohelet in the Context o f Wisdom [BETL; Leuven: Leuven University/Peeters, 1998]—^forthcoming). 1
In this, he follows Lauha (Kohelet, 58). I
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moral transgression, the secondary nature of *703 301 in 7:25 must now be 
reasonably assured.
(iv) The Purpose of the Woman 
If the woman’s victim is free from moral guilt, we must ask the puipose of 
the woman’s appearance. Possibly she is a symbol of the arbitrary nature of the 
deity’s inteiwention in life (as in 9:11-12). This is not, however, illustrative of any 
point in 7:23-25.
Whatever the reasons for incurring God’s displeasure, it would appear that 
the Nbin is punished with a life tightly circumscribed by God. His fate is “...toil 
(p33): to gather and to heap up to give to one who is good before God” (2:26). Love 
(3:8) is also a form of p]3 doled out by God (3:10), one of the times apparently 
allotted “so that nobody may find out the work of God from beginning to end” 
(3:11). This appears to beai' out 2:26, where we are told that God gives wisdom to 
those who are □"n*7Xn ’32*7 3ib, denying it to the Xbin. The woman may therefore 
have a role in preventing the sinner from discovering “the work of God” (exactly the 
kind of information which Qohelet seeks [7:13; 8:17]). Qohelet, when speaking of 
the pleasures, including women, associated with the kingly lifestyle in the ‘Royal 
Experiment’ sh’esses that he maintained his hold on wisdom (2:3, 9) despite their 
designation as “folly and madness” (1:17; 2:3, 12 cf. 7:25). Qohelet supposes such 
pleasures as the woman embodies as antithetical to wisdom.27
Qohelet’s viewpoint in his assessment of the woman is that of the sage, the 
seeker after wisdom. Escape from the woman is therefore a mai’k of divine favor. 
Though one who falls victim to “time” (n3) may not find the work of God, he may
27 Crenshaw argues tiiat pri0 in 2:2 refers only to lighter side of joy: “Qohelet dismisses frivolity as 
incompatible with intelligence and psychological stability” (Ecclesiastes, 77), but the same might be 
said of all joy, for Qohelet dwells on the sadness of the sage in 1:18; 7:4.
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find contentment. Qohelet’s advice to the “sinner”—the vast majority, if not all of 
his audience, is to accept the decision of God with equanimity.
His assessment of the woman as “more bitter than death” is emphasised as a 
personal one (’3X KZ^ ib “I find...”). It does not appear to be so for her quany. The 
reason for Qohelet’s personal assessment of the woman as “more bitter than death” 
has never been satisfactorily explained: presumably God has permitted Qohelet’s 
escape, so why such a harsh judgement? A possible solution to this problem will be 
offered presently (“Woman and the Sum”).
(bl Eccl 9:9
There is no conflict between Qohelet’s view of the woman in 7:26 and 9:9. In 
the latter passage, Qohelet states: “Experience life with the woman you love all the 
days of the life of youi’ vanity, which he has given you under the sun, all the days of 
your vanity: for that is your portion in this life, and in the labour which you take 
under the sun.” Qohelet sees typical life with the woman as reflective of the of the 
overall vanity of existence. Yet he also advises his (male) audience to “experience 
life” with her. Man’s love of Woman is unavoidable : no choice is suggested here as to 
how Man feels about her (as indeed there is none in 7:26), although Man can perhaps 
embrace his fate enthusiastically or not. God’s hand in the matter of love between 
the sexes, illustrated by the imagery of the divine nets in 7:26, is reflected in the fact 
that Woman is called the “portion” of Man in life. 28 For Qohelet, love is allotted by 
God as part of “the work which is done under the sun.” It is potentially a positive 
thing for the one who experiences it: 9:9 suggests that Woman may be a source of 
companionship and support through life. The gift which God gives is one of *73n
28 Such an interpretation is supported by the Oriental Ketib in 9:9 which reads Jpbn X’n “she is your 
portion” for “]pbn ion “it is your portion.” However, mn probably refers to (joyful) life with the 
woman: thus, Muiphy (Ecclesiastes, 93), who remarks, “the usual irony is present; one is to accept 
this ‘portion,’ but widiout forgetting the perspective o f ‘vain life’ and its ‘toil.’”
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“vanity” however, like the less pleasant one which he gives to the afwj in 2:26. 
Qohelet seeks that which is not bnn, explaining why he considers escape from the 
woman in 7:26 a mark of divine favour.
Qohelet’s view of Woman is at once restricting and liberating. Like Man, she 
is a being controlled by the deity. Yet she is also an extremely powerful semi-divine 
figure. Her weapons are allocated to her by God, and Man has no defence in the face 
of them. God may pull the strings fr om heaven, but on earth, it is Woman who is the 
master. In a sense, Qohelet’s world view is one in which Eve has ganged up with 
God against Adam.
(c) Eccl 7:27-28 
(il Humanity and the Sum 
On the basis of the entrapment imagery associated with the woman in 7:26, 
the scholarly consensus has hitherto been that the woman of this passage is an 
archetype of wickedness. This alone has provided the rationale for the elliptical 
interpretation of the verb xz^ n in 7:28 as “found trustworthy.”
In 7:27, Qohelet describes the counting process by which he hoped to “find” 
the “sum”. The Hebrew teim ]l30rr which lies behind this translation is identified 
with Wisdom in 7:25. A possible connection between humanity (Man and Woman) 
and the p30n is underlined by the repetition of the verb xzsb in Qohelet’s statement 
that “one man in a thousand have I found, but a woman in all those have I not found” 
(7:28).
I would argue that this repetition is significant. Qohelet speaks of failing to 
“find” the p30n (described as “that which I sought continually”), and then, in what 
appears to be an explanation of his statement, remarks on his inability to “find” 
human beings. The human connection is reinforced by the appearance of the p30n in
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7:25 among the human qualities of “wisdom...foolishness and madness” which define 
the internal state of all human beings and their external actions. 29 This human 
element is further suggested by its parallel usage to wisdom (nbDn), knowledge (n3i) 
and work (n03b) in 9:10. Qohelet considers that the ]i30n may be discovered by an 
investigation into humanity, their motivations and their deeds—this is also implied 
by Qohelet’s statement that he intended “acquainting my heart with wisdom...to lay 
hold on folly, till I might see what was that good for humankind which they should 
do under the heavens...” (2:3).
Commenting on Whybray’s assertion that the generally accepted elliptical 
interpretation of xz^ b as “find trustworthy” when applied to Man and Woman in 
7:28 is “merely a guess”, Murphy states “it is the context (vv. 26 and 29) which 
justifies the assumption that the specific meaning deals with moral conduct.”30 
However, if the context which 7:26 provides is now of the woman acting as a divine 
agent not against men who have committed a distinct moral transgression, but who 
have “displeased God” in some indefinable way, the justification for a moral 
understanding of the “finding” of human beings in 7:28 becomes more tenuous, and 
an alternative interpretation must be sought.
(ii). The Language of Seeking and Finding
In speaking of the ]n0n Qohelet never uses the verb 30n. Instead, the verbs 
0pn (7:25, 28, 29) and XZib (7:24, 26, 27 [twice], 28 [thrice], 29; 9:10) occur. The 
other significant object of these verbs as concerns Qohelet’s search is “the work of 
God”/“the work which is done under the sun” (3:11; 8:17).
29 Crenshaw states: “Coupled with wisdom, / ? j ? c o n s t i t u t e s  the substance of human thought,
the sum total of all knowledge” (Ecclesiastes, 145). Whybray follows a similar course in his 
understanding of it as “the sum of things” (Ecclesiastes, 124).
30 Whybray is alone in insisting that the verse “does not state what it is that the speaker has sought, 
and which he has, or has not, foimd.” (Ecclesiastes, 127); cf. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 77.
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I follow the positions of Gordis, Fox and Miu’phy that “the work of God” 
and “the work which is done under the sun” are one and the same (an important 
point if a case is to be made for determinism). 31 Qohelet sees (nxn) “all the work of 
God” in the course of his investigation (8:17) and recommends his followers to do 
likewise (7:13), but this work is impossible to “find out” (xz^b—3:11) or “know” 
(V T — 11:5). Likewise, Qohelet and others can see (nxn—1:14; 2:17; 4:3) “the work 
which is done under the sun”, but Qohelet denies the ability of humankind to “find 
out” (xz^ b—8:17) this work.
Thus, both “the work which is done under the sun” and “the work of God” 
appear to be the objects of Qohelet’s seaich, along with the ]ib0n. Perhaps all three 
aie not to be identified exactly, though that is certainly the implication of Whybray’s 
definition of the pb0n as “the whole of that which is”: it does, however, seem 
reasonable to suppose that finding the pb0n must be linked fairly intimately with the 
other declared objects of Qohelet’s search. Indeed, Murphy’s comment that 3:14 
“whatsoever God does, it shall be forever: nothing can be added to it, nor anything 
taken from it” is about “the immutability of the divine deed, not word” and is thus to 
some extent divorced from possible antecedents in Deut 4:1-2; 13:1 would appeal’ to 
support the idea that Qohelet might have envisioned “the work of God” as a ]ib0n.32 
Qohelet’s intent, however, is not to alter it but to count it.
In the context of his search, whether he chooses to denote the object as “the 
work which is done under the sun”, “the work of God” or “the sum”, Qohelet uses 
the terms 0pb and xzib in the sense of “seek to know”, and “find out about”
31 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 298-9; Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 175; 
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 13.
32 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 35.
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respectively.3 3 This is reflected in the parallel usage of the verbs 0pb and HT in 7:25 
and of xz^b/0p3 and 3b’ in 8:17. When Qohelet speaks of “seeking” and “finding”, he 
never uses it in a moral context.34
In 7:28, Qohelet speaks of “finding” a man, but not “finding” a woman on his 
quest for knowledge about “the sum.” Qohelet seeks knowledge of the world around 
him, and specifically what is “good for people to do under the sun” (2:3) by finding 
“the work which is done under the sun.” In order to do this, he considers by turns 
the cases of other individuals in order to build up his world view, di’awing 
appropriate conclusions with which to illuminate his thinking. Thus, having 
experienced the life of a king (2:12), he examines the situation of “the man whose 
labour is in wisdom and in knowledge and equity” who may leave his wealth to an 
unworthy person (2:21), he considers the oppressed as a group (4:1), the solitary 
driven individual with no-one to inherit the fruits of his toil (4:8), the young man 
who attains rank but is ultimately despised (4:13-16), the man who loses his money 
in an unlucky venture so that he cannot leave it to his son (5:12-17 [Eng. 13-18), the 
man who is given riches and the ability to enjoy them (5:19 [Eng. 20]), the man who 
is given riches but no ability to enjoy life, although he has every advantage including 
children and longevity (6:2-6). He cites the case of the righteous man who dies young 
and the wicked man who has an extended life span (7:15), the man who “rules over 
another to his own hurt” (8:9), the poor wise man who is despised despite his
iwisdom (9:13-18), and the situation in which servants appear to have greater status |
than their masters (10:7). These examples which he gives are “real life” cases which j
he examines in the course of his quest for “wisdom and the sum” (7:25). From these
33 Cf. Whybray’s understanding of the verb as “find out” (Ecclesiastes, 74); Crenshaw’s 
translation “fathom” (Ecclesiastes, 91, 153), or tliat of Gordis, “discover” (Koheleth: The Man and 
his World, 156, 186).
34 This observation is also made by Lohfink (“Wai' Kohelet em Frauenfeind?” 280-81) and Baltzer 
(“Women and War in Qohelet 7:23-8: la,” 130).
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examples he attempts to discover an underlying pattern which might tell him “that 
which is good for people to do under heaven the few days of their lives” (2:3). Thus, 
the ‘finding’ of individual people is intimately linked with the enquiry into the ]i30n: 
it is the only way in which Qohelet, who cannot take for granted those beliefs touted 
as certainties by the sages, can hope to comprehend the nature of existence.35
Just as Qohelet “sees” (nxi) “the work of God” or “the work whis done 
under the sun”, he “sees” these people who make up his worldview. Just as he fails 
to “find” (siib) his object, whether this be termed “the sum”, “the work of God” or 
“the work which is done under the sun”, he fails to “find” human beings. Essentially, 
Qohelet uses the teim “see” for the consideration of events and people: “find” has to 
do with the acquisition of knowledge from this process. Yet human actions aie 
tainted by the irrational (2:3; 9:3) and the behavior of human beings leaves Qohelet 
bewildered (2:2, 15; 4:4, 8; 5:10 [Eng. 11]; 6:7; 9:16; 10:7). Because of this, the 
individual may be as unfindable as “the sum.”
/
(iii) Woman and the Sum 
Qohelet’s attempt to discover the ]in0n is based on his examination of 
humanity as a whole, their motivations and actions as defined by wisdom and folly: 
those characteristics of humanity, in other words, which reside in the mind (3*?) of 
the individuals which he considers.
This seai’ch is conducted by Qohelet’s application of his own mind (3*7) to 
certain features of existence. The term 3*7 is used with a first person suffix 18 times 
in Ecclesiastes (1:13, 16 [twice], 17; 2:1; 2:3 [twice], 10 [twice], 15 [twice], 20; 3:17, 
18; 7:25; 8:9; 8:16; 9:1). Once again, there is a concentration of usages in the ‘Royal
35 Such cases may be “hypothetical” or “an example from dally observation” (Crenshaw, 
Ecclesiastes, 110), but even if the former, Qohelet could not mentally reproduce all possible 
scenarios which may occiu* in a hiunan existence. Such hypotheticals would also still have to be 
based on some form of knowledge gained from observation.
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Experiment’ (12 uses), finding an echo in 7:25. Yet Qohelet by this means also 
considers and reaches conclusions about the hearts and minds (33*7/3*7) of other 
people, both individually and as groups (2:22, 23; 3:11; 5:19 [Eng. 20]; 7:4 [twice], 
7; 8:5,11; 9:3 [twice]; 10:2 [twice]; 10:3).
Qohelet reaches a conclusion about the 3*7 of Woman in 7:26; the counterpart 
to Qohelet’s heart with which he embarks on his quest for “the sum.” It is a mass of 
traps (o’liz^b/o’onn) ready to close on the unwary. Those who are caught by the 
woman may obtain the chance for a closer investigation of her, but as far* as Qohelet 
is concerned, the best that the sage can hope for is not that the male individual may 
‘find’ the woman: that way lies entrapment. Rather, God’s favor lies in escape and 
the hope that God may grant the sage “wisdom, knowledge and joy.”
Qohelet’s statement therefore, that “a woman...I did not find” works on two 
levels. On the one hand it suggests his objectivity and that he retained his wisdom (as 
in 2:3, 9), but on the other, it signals failure to know the sum totality of human 
motivation and action which is denoted by the ]i30n or “the work which is done 
under the sun.” If failure to find the ]i30n is explained by Qohelet’s inability to 
“find” men and women, we must assume both to be necessary for a successful 
resolution of his sear ch.
Essentially, Qohelet finds himself in what might be called a “Catch 22” 
situation. Even were Qohelet able to “find” more than a miniscule proportion of the 
male population, the finding of even one woman, equipped as she is with her divine 
weapomy, would mean the end of the search for the ]i30n. In Qohelet’s classic 
consideration of Sheol in 9:10, he states: “Whatever your hand finds to do, do 
mightily, for there is no work (ntU3û), no sum (]l30n), no knowledge (n3i), no 
wisdom (nbbn) in Sheol where you are going”. Woman has prevented Qohelet’s
Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes 161
object which is stated in 7:25 to be “to know (ni^ib)...wisdom and the sum 
noDn)”, and which is described in 8:17 as “the work which is done under the
sun”. Because of the woman of 7:26, Qohelet experiences a form of death-in-life, a 
grim foretaste of Sheol. Little wonder then that he can say on a personal level “/  find 
more bitter than death...Woman”. The dead are aware of nothing (9:5): Qohelet lives 
on with the experience of failure and no expectation of better things after death.
Whether the individual is tmpped or allowed to escape by God, the integrity 
of the pn0n remains intact. Qohelef s earlier assertion that “(Humankind) cannot 
contend with one stronger than them” (6:10) is proved correct. Woman forms a 
divine defence against attempts to find such knowledge as Qohelet seeks. God may 
give “wisdom, knowledge and joy” to the one who escapes the woman but this is not 
the same thing as the “the sum” which Qohelet wishes to attain.
(d) Eccl 7:29
The meaning of 7:29 remains obscure, and commentators have attempted to 
deal with it in a variety of ways. Bearing in mind the apparently co-extensive nature 
of the “the work which is done under the sun” and “the work of God”, 
Qohelef s experience in seeking the first has allowed him to conclude something 
about what God has done: it is that “God made (nâju) humankind pleasing but they 
have sought many
The MT’s, nlH^n has the general idea of “intrigues.” It is difficult to see how 
such a meaning fits in with the rest of the passage. Crenshaw remarks “Qohelet’s 
search for the sum...has failed, but humankind’s search for many devices or 
intrigues...has succeeded admirably.”36 Yet it is not the verb but (dp3 which is 
used, suggesting that humankind have failed in their search for m]3(drr. Fox, following
3 6 / w . ,  148.
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Ginsberg, appears to see the object of humankind’s searching as essentially the plural 
of ]l3tdn and accordingly translates “sums”: “the entire book of Qohelet, in fact, tells 
of his search for /7/ss^ùû/7ûù"'’'^ '^  I think the instinct of both is coiTect: they are
supported by other commentators who have argued at least for a double meaning for 
nl330n which takes into account the context of Qohelet’s search for the ]l3îdn.38
I would therefore repoint the MT’s ni]3(dri as n1]3(dn. At this point, however, 
another difficulty arises. Fox’s argument that Qohelet searches for m]3tdn meets with 
a problem because there is only one ]l3tdn mentioned by Qohelet. However, if I am 
on the right lines in suggesting that the p30n is ultimately made up of the thoughts 
and actions of humanity (i.e. “the work which is done under the sun”), it may be that 
Qohelet considered it to be capable of change. When people die, they go to the place 
where there is no ]i35dn and have no further part in “the work which is done under the 
sun.” When people are bom, they become part of the p3E)n. “The work which is 
done under the sun” may thus be different at one point in history than another. If the 
pnm is, as Whybray suggests, “that which is”, there may be n m  m23(dn “many 
sums” stretching back into the past: “those which were.”
Alternatively, it may be that Qohelet is simply playing on words, so that 
m^nîdn refers to (concrete) accounts of existence foimed by many individuals. Each, 
like Qohelet, hopes that their account will balance with the true (abstract) “account” 
par excellence. That they, like Qohelet, have failed in this regard would be suggested 
by the 3pl perfect form I0p3 in 7:29—Qohelet is saying that he is merely the latest 
in a long line of seekers after a pnm.
37 Ginsberg (Qoheleth, 103). Fox points to the use of the key term 0p3 in 7:29 as m 7:25, 28 
(Qohelet and his Contradictions, 243). I do, however, disagree with Fox’s assertion that “lü’ means 
‘shnpie, intellectually dhect’. The argument of Whybray, who points to the idiom ‘to be 10 '' in 
God’s sight’ in the sense of ‘to be pleasing to God’ seems to better fit the context (Ecclesiastes, 
127X
38 Lohfink, Kohelet, 58-9; Zimnierli, Der Prediget', 209-10.
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IV. Conclusion and Summary of Qohelet’s Thought
In 7:25, Qohelet considers humanity and their actions as defined by the teims 
“wisdom and the sum...foolishness and madness.” His failure in this endeavoui’ is 
signalled by the introduction of Woman, the divine agent protecting the ]n2?n. 
Elsewhere, Qohelet describes how “the work of God” is protected by the allocation 
of HP and Love is both of these: the one who has displeased God is caught by 
the woman and once caught there is no escape (9:9). Only God can deteimine the fate 
of the male individual with respect to this woman.
We may assume that Qohelet did escape the woman, but her existence 
nevertheless has serious consequences for Qohelet’s search. Not only does she 
protect “the work of God” from the sinner; she ensures that the counting process (of 
people, their motivations and actions) by which Qohelet hoped to find the p30n 
(7:27), which appears to be linked with “the work of God”/“the work which is done 
under the sun”, is doomed to failure. Qohelet finds only a small proportion of 
Mankind whose actions make up the ]i30n. He is unable to find Womankind (7:28), 
for she is too dangerous to approach—God’s favour is demonstrated not in finding 
Woman but in escaping her (7:26). Qohelet’s conclusion (7:29) ironically plays on 
this hunt for “the work of God.” He finds that that God did not intend humankind to 
search for the pnm but that, like himself, they have done so throughout history.
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Chapter 7 
“A time to Laugh”: 
Qohelet and Human Joy
I. Introduction
It would be fair to say that the joyful imperative is the one positive 
conclusion that Qohelet reaches during his investigation into “what was that good for 
humankind, that they should do under the heaven all the days of their life” (2:3). Yet 
Qohelet initially discounts pleasure and its material trappings as a legitimate good for 
human beings (2:1-2, ll) .i It is the predetermined nature of life which forces 
Qohelet to revise his initial conclusions about the value of pleasure. Thus, Qohelet 
frequently uses the phrase 313 px “there is nothing better” to qualify his 
recommendations to enjoy the material benefits which life can offer (2:24; 3:12, 22; 
8:15).2
Whybray considers the immediate contexts of the passages in which Qohelet 
affirms pleasure as a positive good (2:24-26; 3:10-15; 3:22b; 5:17-19; 8:14-15; 9:7- 
10; 11:7-12:1). 3 From these passages, several things become cleai'. The first, and 
most notable is that the opportunity and the ability to take pleasure in the material 
benefits of life is a gift gianted by God himself. The verb ]n] (2:26; 5:17-18; 8:15; 
9:9) and the derived noun nno (3:13; 5:18) occui' witli some frequency in these 
passages.4 Yet Qohelet also offers other reasons which are essentially related to this
1 Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 233-34, 243; Murphy, in particular, stresses that Qohelet’s experiment is 
not with mindless joy, but with “the good life” (Ecclesiastes, 17-18). Whybray explains Qohelet’s 
failure to find satisfaction in this experiment to the fact that he seeks it independently: joy can come 
only at the time which God determines for it (Ecclesiastes, 52). A very similar view is adopted by 
Hertzberg (Der Prec/zger, 81-82).
2 Murphy, Ibid., 26, 39, 53.
3 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 88. This pattern is followed in the main by de Jong (“A 
Book on Labom*: The Structuring Principles and the Main Theme of the Book of Qohelet,” JSOT 54 
[1992] 110).
4 Whybray, Ibid..
1
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one: that one’s lot in life is unchangeable and must be accepted (2:26; 3:14; 3:22b; 
5:18; 9:9),5 that life is fleeting and must therefore be made the most of (5:17b; 9:9b;
11:9; 12: lb), 6 and similarly that the present must be enjoyed because future events 
are concealed fi'om human beings (3:11; 3:22b; 8:14)7
Although it is doubtful that Qohelet regards all of these things as “positive 
incentives” rather than “depressing considerations”, the essential points of 
Whybray’s analysis of Qohelet’s attitude to pleasure are sound. 8 In Qohelet’s view, 
God does indeed play a pivotal role in the allocation of pleasure as the vast majority 
of commentators accept. This in itself is indicative to some extent of a deterministic 
view of life on Qohelet’s part. However, can pleasure as Johnston, Whybray and 
others suggest, really be considered solely as being within “the gift of God”?^
II. Human Efforts to Attain Jov 
Qohelet’s philosophy of life is notable in that human attempts to achieve 
contentment appear from the very beginning to be doomed to failure. In 4:8, he 
remarks on the case of the individual, without a companion, who labours puiely for 
himself: “there is no end of all his labour, nor does he ask, ‘For whom am I labouring 
and depriving myself of good things?”’ Such a person is symptomatic of the general 
dissatisfaction of humanity with the material benefits of life (a dissatisfaction which
5 R. K. Johnston states: “Man’s pleasure depends on God’s good pleasure, and the divine action 
cannot be neatly categorized or programmed by man” (“’Confessions of a Workaholic’: A Reappriasal 
of Qoheletli,” CBQ 38 [1976] 25). Cf. de Jong (“God in the Book o f Qohelet: A Reappraisal of 
Qohelet’s Place in Old Testament Theology,” 163), who states likewise that “the enjoyment of life 
has to be given by God.”
6 Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 168; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 184-85.
7 Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 238. Crenshaw sees the expression (“after him”) as 
referring to what happens to oneself after death (Ecclesiastes, 105).
8 Wliybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy”, 88.
9 Whybray, Ibid., 89; Ecclesiastes, 52; Johnston, “Confessions of a Workaholic,” 25; Crenshaw, 
Ecclesiastes, 90; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, Ix.
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Qohelet himself has, konically, experienced),! o The theme of acquisitiveness and the 
concomitant dissatisfaction with that which is acquired is one which is close to 
Qohelet’s heart, for he dwells on it in an extended passage (5:9-16 [Eng. 10-17]).!! 
In 5:9-11 he states:
He tliat loves money shall not be satisfied with money, nor he that loves abundance 
with increase: this is also vanity. When goods increase, their consumers increase 
but what good is tliere to then owners except to look at them with their eyes? The 
sleep of a labouring man is sweet, whether he eats little or much: but tlie rich 
man’s abundance will not allow him to sleep.
The paradox of toiling to achieve a goal, which then proves to be unsatisfying in 
some way, yet continuing to labour nevertheless is highlighted in the introduction to 
the book in 1:4-8. There, Qohelet uses a series of analogies from the natural world: 
the unceasing circular motion of the sun (depicted as a weary runner), wind and 
rivers. The labour of the human observer of these phenomena is also suggested in this 
passage: “the eye is not satisfied with seeing nor the ear full of healing” (1:8), i.e. 
that just as these items are in perpetual motion, so this results in a continual stream 
of information to our senses.!2 At the same time, however, every one of these 
natural phenomena follows a predeteimined path: the implication for Qohelet’s view 
of human labour is clear. Humankind also follows a predetermined path, an idea 
which is implicit in the cycle of death and birth for humanity as a whole in 1:3.!3 
The idea of toil driven by dissatisfaction is also evident in 4:4, “Again, I considered
10 Jastrow (A Gentle Cynic, 214 n. 62) perhaps goes too fai- in seeing an autobiograpliical touch in 
4:8, but Qohelet has in a sense experienced the disappointments of wealth in 2:11.
11m . Devine (Ecclesiastes, or the Confessions o f an Adventurous Soul [London: Macmillan, 1916] 
100) detects a note of “sympathy with the rich” here.
12 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 69.
13 Levine, “The Humor in Qohelet,” 78-79. By way of contrast, Ogden (“The Interpretation of i n  in 
Ecclesiastes 1.4,” JSOT 34 [1986] 91-92), followed by Whybray (“Ecclesiastes 1.5-7 and the 
Wonders of Nature,” JSOT 41 [1988] 105-7) argues that i n  refers to the cycles of the natural 
phenomena in 1:4-8.
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all travail, and every right work, that for this a man is envied of his 
neighbour”—Qohelef s comment here recognises the importance of rivalry and 
competition in human society but also contains the implication that competition 
leads to a vicious circle in which the individual drives himself without knowing the 
reason why, or without having an adequate reason for so d o i n g .  14 As we shall see 
presently, a successful outcome to one’s laboui' and the ability to make use of the 
material benefits therefrom is entirely dependent on the goodwill of the deity.
III. God’s Role in the Allocation of Jov
Qohelet appears to recognize that it is necessary for human beings to achieve 
some kind of balance if they aie to have any hope of contentment. Thus, he avers, 
“better is one hand full with quietness than two hands full with toil and chasing the 
wind” (4:8), and in a similar vein he comments, “better is the sight of the eyes than 
the wandering of deshe” (6:9). 15 How is such an equilibrium to be achieved? This 
question is closely linked with the double-sided nature of God’s gifts to humankind: 
on the one hand, God gives joy—the ability to “experience the benefits in one’s 
labour”, and on the other, toil—a sentence of hard labom' without mitigating benefits. 
In order to illustrate this, the relevant paits of the seven passages which Whybray 
considers as cential to understanding Qohelef s view of human joy will be considered 
in this section.
2:24-26
The text of this passage reads:
There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and that he
14 Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4:13-16,” 58.
15 Gordis also points out Qohelet’s expression of the limited nature o f joy here, i.e. that it lacks any 
“absolute value” in the grand scheme of things (Koheleth.'The Man and His World, 261-62).
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should let himself enjoy Üie good in his labour. This also I saw, that it was from 
the hand of God...For God gives to the one who pleases him wisdom, and 
knowledge and joy: but to the one who displeases him he gives toil, to gather and 
to heap up, in order that he may give to the one who pleases God.
Qohelet generally finds it difficult to reconcile pleasure to wisdom, prefening 
to associate it with folly or madness (2:2, 3; 7:1-6). By contrast, wisdom is 
frequently associated with distress (1:18; 2:23; 7:1-6). Uniquely in the book of 
Ecclesiastes, pleasure is paralleled with wisdom in 2:26. In this context, it is 
significant that both lie within the “gift of God.” Only God, it seems, can find a way 
of resolving the essential incompatibility between these two concepts and allow 
them to be present in a single in d iv id u a l.!6
The fact that it is God, and God alone, who grants both wisdom and joy to 
the individual points of itself to a deterministic agenda on Qohelet’s part. Yet, 
Qohelet’s explanation in 2:26 of how God acts to bring this state of affairs about is 
more significant still: God gives to the “sinner”, that is to one who displeases him, 
p v  (“toil”). It is the fate of this unfortunate individual “to gather and to heap up” 
material wealth, to give to “one who pleases God.” God thus determines the course 
of one’s life whether one is favouied or not: everyone it would seem is subject to 
some degree of divine interference.! 7
On another level, the fact of being within God’s gift means that divine 
interference in human actions is not momentary but continuous. In 1:13, the
13 In this context, it is worthy of note that Loader {Polar Structures in the Book o f Qohelet, 38, 41- 
42) argues that one should read UQD fin din" "D1 in 2:25, partially supported by some manuscripts, 
the Peshitta and Coptic version (cf. Barton, Ecclesiastes, 97; Zimmerli, Der Prediger, 164; 
Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 81) He goes on to translate 2:25 “for who can eat and who can think witliout 
him?” There is a strong contextual case for this reading, which would certainly be a supreme 
exposition of determinism on Qohelet’s part, Whitley {Koheleth: His Language and Thought, 28-29) 
is sympathetic to this reading but rightly cautious in the light of the fact that the secondary meaning 
“to worry/consider” for dm occurs only in later Rabbinic Hebrew and Mandaic.
17 Cf. Fox’s remark {Qohelet and his Contradictions, 188) that the complaint implicit in 2:26 has 
its basis in “God’s all-determining will.”
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expression “all things which are done under heaven” is described as the joi which 
God has given (]nD) to humankind in general. In 3:10, the teim is used in 
conjunction with the concept of “God’s gift” to humankind with reference to list of 
divinely appointed actions in 3:2-8.! « God’s responsibility for all human action is, 
as we have seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis, reflected in Qohelet’s parallel usage of 
“the work of God” with “the work which is done under the sun.”
Returning once more to the theme of pleasure in this passage, Whybray’s 
words are significant: “man should ‘eat and drink and find enjoyment in his toil’; but 
this is possible only when it comes ‘fi'om the hand of God’. God may give joy and 
pleasure; man can never achieve it for himself, however hard he may try.” !9 The 
phrase DMbxn “i’ “the hand of God” occurs again in 9:1 alongside V]ri3 and there too 
is indicative of Qohelet’s deterministic worldview.
3:1-12
The depiction of joy or pleasure as “the gift of God” is in line with the 
predetermined nature of life evident in 3:1-8, in which Qohelet speaks of the times 
(nr) for all activities and feelings mapped out for humankind by the deity. Many 
commentators, as we have seen, continue to regard this as a deterministic text, and so 
it may appear' odd that does not appear' among the actions listed therein for 
which there is a divinely appointed time.
Whybray’s thoughts on this passage are somewhat ambiguous. Despite his 
comment that “God may give joy and pleasure, man can never achieve it for
18 Murphy (Ecclesiastes, 34) links ]"]iJ in 1:13 with a divinely appointed task o f making sense out o f 
existence but is less clear as to its frame of reference in 3:10, stating shnply that it is “applied to the
problem of detei-minate tunes” in 3:1-8. It cannot mean that human beings are given the “toil” of i
making sense of these determinate times, shice God acts in 3:11 to prevent human beings from |
“finding out” the work o f God. Thus, the “toil” is that of carrymg out these divinely determined |
actions. This occupies human beings to such an extent that they are imable to act under their own j
mitiative to find out God’s plan (3:11). ]
19 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy”, 89. Cf. Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 53. \
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h i m s e l f  ”20 the exegesis of this passage offered in his commentary follows the line 
that the “times” of 3:1-8 are ideal times, unknowable to human beings, for various 
actions.2i
Although VriQty may not be mentioned in this passage, the idea that human 
pleasure may be to some extent predetermined by God is borne out by the 
appearance of in the list of times in this passage, for Qohelet states that there 
is “a time to weep, a time to laugh” (3:4). Moreover, the title with which Qohelet 
prefaces his list of actions states that “to everything there is a season, and an 
appointed time to every matter under heaven.” The universality of this passage is 
stressed by most commentators.22
The text of 3:12-13 itself reads:
I know that there is no good in them, except to rejoice and to fare well during one’s 
life, and also that everyone should eat and drhik and experience good in all one’s 
toil: it is a gift o f God.
In the face of the fact of divine control over humanity’s actions asserted in 
3:1-11, Qohelet’s conclusion is as one might expect, “I know that there is no good 
for humankind except to rejoice (motob DK ‘’3 [D1K3] 313 px)...it is the gift o f God 
(o^nbx nnQ)” (3:12-13). In Chapter 3 ,1 suggested that the “good” refers to the fact 
that it is an action over which the individual has some foim of control, a suggestion 
borne out to some extent by the fact that enjoyment of life depends on being granted 
“authorisation” (]i3bîi?) from God to do so. Even this “authorisation” is distributed 
according to “time”, however (8:9). Paradoxically, this means that even for those
20 Whybray, Ibid., 88.
21 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 66.
22 e.g. Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 254-55. Barton {Ecclesiastes, 98) also makes a link with Chapter 1 in 
this context and suggests the idea not only of all human action being carried out but all action also 
being repeated periodically.
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things which are apparently within oui' power we are dependent upon God. It is 
therefore the opportunity for pleasure which is detei’mined by God rather than the 
feeling itself (or perhaps one could say that the feeling is determined indirectly, by 
means of the authorisation): in any case, this idea that humanity’s ability to find joy 
is to some extent determined by the deity is expressed in 3:13 by the phrase “it is 
the gift of G od.”23
3:22
The next significant passage in which the same advice occurs is 3:22:
So I understood that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his
own works, for that is his portion (ipbn), for who shall bring him to see what shall
be after him?
Qohelet’s use of the term pbn (“portion”), has already been a subject of 
study in Chapter 2 of this thesis. There it was concluded that one’s “portion” in life 
was mainly associated with the reahn of human emotions: joy (2:10; 3:22; 5:17 [Eng. 
18]), love (9:9) or love, hate and envy (9:6).24 This conception of “portion” was 
also notable, however, in that God was also depicted as the giver or allotter of one’s 
portion in life (5:18). As Fox points out, the refusal to take one’s portion can be 
construed as a refusal to submit to God’s will (9:9).25 God’s control over human 
emotions is another pointer towar ds Qohelet’s deterministic view of existence.
In this context the term pbrr is once again indicative of God’s role in the 
allocation of pleasure. Yet there is also another aspect to this verse: one’s portion is
23 Loader {Polar Structures in the Book o f Qohelet, 105) notes however, “The conclusion drawn...is 
laden with tension because enjoyment comes from God. Enjoy, but remember that God’s gift could 
just as well have been different (another èt can come).
24 This aspect of the concept of portion is illustrated by Fox’s helpful study {Qohelet and his 
Contradictions, 57-59, 258).
25 Ibid., 59.
“A Time to Laugh Qohelet and Human Joy 172
to “rejoice in one’s own works.” In 3:11, Qohelet remarks that God acts as he does in 
order that “no-one might find out the work of God”, and in 8:17, he states that “no- 
one can find out the work which is done under the sun.” Implicit in Qohelet’s words 
in 3:22 is the counsel that that human beings should rejoice individually in their own 
actions and leave those within God’s sphere to God himself (“who shall bring him to 
see what shall be after hirn?”).26
5:17-6:2
Qohelet’s commentary on the dissatisfaction experienced by the avaricious 
man considers the situation of the man whose wealth is lost in an unlucky venture 
(5:12-13). Material wealth, it seems, may be lost as quickly as it is gained. This 
emphasises the lack of control which human beings have over their destiny in much 
the same way as 9:11. By itself, this remark need not be suggestive of determinism, 
however.
There ar e, however, a number of other significant features in the subsection 
5:17-19 which do betray a deterministic outlook on life. The text in question states:
Behold that which I have seen: it is good and comely for one to eat and drink, and 
to experience tire benefits of all one’s labour which one takes under tlie sun all the 
days of his life, which God has given (]ri3) him: for it is his portion (ip'pn). Every 
man also to whom God has given riches and wealth, and has given hhn authority 
to use it, and to take Ms portion, and to rejoice m his labour; this is the gift of 
God.
26 Podechard (L'Ecclésiaste, 317-19), Gordis {Koheleth: The Man and his World, 238), Loader 
{Polar Structures in the Book o f Qohelet, 106) and Fox {Qohelet and his Contradictions, 199) argue 
that tliis pMase, repeated in 6:12, refers to the individual’s future in his own lifetime. TMs is the 
position taken in tliis thesis, but whether it is understood as referring to this or to foreknowledge of 
one’s personal chcumstances after death (Delitzsch, Ecclesiastes, 272; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 81), or 
of events on earth after one’s death (Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 37) or both of the latter (Barton, 
Ecclesiastes, 110; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 105), the implication is the same: human knowledge is 
restricted to one’s actions in the present. Concemmg the fiiture in any capacity, there is only 
ignorance.
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The imperative to pleasure is based not only on the fact that the ability to enjoy 
pleasure in a specific instance is a gift of God (2:26), but also here because life itself 
is a gift. Qohelet has come a long way from his initial reaction on discovering the 
absence of true meaning to human existence. In 2:17, he “hates life.” Here he accepts 
that it is a gift to be made the most of. More significantly still, however, the ability 
“to eat and to drink and to experience the benefit in one’s labour” is termed the 
“portion” of the worker.
God’s purpose in allocating pleasure seems apparent in 5:19 for, speaking of 
the individual whom God favours, Qohelet comments, “he shall not much remember 
the days of his life, for God occupies him by the joy of his heart (nb nna^3).” Like 
the process of labom*, joy prevents humankind from dwelling on the futility of his 
existence. Joy, and indeed, woman occupy the intellectual/emotional side of one’s 
character (3b) occupied just as labour does the physical side. 27 the 3b is the part of 
Qohelet which attempts to grasp the underlying nature of existence during the royal 
experiment (1:17), but the 3b also “rejoices” in his labour or the products thereof 
(2:10). It is only when Qohelet turns and takes a second, closer look at his 
achievements that he sees their b3n, and begins to seek something more substantial.28 
God’s reason for allotting the gift of joy to certain individuals may not be 
disinterested.
Yet joy is not a universal gift. Qohelet also speaks of certain people who
27 Gordis argues against the idea that joy “deaden’s man’s sensibility to the brevity of life” 
{Koheleth: The Man and His World, 255-56) and derives niiJQ from nu) (I) “to answer” (cf. Jasfrow 
[A Gentle Cynic, 219 n. 88]), altliougli this interpretation is behind the tr anslations of the LXX, 
Peshitta and Vulgate. However, the basis for this, that “Koheleth regards joy not as a narcotic, but as 
a fulfillment of the will of God” fails to take into accoimt tlie possibility that joy’s narcotic quality 
may reflect God’s will. Fox argues against Gordis’s position effectively on linguistic grounds 
{Qohelet and his Contradictions, 218).
28 Wliybray {Ecclesiastes, 55-56) argues that joy is “vanity” in the royal experiment because it is 
acheived independently by Qohelet without divine assistance (thus it is opposed to the “gift of 
God”). Yet Qohelet achieves both wisdom and knowledge and joy in tiie course of his investigations 
(cf. 2:26). Even when it is clearly part of the divine gift, as in 9:9, joy is still “vanity”, for “all is 
vanity” (1:2; 12:8).
‘'A Time to Laugh Qohelet and Human Joy 174
have every material advantage in life but who for one reason or another, find 
themselves unable to make use of these benefits. This is illustrated in the following 
text:
There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is common among men: a 
man to whom God has given riches, wealth and honour, so that he wants nothing 
for himself of all that he deshes, but God does not give him the authority to use it 
and a stranger eats of it: this is vanity and an evil sickness (6:1-2).
This passage clearly shows the importance of God not only in the allocation 
of the initial gift of material benefits to the individual, but also in the opportunity to 
enjoy it. It is God who is the giver of “riches, wealth and honour”: the individual 
does not acquire them for h i m s e l f .2 9  ft is also God, however, who gives or withholds 
“authorisation” (Vübtü—5:18 [Eng. 19]; 6:2) to use the material goods which one 
acquires during one’s toil. Seow has correctly pointed out the legalistic overtones of 
Qohelet’s use of V3b .^30 God is portrayed by this means as an absolute ruler who 
controls every action of his subjects. His apparent arbitrariness in the choice of his 
favourites (2:26; 5:17; 6:2) only serves to make the parallel to the despotic rulers of 
Qohelet’s time closer.31
8:15
God’s role in the allocation of joy is also implicit in 8:15 in which Qohelet
states:
29 Crenshaw {Ecclesiastes, 125) remarks concerning this concept of divine gift, “This knowledge that 
life’s pleasures cannot be earned tlu’ougli diligence and good conduct imdercuts the fundamental 
premise of wisdom thinking...In Qohelet’s affirmations about God, the notion o f divine gift loses its 
comforting quality. The gift comes without rhyme and reason; it falls on individuals 
indiscriminately. Those who do not receive it can do nothing to change their condition.” At the same 
time, though divine gifts may be unpredictable, Qohelet does not suggest that they are random.
30 Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context of ‘The Preacher’s’ Hermeneutic,” 176-181; “Linguistic 
Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” 653-54.
31 This assessment holds true whether one dates Ecclesiastes to the Persian or Greek periods.
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So I praised joy, for a man has no better thing under the sun than to eat, and to 
drink, and to be merry; for that shall remain with him of his labour during his life, 
which God gives hhn under the sun.
Qohelet, as Whybray notes, goes further in this passage than in his previous 
commendations of joy by praising (n3(D) it as a positive benefit. 32 His thought has 
developed somewhat since 4:2 in which the same verb occurs when he stated, “So I 
praised (nn^) the dead more than the living.” The reasoning for taking this 
opportunity is not so much that God has given (]n]) life to humankind, but that he 
has given a relatively short span of life.33 This life, in Qohelet’s view is to be made 
the most of, but the fact that pleasure is a second best option for all Qohelet’s 
recommendation is illustrated by Qohelet’s use of the formula DS c . . .313 px “there 
is no good...except.”34
Although God’s role in the allocation of pleasure is not emphasised in this 
text as in others, the rationale behind finding enjoyment is suggestive of God’s role as 
the one who gives and takes away life. By extension, this implies joy as pail of the 
divine plan for human beings. This is particulai'ly evident in the next passage to be 
considered.
9:7-9
The text of 9:7-9 is a crucial one for understanding how Qohelet’s 
recommendation to joy fits in with his deterministic worldview:
32 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 87.
33 Cf. Whybray (Ecclesiastes, 102) on the relationship between the brevity of life and the possibility 
of joy: “Qoheleth does not disguise this Ihnitation of man’s enjoyment: it is precisely this lUnitation 
which adds point to tlie advice to enjoy life as much as possible.”
34 Ogden (“Qoheleth’s Use of the ‘Nothing is Better’ Form,” JBL 98 [1979] 341-50) notes tlie 
fimction as a partial response to the generally negative answer required to the question D“isb ]nn" riD 
but also links it strongly to deterministic thought: the only good for the individual is to follow 
along the path that God has willed for him.
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Go, eat youi- bread with joy and drink yom* wine with a happy heaj% for God has 
aheady approved your actions. Let your clothes be always white and let your head 
lack no ointment. Experience life with tiie woman you love all the days of your vain 
life which he has given you under the sun, all the days of your vanity, for that is your 
portion in this life, and in your labour which you undertake under the sun.
The imperative to joy in 9:7-9 is a remarkably strong one. It is particularly 
significant for understanding God’s role in the allocation of joy to the individual 
because Qohelet bases his advice on the fact that “God has already approved your 
works” ("ptDhD nx O'-nbxn nyi “QD). The precise meaning of this phrase is a matter of 
some debate among commentators. The verb nisn “to accept” used in this verse is 
elsewhere used of the pleasure which God takes in sacrifices (Deut 33:11; Amos 5:22 
etc.). The idea for Murphy is therefore that this divine pleasure means “the 
mysterious approval and gifts freely bestowed by God” (cf. 2:26). Presumably, this 
would mean, as with Whybray, that the fact that God has given human beings the 
opportunity to take pleasure in life means that God has in general approved the
taking of pleasure.35
This, however, is not what the texts says. The statement that “God has 
already approved your works” would appear to suggest that the choices which the 
individual makes and the resulting actions are known in advance by God (how else 
could one’s actions be “already approved”?). Qohelet’s use of the more general term 
“your works” (“f^ tDDD nx) as opposed to a more specific reference such as “these 
works”, “pleasure” or the like, which one should perhaps expect, is suggestive that 
he understands such actions as simply one part of the overall activity which God has
35 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 92; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 144. So also Barton, Ecclesiastes, 162; Fox, 
Qohelet and his Contradictions, 259.
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willed for huinanity.36
In the wider context, such a reading is in line with the deterministic 
worldview advanced by Qohelet in Chapter 9 as a whole. Thus, Qohelet states in 
9:1 : “the righteous and the wise and their works are in God’s power [lit; “the hand of 
God”]: no-one knows either love or hatred by all which is before them.” God’s 
sphere of deterministic control is delineated here as “the righteous and the wise and 
their works (orfiODa)”, thus prefiguring the statement that “God has already 
approved “your works” in 9:7.37 Notably, the phrase “the hand of God”
(o^nbxn T) recurs in 9:1 in this heavily deterministic passage: elsewhere, it is used in 
the context of God’s gift of joy to those he favours (2:24).38
The same deterministic atmosphere is evident in 9:11-12. The divine nets and 
snares of 9:12 and their relevance for determinism have already been discussed in 
Chapter 5.39 This is reinforced by the occuixence of the phr ase np (“time and 
event”) in 9:10 as the controlling factor in the outcome of human endeavour. As has 
been argued in Chapter 2, this passage is similarly indicative of Qohelet’s 
deterministic outlook on existence.
In the context of these passages, the statement in 9:7 that “God has already 
approved your works” is an affirmation of the necessity of deriving pleasure from 
life in the light of Qohelet’s deterministic view of the same. The rationale given for
36 Most commentators such as Podechard (L'Ecclésîaste, 414), however, understand the term “j’toUD 
in the specific (but still deterministic) sense: “Qoh. estime que si le travail d’un homme lui a procuré 
quelques facilités de jouh, c’est ime marque certaine que Dieu veut qu’il jouisse en effet, car Dieu 
seul donne les biens et le pouvoir d’en profiter...”
37 Delitzsch (Ecclesiastes, 354-55) interprets 9:1 in this overtly deterministic way extending even the 
emotions of human love and hatred to God’s control (cf. Rudman, “Woman as Divine Agent in 
Ecclesiastes,” 421). The fact that it is the wise whose actions are under God’s control Ihiks neatly 
with 9:7 for Qohelet advises the wise disciple, whose actions are thus divinely “approved.” The same 
position is also held by Gallmg (Der Prediger, 113) and Loader (Polar Structures in the Book o f 
Qohelet, 102).
38 Ogden (“Qoheleth DC 1-6,” VT 32 [1982] 160) notes the appearance of the phrase in 2:24 but 
understands 9:1 in a non-deterministic sense. God determines the “outcome” of an action rather than 
the action itself.
39 Rudman, Ibid, 417-19.
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Qohelet’s advice is that one may as well enjoy life to the full because God has 
already decided what we are to do. Qohelet’s use of the “nothing is better” formula 
in the context of joy takes on a deeper significance therefore. For Qohelet’s avowed 
aim is to find out “what was that good that men should do under the heavens.” Since 
all is predeteimined, such a search loses its raison d'être—and Qohelet can conclude 
that there is nothing better than to “sit back and enjoy the ride.”
This reading of 9:7 is lent further support by the appearance of Woman in 
9:9. Again, I have argued that Woman acts as a divine agent in Qohelet’s worldview. 
The entrapment vocabulary with which she is associated in 7:26 make her a universal 
force from which escape is possible only through the assistance of God. This is 
reflected in 9:9 in which Qohelet advises his reader to “experience life with Woman 
whom you love.” No choice is given over whether Woman is loved: this is taken for 
granted by Qohelet.40
Thus, the passage 9:7-9 reflects the wider context of Chapter 9 in which it is 
placed but also establishes links with several other deterministic passages in 
Ecclesiastes. Once again, God’s role in the allocation of human joy is amply 
illustrated by Qohelet.
11:8-12:7
The next and final section in which joy is recommended, indeed commanded, 
by Qohelet is found in 11:8-12:7. For the purposes of making detailed comment, 
11:8-10 are reproduced below:
But if a man live many yeai's and rejoice in them all, yet let him remember the 
days of darkness, for they shall be many. All that comes is vanity. Rejoice, young 
man, in your youth and walk in the ways of your heart and in the sight of your
40 Ibid., 421.
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eyes but know that for all these things God will bring you into judgement. So 
remove sorrow from your heait, and put away evil from your flesh, for childhood 
and youth are vanity.
Part of the rationale for the enjoyment of life is the consciousness of the finality of 
death, but Qohelet also makes a rather strange statement: that God will “bring into 
judgement” the young man, holding him accontable for the actions which Qohelet 
recommends. Yet recommend them Qohelet clearly does, both before and after this 
warning of divine judgment. What can be meant by this sentence “Know that for all 
these God will bring you into judgement”?
This phrase therefore requires discussion. In Chapter 2, it was argued that the 
term 3StOQ is expressive of one aspect of God’s determination of all events. Yet this 
paiticular passage depicts God judging human beings for following Qohelet’s advice 
concerning the enjoyment of life. Life itself and the ability to enjoy life are clearly 
stated elsewhere to be the gift of God (2:26; 5:18 [Eng. 18]; 8:15; 9:9; 12:7). Can the 
idea of God’s judgement in this passage be reconciled with Qohelet’s advice to make 
use of this opportunity here and elsewhere?
Gordis attempted to resolve the difficulties posed by the appearance of this 
sentence in such a context by arguing that God will judge the youth according to the 
way in which he has used the opportunities for joy granted to him.4i Others have 
pointed out that the idea of divine judgement is not a concept alien to Qohelet, and 
therefore that even if such a judgement implies a negative attitude towards human 
pleasure on the part of the deity it is compatible with Qohelet’s thought.42 More
41 Gordis, Koheleth: the Man and His World, 336.
42 The case for retaining 11:9b is propounded by Wildeboer, Der Prediger ,161; Gordis, Koheleth: 
the Man and his World, 336; Jones, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, 341; Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 7-XII 8: 
Qoheleth’s Summons to Enjoyment and Reflection,” VT 34 (1984) 31-32; Fox, Qohelet and his 
Contradictions, 279; Fredericks, "Life’s Storms and Structural Unity in Qoheleth 11.1-12.8” 101; 
Mm^hy, Ecclesiastes, 117.
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typically, however, the statement is seen as a g l o s s .4 3
The structure of the passage 11:9-12:8 as a whole is as f o l i o  w s : 4 4
180
11:8 If a man lives many years Thne Phrase
let hhn rejoice Theme A
and remember Theme B
the days of darkness will be many Time Phrase
all that comes is hebel Conclusion
11:9-10 Rejoice Theme A
(in your youth)...in the days of 
your youth
Time Phrase
for youth...is hebel Conclusion
12:1 Remember Theme B
in the days o f youi* youth 
before...
Time Phrase
12:2 before...
12:6 before...
12:8 habel habalim..,B].l is hebel Conclusion
The same applies to the first stanza of this passage (11:9-10). If the sentence in 
question, 33003 DMbxn “|"X"3^  nbx b3 bo "3 on “Know that for all these, God will 
bring you into judgement”, is deleted from 11:9b, the stmcture of this short passage 
can clearly be seen:
“pnmn3 "on “fob -jO'-o"! 
"l"ro "X1031
“]nnb"3 nno noO 
-fob "3“i“i3 “|bm
43 Siegfried, Prediger imd Hoheslied , 73, followed by McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 
26; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 185; Podechard, L ’Ecclésiaste, 452; Jastrow, A Gentle Cynic, 238; 
Zimmerli, Das Buck des Predigers Salomo, 242; Scott, Proverbs & Ecclesiastes, 254; Galling, 
Prediger Salomo, 120; Salters, The Book o f  Ecclesiastes: Studies in the Versions and the History o f  
Exegesis, 227; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 184.
44 This scheme is derived from Ogden (Qoheleth [Sheffield: JSOT, 1987] 193-94), based upon the 
study of H. Witzenrath (Süss 1st das Licht...: Eine literaturwissenschaftliche Untersuchung zu 
Kohelet 11:7-12:7 [MUSKTF, ATSAT 11; St. Ottilien: Eos, 1979).
”A Time to Laugh Qohelet and Human Joy 181
"|“12)3Q “f3bû DUD lOm
bnn nnnmi nnb"n "d
Rejoice, young man in your youth Let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth
Walk in the ways of your heart And in the sight of yom* eyes
Remove soitow from yom* heart Put away evil from your flesh
For youth and dark hairs are vanity
The first line introduces the overall theme of enjoying youth; the term nnb" in the 
first half is balanced by nninD in the second half, whilst the succession of 
imperatives dominate the passage as a whole (îiQiD “rejoice”, D"3" “let cheer” (jussive), 
“|brr “walk”, "ion “remove”, “nun “put away”). Of itself, this would not point to 
11:9b being a gloss, for it too uses an imperative, un “know.” Significantly, however, 
it appeal's between the second and third lines of this passage which appear* to form a 
couplet. Line 2a and 3 a give advice with respect to the intellectual/psychological side 
of the young man’s life “your heart”: these are, however, balanced by the physical 
dimension to life in 2b and 3b as expressed by the terms “your eyes”/“your flesh.” 
That there is a close relationship in structure and thought between the second and 
third lines of the passage above is cleai'ly suggested by its structure, yet the phrase 
33dDD D"nbxn “îX"D" nbx bD bu "D urn is interposed between them in the MT, 
breaking up both the rhythm and the thought of the passage.
This consideration alone might give giounds for suspicion that Qohelet 
himself was not responsible for 11:9b. Yet commentators deny the authenticity of 
this phiase on other grounds: the similarity between 330DD D"nbxn nbx bD bu 
in 11:9b and a conesponding expression, obu] bu bu Damn XD" D"nbxn bD nx 
in 12:14 is striking, and has led many to suppose that the addition of 11:9b has 
resulted from the influence of the second epiloguist. That is, an attempt has been
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made to interpret the extended passage 11:7-12:7 in the light of the pious comment 
of the second epiloguist in 12:14. This may also underly the MT’s reading of 
“your creator.”45
Whilst it is true that Qohelet speaks of judgement elsewhere in Ecclesiastes, 
it is the context of this particular occurrence that gives cause for suspicion. In 3:17, 
Qohelet mentions that God will judge the righteous and wicked as a natur al follow up 
to his observations about the lack of human justice. The fact that this remar k is made 
in the context of there being “a time there for every purpose and every work”, 
recalling his original statement in 3:1 gives it a ring of authenticity. The fact that it is 
God who is the subject of the verb reinforces the idea that these times refer to the 
appointed times for divine activity, or to human activities which are determined by 
God.
Likewise, the terms 33K7D and nu are associated in 8:5, 6 in which Qohelet 
speaks of the sage’s ability to detect God’s activity in the events which occur on 
earth and also humanity’s distressing situation resulting from the divine control of 
such events. Again, there is a clear* echo of 3:1, 17 in the phraseology of 8:6: 
“because to every business there is time and judgement, therefore the misery of man 
is great” (rbu nnn Dnxn nun "d nu (5" fsn bub "D).46 This use of the term
finds no par allel in 11:9. On the basis of this, and the other* evidence adduced, it 
should therefore be considered as a gloss.
This consideration of the passage 11:8-12:8 has so far sought to demonstrate 
that God does not seek to judge those who make use of the material benefits they
45 I emend to - j in  "your grave”, with Scott (Proverbs Ecclesiastes, 253). This best fits the context j
as delineated by the overall stmcture of 11:8-12:8. 12:1 should be a recapitulation o f Theme B, i.e. a ^
reminder of the brevity of life (cf. 11:8). It is possible to retain the MT’s “j’smu “your Creator” if |
this is imderstood as an oblique reference to God’s role in giving and taking away life (Fox, Qohelet
and His Contradictions, 300; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 117).
46 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 247.
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derive from life. The receipt of and ability to use these benefits are part of the gift of 
God and to that extent are determined by God. Nevertheless, the emphasis in this 
passage is on human rather than divine activity as the succession of imperatives in 
11:9-12:1 suggests. This does not detract from Qohelet’s essentially deterministic 
worldview, for as I have argued in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the ability to act for 
oneself depends on God’s authorisation (V^bd) to do so, and such authorisation is 
itself subject to “time.”
IV. Conclusion
Although a certain amount of human free will is presupposed in the taking of 
pleasure, indicated by the legalistic use of Vabü to suggest God’s acquiescence in 
such actions, and by the imperative forms which Qohelet uses in his exhortations to 
the reader to enjoy life (cf. esp. 9:7-10; 11:9-10), the fact remains that human beings 
according to Qohelet’s worldview are entirely dependent on God for the finding of
pleasure.47
First of all, humanity is reliant on God for the material goods from which 
pleasure may be derived (2:26; 5:18 [Eng. 19]; 6:2). Qohelet speaks of pleasure in 
terms of eating and drinking (2:24; 3:13; 5:17 [Eng. 18]; 8:15; 9:7). It is also closely 
associated with material wealth (2:1-11; 5:17-19 [Eng. 18-20]; 10:19). Only God can 
provide these things: human efforts to acquire them are doomed to failure. Secondly, 
and more significantly, human beings are dependent on God for the ability to make 
use of the material wealth which they acquire (5:18 [Eng. 19]; 6:2). This is a 
fundamentally new idea in the Hebrew Bible. For whereas God is shown to bestow 
riches on the sage in Proverbs, the implications of God being responsible for the 
ability of the individual to make a choice as to whether such wealth is used points
47 Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 136.
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more strongly to a deterministic outlook on life.
It is perhaps too fine a distinction to make as to whether God “gives” joy per 
se (2:26), thereby imposing it on human beings, or whether he is responsible simply 
for giving the ability to find joy in life (5:18 [Eng. 19]). Qohelet seems to have 
viewed the two as identical. What is certain, however, is that the acquiescence of the 
deity is absolutely essential to human attempts to find happiness. In this area, as in 
others, God’s control over human life is absolute.
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Chapter 8 
Determinism in Early Jewish Literature
I, Inftoduction
How does Qohelet’s conception of determinism relate to his Hebraic 
background? The determinism in the catalogue of times and seasons does, as has been 
pointed out, have general parallels in the Hebrew Bible. Thus, the Psalmist states 
concerning his relationship with God in 31:15, “My times are in your power” ("nnu 
“|T3) in the sense that God is able to determine what happens to the Psalmist and to 
rescue him from his enemies if he so desires. i Such a position, however, is not far* 
removed from the traditional view of God in the Hebrew Bible who intervenes in 
history to rescue or punish Israel, the community, or the individual. Such activity, 
though it may be called “Providential” is certainly far from deterministic.^
Before continuing further, it would be as well to redefine the criteria by which 
one may properly call a particular* view of the world deterministic. Determinism is 
the belief that some outside force (usually God) controls the thoughts and actions of 
the individual and thereby intervenes in one’s life not merely on a regular basis, but 
constantly. This intervention must be true of all individuals, so that God can be said 
to control the workings of the world down to its smallest details. A limited amount 
of free will may be presupposed (particularly in the moral/ethical sphere) but 
generally the room for humanity having control over* their* own impulses may be said 
to be severely restricted.
However, it is clear* that “deterministic” is a term which is applied to 
Ecclesiastes by some commentators in a very loose sense. For example, Blenkinsopp 
ar gues that Qohelet is a determinist, yet is reluctant to see the catalogue of seasons as
1 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 195; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 33.
2 Whybray (Ecclesiastes, 66) points out Qohelet’s negative view of human freedom as confrary to 
conventional wisdom. This, in fact is also tiaie of the Hebrew Bible generally.
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asserting this idea because of the extent to which this would subordinate human free 
will to that of the deity. For him, as indeed for Whybray, Qohelet’s determinism 
means that events are “predisposed” to happen rather than preordained.^ Most 
recently, this view has also been echoed by de Jong, who when he states that “God 
acts deterministically” in Ecclesiastes, means by this statement that the deity acts 
“according to non-moral standards.”^
The rationale for de Jong’s article is to demonstrate that the God of Qohelet 
is “...the same as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob”, and by defining the concept 
of determinism so loosely (that is, by saying that it refers to God’s action outside the 
narrow bounds of reward-retribution imposed by the sages), he naturally finds many 
parallels within the Hebrew Bible (Prov 16:1, 4, 9, 33; 18:22; 20:24; 21:1, 31; Job 
1:21; 2:10; 3:23; 9:17-20, 22-24, 28-31; 10:3, 15; 12:4, 6, 16-25; 16:7-17; 19:6; 21:7- 
9; 23:13-17; 24:1,12; 27:2; 30:20-23; 33:9-11).5 Relatively few of these passages can 
be said to be deterministic in the truest sense of the word (Prov 16:1, 4; 20:24), with 
God controlling the thoughts and actions of the individual: most simply contain the 
idea of God’s inscrutability, or of God controlling the outcome of one’s actions, or 
the events which happen in one’s life. This is not, strictly speaking, determinism, but 
God acting in a way which is similar to an impersonal Fate. While this idea is evident 
in Ecclesiastes, it is important to distinguish between God as “Fate”, and God as a 
deterministic force in existence.
An example of something approacliing determinism in the Hebrew Bible may 
be found in Exod 7:2-3, where God states to Moses: “You shall speak everything 
which I command you and Aar on your brother shall speak to Pharaoh, that he shall
3 Wliybray, Ibid., 66; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 61-63.
4 De Jong, “God in the Book of Qohelet: A Reappraisal of Qohelet’s Place m Old Testament 
Theology,” 156.
5 De Jong, Ibid., 154, 166.
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send the Israelites out of his land. Then I will harden Pharaoh’s heart and multiply 
my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt.” Thus God is shown to control 
Pharaoh’s thoughts and actions in this paiticulai' instance in order to fulfil a wider 
plan. However, this idea seems more designed to provide an explanation for 
Pharaoh’s continuing (and successful) resistance to the God of Israel in the nanative 
rather than genuinely to express a deterministic worldview (cf. Gen 20:6). In 2 
Samuel 24:1-10, we find a stoiy in which God incites David to sin by making a 
census and then punishes Israel for this act. 6 An example of neai-detenninism may 
be seen in the story behind Ahab’s decision to fight at Ramoth-Gilead in 1 Kgs 
22:20-23 in which Yahweh allows a “lying spirit” to speak thiough Ahab’s prophets 
in order that the king should go to his death. This however, is a rather indirect foiin 
of determinism (indeed Ahab’s free will is presupposed in the necessity for Yahweh 
to go to such lengths to ensure his death). Other texts in the Hebrew Bible can be said 
to have a quasi-deterministic element to them. For example, in Ps 139:16, the 
Psalmist states: “Your eyes saw my limbs unformed in the womb, and in thy book 
they aie all recorded; day by day they were fashioned, not one of them was late in 
glowing (NEB Translation).” A rather more overt example may be found in the call 
narrative of Jeremiah (Jer 1:4-10).
In many ways, however, these texts seem to be the exceptions that prove the 
indeterministic rule. Generally speaking, the Hebrew Bible cannot be said to advance 
a concerted idea of determinism. The indeterminacy of events is captured in 
particular by Von Rad when he cites Jer 18:7-10:?
Sometimes I threaten a nation or a kingdom, to uproot it and demolish it and
destroy it; but if the nation which I threaten turns fi*om its wickedness, Üien I shall
6 Cited along with Exod 11:10 by A. A. Di Leila, “Wisdom of Ben Sira,” mABD  6.942. 
? Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 270.
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repent of the evil which I have decreed for it. Sometimes I promise a nation or a 
kingdom, to build it and plant it; but if it does something that displeases me and 
does not heed my words, then I repent of the good which I had promised to it.
This is the very opposite of determinism, for here it is God’s activity which 
is determined by the deeds of humanity and not vice versa. Nothing is preordained. 
No decision of God is iiTevocable. Everything depends on the decisions which fiee 
human beings make in the present. This position is echoed in numerous texts in the 
Hebrew Bible (e.g. Judg 2:11-19; 2 Chr 34:11-13; Jon 3:10-4:2).
Despite the general indeterminacy of the Hebrew Bible, it is possible to say 
that there may be links between Ecclesiastes and its biblical background as regards 
the concept of a detemiinistic God. More likely, however, is a connection with the 
literatuie of the Hellenistic period, which shows a more overt interest in the idea of 
determinism than the older biblical texts.8 As shall be demonstrated presently, some 
of these later writings contain close parallels of language and thought to the work of 
Qohelet.
II. Text and Context
(a) The Book of Daniel 
A few similarities between the thought of Qohelet and that of the author of 
the book of Daniel have already been mentioned in the course of this thesis. The 
authors of Daniel and Ecclesiastes both use VtDbto in its technical legal sense which is 
chaiacteristic of eailier periods. However, the usage in both texts is differentiated 
from that of say, the authors of Ezra-Nehemiah, by the metaphorical sense in which 
the root is employed: God in these later texts, is seen as the supreme holder of pob#
8 Von Rad {Wisdom in Israel, 264) also picks up on the sudden increase of the usage of the teim nr 
in both Ecclesiastes and Ben Sira. Detenninistic texts cited by Von Rad include Ben Sha (c. 180 
B.C.E.), Daniel (c. 250-160 B.C.E.), Juditii ( late second Cent. B.C.E.).
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and dispenses it at will to his favoured human subjects.9 On the other, Eccl 4:13-16 
appears to make use of the court story genre in much the same way as the author of 
Daniel. 10 This need not mean that Qohelet was actually familiar with the book of 
Daniel. It would, however, appear to suggest that there is a common backgiound to 
both.
The idea of an “appointed time” in its deterministic sense also appears in the 
book of Daniel. Thus in 2:21, Daniel praises God, saying “He changes times and 
seasons (K’3Qn K'ni: xim), deposes kings and sets up kings.” n  This is an idea
broadly similar to the thought of Qohelet: indeed, the terms used in this verse, and 
jiü, are direct Aramaic parallels to the terms ]ûî and nr which Qohelet uses together 
in 3:1.
The idea of determinism underlies apocalyptic literatuie, as we shall see 
presently, and thus it should come as no suiprise to find similai' uses of the terra ] ir  
in the sense of a time appointed by God in the later portions of the book of Daniel. 
Thus, in 7:12 Daniel states that subsequent to the stripping of power from three of 
the four beasts which appear in 7:4-7, “their lives were prolonged until a season and 
a time (]nri p i i r ) .” At the appropriate preordained moment in histoiy, it is 
promised that God will utterly cmsh the enemies of the saints. Likewise, the fourth 
beast is permitted by God in Dan 7:22 to have dominion over the earth “until the 
ancient of days came...and the appointed season came that the saints possessed the 
kingdom (p^np uonn smrbD Hcdd xDon).”
Thus, there are similarities between the author of Daniel’s conception of 
“time” and that of Qohelet. The most striking is in the use of the parallel terms ]~îr or 
]Qî for a divinely appointed time which is indicative of a deterministic worldview. In
9 Rudman, “A Note on the Dating o f Ecclesiastes.”
JO Rudman, “A Contextual Reading o f Ecclesiastes 4:13-16,” 61-63, 65-69, 72. 
J J Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 268.
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this respect, Qohelet would appeal' to be indebted for the idea of deteirainism to his 
Hebraic background. However, it should be noted that the deteirainism of Daniel (and 
indeed of Apocalyptic literature as a whole) is largely a global phenomenon. God 
detennines the rise and fall of kings and empires, but relatively little interest is shown 
in smaller events applicable to the life of the individual such as we find in 
Ecclesiastes.
(b) Apocalvptic Literature 
As has been suggested already, the concept of determinism is most often 
associated with Apocalyptic literature, and it is for this reason that Von Rad suggests 
that the roots of such literature lie ultimately in Wisdom (of the Mantic variety), 
rather than in Prophetic Eschatology. 12 This position has been followed to some 
extent by H.-P. Müller, M. E. Stone, J. J. Collins, K. J. A. Larkin and M. A. Knibb 
but remains controversial. 13
God’s foreknowledge of earthly events, which provides the very basis for 
apocalyptic literature, is asserted in a number of texts. 14 Thus, in As. Mos. 12:4; 1 
Enoch 39:11, one reads that God has foreseen evei’ything that will happen in the 
world. Several Qumian texts also express this idea (IQS 3-4; CD 2:3-10; IQH 1:7-8, 
23-25; 4Q180 1; IQpHab 7).i5 Implicit in this idea of divine foreknowledge of
12 Ibid., 277.
J3 H.-P. Müller, Mantische Weisheit undApokalyptik (VTSup 22; Leiden: Brill, 1972) 271-80; M. 
E. Stone, “Lists o f Revealed Things in tlie Apocalyptic Literatuie,” in Magnalia Dei: The Mighty 
Acts o f God, ed. F. M. Cross et al. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976) 414-52; J. J. Collins, “Cosmos 
and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic Age,” HR 17 (1977) 121-42; K. J. 
A. Larkin, The Eschatology o f  Second Zechariah: A Study in the Formation o f a Mantological 
Wisdom Anthology (Kampen; Kok Pharos, 1996) 248-53; M. A. Knibb, “‘You are indeed Wiser tlian 
Daniel’: Reflections on the Character of the Book of Daniel,” in A. S. van der Woude (ed.), The Book 
o f Daniel in the Light o f  New Findings (BETL 106; Leuven: Leuven University/Peeters, 1993) 399- 
411.
14 A. Yarbro Collins (ed.) {Early Christian Apocalypticism [Semeia 36; Decatur: Scholai's, 1986) 7) 
defines apocalyptic as “a revelation...mediated by an otherworldly being to a human 
recipient...intended to interpret present earthly chcumstances in the light of the supernatural world 
and of the future.”
15 G. W. E. Nickelsburg, “Eschatology (Early Jewish),” inABD  2.585.
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eaithly events is that of determinism, since these events must be fixed in order to be 
foreseen. From this must arise the question of what is the predetermining factor at 
work in human history. Von Rad argues, on the basis of 1 Enoch 85-90, that this is 
God himself. 16
In the book of Jubilees, God shows to Moses all of past and present history 
(1:4), which is recorded on tablets stretching from the moment of creation to the day 
of the new creation (1:29). Even relatively small details in the lives of the patriarchs 
are preordained: the giving of the name Isaac (16:3) and Isaac’s curse on the 
Philistines (24:33). Likewise, Isaac’s son Jacob read from the heavenly tablets of 
destiny “what would happen to him and his sons for all eternity” (32:21). Such ideas 
are, however, not confined to apocalyptic literature. The same theme of Yahweh 
deteimining the histoiy of Israel may be found in Judith’s prayer: “You designed the 
things that are now and are yet to be, and what you intended happened. The things 
you have ordained present themselves and say, ‘Here we are.’ For all your ways are 
prepared and your judgement has already taken place” (Jdt 9:5-6).i? In this context, 
it is interesting to note the idea of God’s determination of events as a form of Î
judgement (cf. Eccl 8:5, 6), and of this judgement having taken place prior to the 
occurrence of the action that is being judged. One may compare Eccl 9:7, “Go, eat 
youi' food with pleasure and drink your wine with a cheerful heart, for God has 
already approved your works” for a similar thought (albeit aimed at the individual 
rather than the nation).
The deteimination of events in histoiy is typically demonstrated in 
Apocalyptic thought with reference to the nation or the community rather than the
16 Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 272. The identification of God and “destiny” (eL[xapp.evTi) is also 
made several times by Josephus {J.W. 4.297; 6.250, 268, of. 288-315)—so H. W. Attridge, 
“Josephus and his Works,” in M. E. Stone (ed.), Jewish Writings o f  the Second Temple Period 
(Assen: Van Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 205.
1? Ibid., 270-72. God’s determination of historical events is also explicitly stated in 4 Ezra 6:1-6; 
13:58.
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individual, although the implications for the latter are clear and are sometimes alluded 
to. However, no real attention is given to the problem of how human free will fits 
into this deterministic scheme. D. S. Russell remarks on this situation and states 
“The clash of human freedom and divine control had not as yet become a conscious 
problem, so that these two appaiently contradictory points of view could be 
expressed side by side without any intellectual difficulty. For the most part, the 
point of view of the apocalyptic writers is that of ‘normative’ Judaism as expressed 
in Rabbi Akiba’s celebrated statement: ‘all is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given’ 
(Pirqe’Abot3.16).”i8
Thus, in 1 Enoch 30:15, the idea that human beings aie free to make moral 
choices concerning good and evil is stressed, despite the fact that elsewhere in the 
same book it is stated that one’s future actions are wiitten down before one is created 
(1 Enoch 53:2). Likewise, it is stated in Apoc. Abr. 26 that God is free to do as he 
sees fit, but that humanity also have free will. Nevertheless, this statement is 
juxtaposed with a scene in which God shows Abraham what will befall his 
descendants in the future {Apoc. Abr. 27). In 2 Apoc. Bar. 48:40; 85:7, human free 
will in the moral sphere is also given e m p h a s i s .  19 The fundamental illogic of this 
position is outlined by J. J. Collins, who remaiks concerning the clash between 
detenninism and free will in the book of Jubilees that “If ‘the judgment of all is 
ordained and written in the heavenly tablets in righteousness,’ this is especially a 
warning for ‘all who depart from the path’ that ‘if they walk not therein, judgment is 
written down for eveiy creature and for every kind’ (5:13).”20
Thus, in general, early Jewish writings would appear to mask the problem of
^8 D. S. Russell, The Method and Message o f  Jewish Apocalyptic (OTL; London: SCM, 1964) 232. 
■19 Ibid.. Cf. also G. H. Box, The Apocalypse o f Abraham (London: SPCK; New York: Macmillan, 
1918) 74-75.
20 J. J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1984)66.
Determinism in Early Jewish Literature 193
deteirainism and its ethical implications for human beings by emphasising divine 
foreknowledge over determinism (although, as I have mentioned, the one cannot exist 
without the other). Such an approach is fundamentally different to that of Qohelet, 
who mentions divine foreknowledge only in 9:7. Elsewhere in Ecclesiastes as we have 
seen, God’s activity as the detennining force in existence is constantly asserted and 
human freedom severely restricted.
(c) Ben Sira
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, Sirach’s detenninistic thought was mentioned 
briefly with reference to its possible relationship either to Stoic philosophy or a 
biblical background. It is at this point that a some consideration of the nature of the 
determinism in Ben Sira is appropriate. First of all, it is noticeable that Sirach 
concerns himself explicitly with the ethical dilemmas which the theory of 
deteirainism raises. Logically, blame for human wrongdoing in a truly deterministic 
scheme lies with the deity, but this is an aspect of deterministic thought which is for 
the most part passed over in the Jewish authors mentioned thus far. However, it is 
this problem which is considered in Sfr 15:11-20:
Do not say, “The Lord is to blame for my failure”; it is for you to avoid doing
what he hates.
Do not say, “It was he who led me astray”; he has no use for sinful men.
The Lord hates every kind of vice; you cannot love it and still fear him.
When he made man in the beginning, he left him fi*ee to take his own decisions;
if you choose, you can keep the commandments; whether or not you keep faitli is
yours to decide.
He has set before you fire and water; reach out and take which you choose;
before men lie life and death, and whichever he prefers is his.
For in his gi-eat and mighty power the Lord sees eveiything.
He keeps watch over those who fear him; no human act escapes his notice.
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But he has commanded no man to be wicked, nor has he given licence to commit
sin.
(NEB Translation)
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, it has been argued that Qohelet makes a concerted 
attempt to find an explanation for the presence of human wickedness in the light of 
his deterministic worldview. The way this is done is by advancing the idea that God 
in some circumstances gives an individual “authorisation” (pübtd) to act as he will. 
Indeed in 8:9, Qohelet states that there is “a time (np) in which a man has 
authorisation (ob::) over another to harm him.” This could be interpreted as saying 
that God not only allows wickedness but actually commands it in some 
circumstances. This, as I have ai'gued leads logically on to the thought of Driver’s 
suggested emendation of 8:10, “and so I saw the wicked approaching and entering the 
holy place, walk about and boast in the city that they had done right.”
It is this point of view which is explicitly attacked by Sirach when he states 
that “he has commanded no man to be wicked, nor has he given licence to commit sin 
(no D'^ bnn xbi xtonb (üiDX xb).” Although Shach does not utilise Vcûbï? inthis 
context, the same viewpoint provides the basis for both passages. The wicked men 
whom Qohelet describes in Eccl 8:10, who “walk about in the city and boast that 
they had done right” are addressed by Sirach when he says “Do not say, ‘the Lord is 
to blame for my failure’...Do not say, ‘it was he who led me astray.’” Under the 
circumstances, it may be that a moral crisis was provoked by the general acceptance 
of deterministic thought in the third-to-second centuries B.C.E. as its ethical 
implications became apparent, and that both Qohelet and Sirach bear witness to a 
growing awar eness of this problem in certain circles.
Despite his condemnation of those who would ar gue against the existence of
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free will in the moral/ethical sphere, Sirach (like other Jewish authors) does in fact 
assert divine foreknowledge of earthly events. Thus in 23:20 he states, “Before it 
happens, everything is known to him, and similarly he sees it before it is finished” 
(nx'T’ bDn mbD nns p i ib m i  bDn xi3] n“icû).2i Yet divine foreknowledge of an 
event need not necessarily imply the presence of God as the motivating force behind 
it. Thus far', Sirach’s view can be argued to be consistent with his rejection of 
theological detenninism in the moral/ethical sphere.
Like the Apocalyptic writers, Sirach is tom between the wish to present God 
as the prime mover in earthly events, but also to exonerate God from possible blame 
for human wickedness. Thus ethical freedom, as well as being explicitly stated, is also 
implicit in texts such as Sir 4:26; 7:1-3, 8, 12-13; 8:5; 21:1-2; 23:18-20; 27:8.22 At 
the same time, a limited form of determinism is also asserted in 33:7-15:
Why is one day better than the others, while all the daylight of the year is from the sun?
They were separated by the wisdom of the Lord, and he made tlie times and feasts
different.
Some of them he made exalted and holy, and some he counted as ordinary days.
Men aie all made of clay, and Adam was created from the earth.
hi the fullness of his wisdom the Lord separated them and made their destinies
different.
Some he blessed and exalted, and some he made holy and brought near to himself.
Some he cursed and humbled, and hurled from thefr place.
Like the potter’s clay in his hands, to form it as he pleases.
So ai*e men in the hands o f their Creator to give to them as he decides.
As good is the opposite o f wicked and life is the opposite o f death, 
so the sinner is tlie opposite of the godly.
So look upon all the works of tlie Most High; they are in pah s, the one the
21 The Hebrew of this passage is ambiguous. Here I have followed the tt anslation offered in Von Rad 
(Wisdom in Israel, 265). The NEB ttanslates, “Before the Universe was created, it was known to 
him, and so it is since its completion.” However, tliis still expresses tlie idea of divine foreknowledge 
of the actions of the shiner in 23:18,
22 Di Leila, “Wisdom of Ben Sira,” 942.
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opposite of the other.^^
Several themes found in Ecclesiastes appear in this passage. God’s determination of 
individual days finds some echo in Eccl 7:14. Sirach considers the inscrutability of 
God’s gifts to humanity (cf. Eccl 2:26; 5:18 [Eng. 19]; 6:2). No causal connection is 
suggested between human righteousness or sin and God’s blessings and curses. God’s 
reasons for acting as he does are shown to be inexplicable.
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, it was argued that the catalogue of seasons 
was effectively a list of divinely determined human activities. In this context, one 
may point to Sirach’s comment “Look upon all the works of the Most High; they are 
in pairs, the one the opposite of tlie other” (cf. Eccl 3:1-8). Even Sirach’s exhortation 
to “look upon all the works of the Most High” finds its parallel in Qohelet’s 
exhortation “Look upon the work of God” (7:14), and his claim that “I saw all the 
work of God” (8:17).
However, it is doubtful whether Sirach is in actual fact asserting full 
determinism in this passage: what is envisioned here is a world in which God may 
“give to (the individual) as he decides”, rather than controlling his thoughts and 
actions. In other words, God controls what happens to the individual rather than 
what that individual says and does. God is shown to be an inscrutable distributor of 
favours but he is not a puppet master.
In the light of this conflict between theological detenninism and free will, of 
which both Qohelet and Sirach are aware, it is notable that the ways in which these 
two authors approach the problem differ maikedly. Qohelet is forced to recognise, at 
least partially, the tmth of the wicked man’s claim that the responsibility for human 
misdeeds lies with God. Sirach protects God from such a charge by arguing that
23 Translation from Von Rad (Wisdom in Israel, 266-67).
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human beings aie entirely free to make their own ethical decisions. The detenninism 
of Sirach is therefore broadly similar to that of the Apocalyptists and unlike that of 
Qohelet.
(d) Psalms of Solomon 
Certain of the themes which we find in Ben Sira concerning divine 
deteimination of events and human free will are also apparent in the Psalms of 
Solomon, which probably date from the first century B . C . E . 2 4  in 9:4, for example, 
the Psalmist states “Our works are in the choosing and power of our souls, to do 
right and wrong in the works of our hands.”25 This clearly demonstrates an 
awareness of the ethical dilemmas presented by detenninistic beliefs since the 
Psalmist’s emphatic avowal of free will implicitly argues against the suggestion that 
God may be responsible for human iniquity: such a statement would not be 
necessary if there were no doubt that human beings retained control over their own 
thoughts and actions.
Yet the Psalmist does not reject the idea of detenninism outright, for he states 
in 14:5 that God “knows the secrets of the heait before they happen”, meaning at the 
veiy least that God is able to foresee whether a given individual will turn out good or 
bad, but possibly implying that God has more specific foreknowledge of the 
thoughts and actions of the individual. Likewise, in 5:6 the Psalmist states that the 
portion of the individual in life is predetermined by God and is unchangeable.26
Again, it is important to remember that an assertion of God’s foreknowledge 
of an event is not the same as saying that God himself has determined it. Hence the
24 J. L. Trafton, “Solomon, Psalms of,” m Æ D  6.115.
25 Verse numbers and translations from the Psalms of Solomon are from J. H. Charlesworth (ed.). 
The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha Vol. 2 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985).
26 The tension between divine determination and human free will in these passages is noted by 
Russell {The Method and Message o f Jewish Apocalyptic, 232-33).
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Psalmist, as we have seen, can state that God knows the motivations of the 
individual and how they will be acted upon (14:5), without being himself the cause of 
that motivation (9:4). Because of this foreknowledge, God can prejudge the individual 
and predetermine the individual’s portion in life (5:6). The theology of the Psalms of 
Solomon is therefore, in its essentials, in line with the statement of Akiba that “all is 
foreseen, but freedom of choice is given.”
III. Conclusions
Qohelet’s conception of determinism clearly owes a great deal to his Hebraic 
background. Yet, while there exist deterministic echoes in the Hebrew Bible, these are 
relatively few. In general, the Hebrew Bible may be said to be indeterministic in the 
sense that although God regularly intervenes in history, human beings remain in 
control of their own moral choices and, generally speaking, over their own actions. It 
is only in the Hellenistic period that we find anything like an idea of determinism 
consistently being advanced in the apocalyptic literature of that time.2?
One way in which this debt to his Hebraic background is evident in his choice 
of the terms ru? and ]QT to express the idea of divinely appointed times for events 
which impinge upon human existence. Both teims appear in this context in the book 
of Daniel, a product of the Hellenistic period. Even more striking are the parallels 
which can be made with extrabiblical texts. Determinism is at the heart of Jewish 
apocalypticism, and though this concept is typically expressed through global 
events, reference is sometimes made to its implications for the individual.
There are, however, differences between Qohelet’s approach to the 
consequences of detenninism and that of the apocalyptic writers. Broadly speaking, 
the apocalyptic writers attempted to claim complete sovereignty for God over
27 Russell {Divine Disclosure [London: SCM, 1992] 14) sees apocalyptic as essentially a product of 
tlie Hellenistic period, from 250 B.C.E. on.
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earthly events, so that everything was said to be predetermined.28 However, the 
same writers also wished to retain the idea that human beings were free to make 
moral/ethical choices since the alternative, that God was responsible for the actions 
of the wicked, would have denied the goodness and justice of God and indeed would 
have rendered the law invalid 29
Thus a tension is cleaiiy apparent in apocalyptic thought: one may find 
juxtaposed visions of a futuie which is preordained with an assertion of human free 
will. Cleai’ly such writers were aware of the conflict between determinism and free 
will and a partial solution is offered by emphasising divine foreknowledge rather than 
divine determinism per se (although foreknowledge implies determinism). Yet, even 
where determinism is emphasised, it is typically the determination of events rather 
than human action which is depicted. The same approach to this problem is also 
evident in the Psalms of Solomon and Ben Sira. Faced by the conflict between 
determinism and free will, both assert the orthodox idea that human beings are 
entirely free moral beings, but also make claims of divine foreknowledge elsewhere.
The form of determinism advanced by Qohelet therefore differs significantly 
from that of his fellows. Faced with moral evil in humanity, Qohelet does not 
entirely absolve the deity of blame. Although God is removed from the implication of 
direct responsibility for wickedness, he is still accused of giving the wicked the 
freedom to commit evil. Moreover, a question mark hangs over even the morally 
upright as to whether they can take credit for their own actions, for in 9:1, Qohelet 
states that “the righteous, and the wise, and their works, are in God’s power...” The 
wicked are conspicuously absent from this observation, so that a situation appear s to 
exist in which the detenninistic God can take the credit for the actions of the good.
28 L. Morris, Apocalyptic (London: Inter-Varsity, 1973) 47-48.
29 Russell {Divine Disclosure, 113-14) makes the connection between the apocalyptists’ assertion of 
free will and of the consequent necessity of obedience to the law.
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while he is distanced at least to some extent from the evil. As we shall see presently, 
this position has a parallel in Stoic thought.
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Chapter 9 
Qohelet and Stoic Determinism
I. Introduction: A Note on Methodology 
As was suggested in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the idea that the book of 
Ecclesiastes was subject to Stoic influence is not a new one. Indeed, this position 
was widely held in some scholarly circles at the end of the last century. i Since then, 
the emphasis in more recent yeai's has been on understanding Qohelet solely in the 
context of his Hebraic background, 2 and although some commentators have detected 
a certain Hellenistic colouring to his work, this has been attributed to the influence of 
a general Zeitgeist rather than to direct contact with Greek philosophy. 3
Nevertheless, the idea that the author of Ecclesiastes was influenced by 
specific ideas from Greek philosophy is still advanced by a small but significant 
minority of scholai’s.4 Recent years have also seen several new attempts to claim 
links between Ecclesiastes and Stoic thought.^ To this extent, a comparison between 
Qohelet’s deterministic worldview as I have attempted to reconstruct it in this thesis 
and that of the early Stoics, who similarly held that all earthly events were 
preordained by God, is a worthwhile exercise; the more so since Qohelet’s approach 
to the subject of determinism has been shown in the previous chapter to differ in
1 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 10-29;Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 30-32; Coiidamin, “Notes sur TEcclésiaste."; 
Siegfried, Der Prediger, 8-10.
2 Eai’lier commentators who held that Qohelet was not subject to Greek influence include Renan 
(L‘Ecclésiaste,62-63) ; McNeile (An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 43-44), Barton (Ecclesiastes, 34). 
More recently their ranks have been joined by Loretz (Qohelet und der Alte Orient, 134), Seow 
(Ecclesiastes, 16).
3 Hengel, Judaism and Plellenism, 1.115-30, 126-27; Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 16; 
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, xliv-xlv.
4 Recent exceptions include Braun (Kohelet und die frühhelenistische Popularphilosophie, 167-71); 
Lohfink (Kohelet, 7-15 esp. 9).
5 Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 169-187; Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: 
Another Interpretation,” 55-64; Levine, “The Humor of Qohelet,” 78. Kaiser (“Detennination und 
Freiheit beim Kohelet/Prediger Salomo und in der Fmhen Stoa,” NZSTh 31 [1989] 251-270) makes 
no attempt to prove dependence, restricting himself largely to a comparison between the thought- 
systems of the autlior of Ecclesiastes and the first thi ee Stoic leaders.
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some essentials from those of his Jewish contemporaries.
In considering the possibility of Stoic influence on Qohelet, it is important to 
restrict material for compaiison to known Stoic beliefs of the third century B.C.E. It 
is therefore necessaiy, as far as possible, to distinguish between the ideas of different 
Stoic philosophers and common Stoic belief.6 While it is true that our knowledge of 
early Stoicism is entirely dependent on reports and quotations found in other ancient 
writers such as Cicero (c. 106-43 B.C.E.) and Diogenes Laertius (fl. 200-220 C.E.), 
there remains evidence enough to reconstruct the worldviews of the first three leaders 
of the Stoic school, Zeno (fl. 300-261 B.C.E.), Cleanthes (fl. 261-232 B.C.E.) and 
Chiysippus (fl. 232-208/4 B.C.E.) whose dates straddle the period in which the 
current scholarly consensus would place the composition of Ecclesiastes.
II. Determinism and Stoic Thought 
The philosophy known as Stoicism may be divided into thiee main branches: 
physics, logic and ethics. Much of Stoic thought was profoundly influenced by the 
work of Heraclitus (fl. 500 B.C.E.), who taught among other things that there was a 
universal logos or rationality which controlled the workings of the universe.? 
Although only fragments of Heraclitus’s work suiwive, making it impossible to say 
for certain whether he was a determinist, this concept is a logical corollaiy of his 
philosophy and was advanced enthusiastically by the Stoics.
There are, however, other precui'sors to the deterministic philosophy of the 
Stoics. The mechanistic atomist Democritus (b. 460-457 B.C.E.) argued that all 
events occur in a predictable way through a series of atomic collisions: this comes 
close to the idea of determinism advanced by the Stoics, but Democritus appears not
6 Gammie, Ibid., 173. This necessity is also emphasised by J. B. Gould (The Philosophy o f 
Chrysippus (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 1-6.
? W. K. C. Guthrie, History o f Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1972) 1.428; M. C. Nahm. 
Selections from Greek Philosophy (New York: Appleton-Centmy-Crofts, 1968) 62.
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to have considered the implications of his philosophy for human free will. 8 Another 
proponent of an idea close to determinism was the Pre-Aristotelian philosopher 
Diodorus Cronus, one of the school referred to by Aristotle as the Megarians. The 
philosophy of determinism is not fully developed in Diodorus’s thought, but he does 
attempt to advance a logical (albeit flawed) argument for its existence.^
(a) ChiTsippus ffl. 232-208/4 B.C.E.)
It was the Stoics who first propounded a far-reaching and elaborate fonn of 
determinism. 10 In paiticular, this idea is generally attributed to Chiysippus, the 
third leader of the Stoic school and indeed those commentators who have ar gued for 
Stoic influence on the thought of the author of Ecclesiastes have typically suggested 
a link with Chrysippus.11
This position is not without its problems, however. The most significant of 
these is that Chrysippus’s leadership of the Stoic school began in 232 B.C.E. 
Commentators have generally been reluctant to date Qohelet’s work much after 225 
B.C.E., since the social conditions which are presupposed therein suggest that 
Qohelet lived in a time of peace and prosperity (at least as far* as the upper classes 
were concerned).! 2 The invasion of Palestine by Antiochus III in 219-17 B.C.E. saw j
the country change briefly from Ptolemaic to Seleucid hands bringing to an end over a j
j
hundred years of peaceful economic development under the Ptolemies. Although j
Antiochus was forced to withdraw after the Battle of Raphia in 217 B.C.E., !
Ptolemaic rule during the closing years of the third century B.C.E. was marked by I
8 J. B. Gould, “The Stoic Conception of Fate,” JH I35 (1974) 19.
9 Taylor, “Deteiminism,” in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan, 1972) 2.360.
19 J. Den Boeft, Calcidius on Fate: His Doctrine and Sources (Brill: Leiden, 1970) 2.
11 Gaimnie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qohelet,” 184; Blenkmsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: 
Another Interpretation,” 58, 62.
12 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 50.
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poor administration and internal dissension. Palestine fell into Seleucid hands, this 
time permanently, after the Battle of Paneion in 200 B.C.E.13
Assuming, therefore, the dating of Ecclesiastes to 250-225 B.C.E. to be 
correct, this would leave a period of only seven years for Chrysippus’s distinctive 
teachings as leader of the Stoa to be formulated and to reach Palestine. However, 
Chrysippus had taken on the role of Stoicism’s chief apologist much earlier. Gould 
states: “Cleanthes did not possess a combative nature, and even while he was 
nominally heading the Stoa, Chrysippus, his student, was the prime defender of the 
Porch against the assaults of the Epicureans...and those of the academics.” 14 So 
effective were these attacks on Stoicism that by the mid-third century B.C.E., 
Stoicism as a philosophy was in serious danger of being discredited. That it not only 
survived but even flourished thereafter may be attributed to the work of Chrysippus 
in countering objections from rival schools {SVF 2.6).15 Under the circumstances 
then, Chrysippean ideas may well have influenced the direction of Stoic thought at a 
relatively early stage. This idea is certainly reflected in a saying attributed to 
Chrysippus who remarked to his teacher Cleanthes that all he wanted was to be told 
what the main Stoic theories were, and he himself would find the proofs for them 
{SVF2A).
The question of to what extent Chrysippus’s thought differed from that of 
his predecessors is a moot one. In general, it would be fair to say that his 
deterministic philosophy can be distinguished from that of his predecessors by its 
comprehensiveness, but also by its complexity; a result of attempting to find room
13 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.7-9.
14 Gould, The Philosophy o f Chrysippus (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 35. 
15 /W ., 9.
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for human free will in the moral sphere. This is in fact alluded to by Plutarch: 16
Anyone who says that Chiysippus did not make fate the complete cause of these 
things (right and wi’ong actions),...will reveal him as once again in conflict witli 
himself, where he extravagantly praises Homer for saying of Zeus ‘Therefore accept 
whatever evil or good Üiat he may send to each of you’,...and himself writes many 
things in agreement with this, and ends up saying that no state or process is to the 
slightest degree other than in accordance with tlie rationale of Zeus, which he says 
is identical to fate.
(Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn. 1056b-c [SVF 2.991Y)
In a similar vein, Chiysippus is quoted by Gellius as saying that “Fate is a 
certain everlasting ordering of the whole: one set of things follows on and succeeds 
another, and the interconnexion is inviolable” (Gellius 7.2.3 [iS'FF 2.1000]). Two 
things are emphasised by these quotations. Firstly, Chrysippus’s view of fate is that 
it controls all events on earth, all human action and even human thought {SVF 2.913, 
925, 997). To this extent, it may justly be said that Chrysippus’s worldview is 
deterministic in the truest sense of the word. Secondly, human beings are powerless 
to resist the dictates of Chiysippus’s deterministic fate: it is an utterly implacable 
force.
Naturally, there aie some general similarities between the thought of 
Chiysippus concerning fate and that of Qohelet. I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3 of 
this thesis that Qohelet’s statement in 3:1 that “there is a time for everything, and an 
appointed time for eveiy business under heaven” and the catalogue of times in 3:2-8 
outline a deterministic worldview in which all human actions and emotions aie 
controlled by the deity. This also appeals to be the purport of other key passages 
within the book of Ecclesiastes, such as 7:14, 26-29; 8:5-6; 9:7, 11-12. Like Qohelet
16 Translations of Stoic texts in this chapter are derived from A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley (The i
Hellenistic Philosophers [Cambridge: C.U.P., 1987] Vol. 1). The texts in then original languages J
may be found in Vol. 2 of the same work. I
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who expresses the concept of determinism by equating “the work of God” with “the 
work which is done imder the sun,” Chrysippus sees fate as ultimately one and the 
same as the will of the deity (cf. Calcidius 204 [SFF 2.933]). i? Beaiing in mind the 
evidence adduced in the last chapter about the nature of Jewish determinism, 
Qohelet’s constant emphasis on the determination of human action and thought by 
God, rather than on God’s foreknowledge, might in some ways appeal' closer to 
Stoicism than Jewish thought.
As has been suggested in Chapters 5 and 8 of this thesis, the espousal of a 
belief in determinism, particularly when the deteiministic force is depicted as a 
benevolent God, results in a moral problem. How can life’s injustices and the 
presence of human evil be explained? More importantly, does the presence of 
injustice and evil in life mean that God is the author of these things? With whom 
does responsibility lie for such actions: with the human doer, or with the deity who 
in theory contiols all human actions? This problem is again discussed in the light of 
Chrysippean determinism by Gellius, who outlines a philosophical position against 
Chi'ysippus similai' to that of Plutarch (i.e. in terms of the criminal who may appeal 
to deterministic philosophy to escape justice, cf. De Stoic. Repugn. 1056b-c 
[above]):
If Chrysippus they (holders of rival views) say, thinks that all things are moved 
and governed by fate and Üiat the causes of fate and tlieii* turns cannot be changed 
or surmounted, then the faults and misdeeds of men ought not to cause anger or to 
be referred to themselves and their wills, but to a certain imperious necessity, 
which stems from fate; and this is the mistress and arbiter of all things, by which 
everything which will happen must happen; and for this reason punislunents of 
criminals have been established by the law unjustly, is men do not come to their 
evil deeds willingly, but are led to them through fate.
17 Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.331.
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(Gellius 7.2.13 [STF 2.1000])
Such objections to Chiysippus’s scheme of determinism must have sui’faced 
eai'ly, for he is forced to make elaborate attempts to explain the presence of evil in a 
divinely deteimined world. For example, he suggests that the “good” things in life 
such as justice, truth or beauty derive their significance from the presence of their 
opposites in the world (Gellius 7.1.1-13 [= SVF 2.1169-70]). Evil may also be the 
necessary consequence o f God’s wider plan for good. Adversity may be a good thing 
in that it teaches the individual fortitude or other good qualities. Good may come 
from evil: an earthquake may rid the world of evil people as well as good. War may 
relieve overpopulation (Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn. 1049a-d [= SVF 2.1125]).
Yet Chrysippus (like Qohelet and Sirach) explicitly considers the problem of 
the criminal denying responsibility for his crimes, and despite his deteiministic 
beliefs argued that such people should be punished. 18 
Thus, Gellius states on this subject:
(Chrysippus) denies that those who, whether through laziness or through wickedness, are 
haimful and reckless, should be tolerated and given a hearing, if when caught red-handed 
they take refuge in the necessity of fate, as if it were a temple-asylum, and say that their 
worst misdeeds are attributable to fate, and not to their own recklessness.
(Gellius 7.2.13 [SVF 2.1000])
An apocryphal story told about Zeno suggests a similar approach to the 
problem of moral responsibility for wrongdoing: “The story goes that Zeno was 
flogging a slave for stealing, T was fated to steal’, said the slave. ‘And to be flogged’, 
was Zeno’s reply.” (DL 7.23). Another attempt to resolve the problem was to state
18 Gould (The Philosophy o f Chiysippus, 149) suggests that Chiysippus “must have been somewhat 
bitter towards the wicked who thouglit tliat the Stoic docti ine of fate bestowed upon them the right to 
do evil deeds with impimity.”
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that while detenninism was a real force which controlled the cosmos, there were 
certain things over which human beings did have control {SVF 2.974), described as to  
ù(j>’ T)|iiv “what depends on u s .” i9
Examples of “what depends on us” focus on presentations in the mind which 
we may enact and make real or refrain from enacting. We do not have any control 
over how presentations enter out mind, so that for example, a man who has a picture 
in his mind of himself overeating, or of sleeping with a neighbour’s wife, is not 
responsible for what he is thinking. It is, however, within his power to choose 
whether or not he enacts these things, and therefore human beings must beai’ 
responsibility for their own wickednesses {SVF 3.177). 20 Thus Chrysippus ends up 
asserting total determinism and moral free will side by side in much the same way as 
we have seen in some Jewish writings of this period. That is not to say that the 
position of these Jewish writers is influenced by Chiysippus: one can clearly see 
how they arrived at the same conclusions independently, but the pmallel remains 
nevertheless.
At a superficial level, there are similaiities between the thought of Qohelet 
and Chiysippus in their approach to the question of fate. Both authors lay an 
emphasis on deteiminism in their consideration of existence, and see God as the 
deterministic force behind eaithly events. Both are conscious of the theological 
problem which this philosophy poses in considering human injustice and 
wickedness. Many other cultures, however, have expressed like concerns about the
19 Blenkinsopp (“Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation,” 62) in fact argues that it is this 
concept of free will that lies behind the series o f actions enumerated in 3:2-8, as does Levine (“The 
Humor of Qohelet,” 78) who sees the actions in this passage as denoting “human freedom in foolish 
opposition to detenninism.”
20 M. E. Reesor, The Nature o f  Man in Early Stoic Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1989) 49-58.
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moral problems consequent from a belief in fate or deteiminism. 21 Despite the 
similarities, it is also evident that Qohelet makes no such convoluted attempts as 
Chiysippus to explain human evil, nor does he demonstrate any knowledge of 
Chrysippus’s position by attempting to ai'gue against it. The position which Qohelet 
takes with the question of human evil in fact brings him somewhat closer in thought 
to Chiysippus’s predecessor, the second leader of the Stoic school, Cleanthes.
(b) Cleanthes rfl. 261-232 B.C.E.)
Although Stoicism even from its inception laid gieat emphasis on the role of 
God in the workings of the world, it is Cleanthes who is generally credited with being 
the most religious of the Stoic leaders. 2 2 Cleanthes’s pupil Chrysippus, as we have 
seen, is often asserted to be the first Stoic leader to advance the idea of an all- 
embracing deterministic force which controls existence. Generally speaking, the 
viewpoint ascribed to his predecessors by some modern commentators is not 
dissimilar to traditional Greek conceptions of fate as a force which deteimines the 
major milestones in one’s life, but in which the details remain under human control.23
Such a view is misleading, however. If it is clear that Zeno and Cleanthes 
were not fully determinist in their outlook, they nevertheless advanced viewpoints 
veiy close to it.24 Cleanthes in paiticulai' aigued for the activity of Providence lying
21 B. C. Dietrich (Death, Fate and the Gods [London: Athlone, 1965] 3-5) cites the examples of a 
serpent in tlie Mahabharata (13.1) who devours a child and disclaims responsibility for the deed on 
the grounds that it was fated. Similar, in the Qui’an (35.8) is the assertion that “God leads astray 
whom he pleases and guides whom he pleases.”
22 Gould, The Philosophy o f Chrysippus, 34-35; Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1. 
332.
23 Long & Sedley, Ibid., 1.342, 392.
24 Some classical scholars have indeed asserted that Chiysippus is totally beholden to his 
predecessors for his philosophy and made no original contribution to Stoic thought: in essence he 
recapitulated the ideas of Zeno and Cleanthes and systematized them (so A. C. Pearson, The 
Fragments o f Zeno and Cleanthes [London: Clay, 1891] 48; E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism [New 
York: Humanities, 1958] 91). Not dissimilar (at least as fai* as the concept of determinism is 
concerned) is the view of Gould (The Pliilosophy of Chrysippus, 206), who argues that Chrysippus 
did not so much build his own deterministic world view as systematize that of his two predecessors.
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behind every walk of human life. This “Providence” was not a series of isolated acts 
of divine generosity but a continual and thoroughgoing intervention in the affairs of 
the individual and the world. Indeed, so extensive was God’s interaction with 
existence that one may basically characterise Cleanthes’s position by calling it a kind 
of “positive determinism.” Such a view of life gives rise to the very same problem 
which Chiysippus faced later. How can this divine Providence be reconciled with 
wickedness? Cleanthes writes:
No deed is done on earth, God, without your offices, nor in the divine ethereal 
vault of heaven, nor at sea, save what bad men do in their folly. But you know 
how to make things crooked straight and to order things disorderly.
(Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus, SVF 1.537)
As may be observed from this passage, the solution to the problem of human 
wickedness and how this can be reconciled with a belief in a benevolent deterministic 
God was a very simple one. Cleanthes assigned blame for humanity’s wickedness 
with humanity itself and apportioned credit for human good deeds with the 
providential deity. Cleanthes speaks not just of major events being subject to 
external control but every human action not tainted by folly or wickedness.
If one considers the view of Providence offered by Cleanthes, it appears to be 
quite similar’ to that of Qohelet. I have argued in this thesis that the latter reconciles 
the concepts of free will and determinism by means of a parallel from the legal 
sphere. God gives pobo “authorisation” to certain people to act as they wish (5:18; 
6:2; 8:4, 9; 10:5). Qohelet recommends that this freedom be used to derive enjoyment 
from life (5:18) but others are also free to gain dominion over their fellows or to act 
wickedly (8:9). Others, perhaps well-meaning, make eri’ors of judgement and upset 
the social order by giving preferential treatment to people of low rank at the expense
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of those who really ought to be honoui'ed (10:5-6).
The implication of this is that while God in theory controls everything, He is 
not directly responsible for human injustice, folly or wickedness. Both Cleanthes and 
Qohelet stress the universality of God’s intervention in existence, yet aie caieful not 
to assign blame for human wickedness directly to the deity. It is as if the wicked 
stand outside the control of the deterministic force, retaining freedom over their 
actions, while the good aie enslaved by Fate, God, or whatever this power is called.
The same implication is made by Qohelet, who states “the righteous and the 
wise, and their works, are in God’s power” (9:1). What Qohelet claims here is that 
God controls the thoughts and actions of “good” people.25 One might object that 
this verse could simply mean that the righteous and wise are dependent on the will of 
an inscmtable God for their “just” reward and that God alone can ensure that their 
actions have a successful outcome.26 However, the position of 9:1 following 8:16-17 
would appear to be significant. Qohelet has just linked “the work of God” with “the 
work which is done under the sun” and stated the impossibility of achieving his 
intention of “finding out” these things.^? No “wise man” can do so because, as 9:1 
explains, “the righteous and the wise ai’e in God’s power.”28
Nothing is said of the foolish or wicked—they are appaiently not in God’s 
power. The parallel between this thought and that of Cleanthes: “No deed is done 
on earth, God, without your offices...save what bad men do in their folly” is striking,
25 So Crenshaw, who states “The destiny of just people and wise is enthely at God’s disposal, 
contrary to the sage’s belief that they controlled their own destmy (sic). The term ‘and their actions’ 
refers either to what the wise and just think they accomplish in then* own strength, or to then 
inability to do anything apart from the deity’s prior approval” (Ecclesiastes, 159), Cf. Delitzsch, 
Ecclesiastes, 354-55; Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 153-55; Galling, Der Prediger, 112-13; Loader, 
Polar Structures in the Book o f Qohelet, 101-2.
26 McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 19; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 157-58; Glasser, Le procès du 
bonheur par Qohelet, 140-41.
27 Rudman, “The Translation and Interpretation ofEccl 8:17a,” 5.
28 Fox (Qohelet and His Contradictions, 257) also understands 9:1 in the light of 8:16-17, although 
his interpretation of the former is somewhat ambiguous.
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but it is, as I have suggested, borne out by the way that Qohelet uses Vobo to denote 
a degree of freedom from divine control in contexts having to do with human 
wickedness and injustice.
Yet while Qohelet is apparently sympathetic to the basic position adopted 
by Cleanthes, he also notes its weaknesses. The fact that human evil is a 
consequence of free will does not absolve the deity of all responsibility for the 
inequities of existence: it is God, after all, who gives freedom to people who will use 
it wickedly in the first place, enabling them to “boast that they had done right” (8:9). 
Moreover, God is often tardy in his judgement of such people: sometimes they may 
even go unpunished.
Qohelet’s God therefore has a darker side than that of Cleanthes. While 
Cleanthes can say that the function of the Stoic god is “to make crooked things 
straight,” Qohelet chai’ges God with doing the exact opposite: “Consider the work of 
God—who can make straight what he has made crooked?” (7:13) and in a similar vein 
he says of existence in general, “The crooked cannot be made straight, nor the 
missing counted” (1:15).
Thus, there ar e similarities between the deterministic thought of Qohelet and 
ideas expressed by the early Stoic philosophers, notably Cleanthes: if this could be 
said to indicate some form of influence, it would support the generally accepted 
dating of Ecclesiastes to 250-225 B.C.E., typically advanced on the basis of the social 
situation described by the book and its close correspondence with the situation in 
Palestine as depicted in the Zenon Papyri (c. 265-255 B.C.E.).29 On the basis of the 
evidence adduced so far however, one may well object that these similarities can only 
be considered as parallels (albeit striking ones), rather than the product of direct 
contact. This is a not umeasonable position. Although Murphy, commenting on
29 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 50; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 11-12.
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criteria for demonstrating Hellenistic influences on the book of Ecclesiastes, is corr ect 
in warning against expecting evidence to be too specific and thus discounting more 
general connections as mere parallels, 3 o more evidence (indeed, more specific 
evidence) is required before Stoic influence on Ecclesiastes should be given serious 
consideration.
Significantly, as the next section will demonstrate, Qohelet appears to show a 
more specific awareness of the concept of a controlling mechanism of the cosmos 
which the Stoic philosophers called the logos.
III. Qohelet and the Logos 
(al The Meaning of p30n in Ecclesiastes
Traditionally, commentators have interpreted the noun p30P (“account”) in 
one of two ways. On the one hand, there are those who have argued that Qohelet 
uses the term in a concrete way to refer to an account of existence which Qohelet 
hopes to piece together from his observations. On the other, it has also been 
suggested that the term has an abstract meaning, and that has an existence 
outside Qohelet’s imagination.
Among those who hold to the first of these options is Fox, who suggests that 
p30n “refers to both the process of reckoning and the solution reached.” In other 
words, the term denotes the sum total of knowledge which Qohelet is able to 
establish as a result of his observations. 31 Glasser follows the same line of thinking, 
seeing riDDn as a hendiadys. For him, p 3 0 n  refers to “les estimations de la
sagesse.” and riQDn to the practical wisdom enabling Qohelet to see cause and effect
30 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, xliv.
31 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 241.
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in the world .32 The logical conclusion which follows from the ar guments of both 
commentators is that the book of Ecclesiastes is itself the which Qohelet 
sought and which he has succeeded in finding.
This position is supported by the LXX which translates p3on in 7:27, 29; 
9:10 with the Greek noun Xo"yrop.6c, derived from the verb XoyL e^oGaL which has 
the sense of reckoning, evaluating, charging up a debt and typically denotes the act of 
(typically human) thought according to strict logical rules.33 In 7:25, ]i30n is 
translated by i|jf|cj)oc, which refers to a small stone (Hdt 3.12.1). Such stones were 
often used in counting (Hdt 2.36.4), and hence the temi comes to have the alternative 
meanings “number” or “account” (P. Lips. 1.64.7; 1.105.17-19).34 The use of both 
terms emphasises the translator’s belief that the term p30n was used in the concrete 
sense of an “account” given by Qohelet of his investigations.
The second option, that the term pn0n refers to an abstract “account” or 
“sum” which is already in existence is upheld by Tyler, who argues for the meaning 
of “...plan, i.e. of the moral administration of the world. The idea represented by 
p30n is, probably, the thought underlying and manifest in the condition of man 
viewed as the subject of a moral government.”3 5 McNeile follows much the same 
path when he states that “Here, and in v. 27 it means ‘the rationale of things’, a law 
by which the perplexing phenomena of life can be explained.”36 Likewise, Whybray 
follows RSV “the sum of things” and remarks that Qohelet is seeking “something
32 Glasser, Le procès du bonheur par Qohelet, 124. Michel (Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des 
Bûches Qohelet, 235-36) also argues for this understanding of the term ]inün, which defines fiu'Üier 
the nature of the wisdom which Qohelet utilises.
33 H. W. Heidland, “XoytCoiJLaL, Xoyiogoç,” in TDNT 4. 284
34 G. Braumann, in TDNT 9.904
35 Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 137.
36 McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes, 75. Similar is Podeschard {L’Ecclésiaste, 385) who 
understands the ]incn to be “l’explication du monde et des événements.”
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which makes sense of the whole of ‘That wliich is .’”3 7
Both arguments have their adherents, and yet neither understanding of the 
term pnm appears to be appropriate to every occurrence of the term in Ecclesiastes. 
In 7:25, for example, is parallel to that noon and indeed both Glasser and 
Whybray have suggested that the expression pntdm HQDn is a hendiadys. The wisdom 
which Qohelet seeks, as Whybray well observes, is “not the superficial, 
conventional, ‘practical’ wisdom.”38 it is teimed “very deep” in 7:23 and Qohelet 
alludes to it in 7:24 as “fai’ from me.” In the sense that it is a wisdom designed to 
enable him to see the whole of that which is, it is something analogous to divine 
wisdom. Crenshaw describes it as “wisdom par excellence, as opposed to practical 
knowledge” which is one and the same as “the substance of human thought, the sum 
total of all knowledge.”39 Thus, there would appear’ to be good reason for thinking 
that the term in 7:25 refers to an abstract preexistent “account” or “sum of 
things” as Whybray terms it, which is coextensive with Wisdom. Whether it be seen 
as “wisdom par excellence” or “the reason of things”, it is something more than the 
purely human-made account described by the LXX’s ijjf|ct)OC in this location. The 
finding of this p30n (and 7:28 suggests that Qohelet failed in this regard) would give 
Qohelet a degree of mastery over existence. In the sense that it appear s (as Crenshaw 
suggests) to denote the substance of human thought and (as Whybray suggests) to 
define “the whole of ‘That which is’”, it would appear to be coextensive with “the 
work of God”/“the work which is done under the sun.”
In a recent article, I have pointed out that the verbs dp3 (7:25, 28, 29) and 
(7:24, 26, 27 [twice], 28 [thrice], 29; 9:10) are constantly used in those passages
37 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 124. Barton (Ecclesiastes, 146) describes the ]inBn similarly, calling it 
“the ultimate reality.”
38 7W., 124
39 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 145,
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which speak of ]indn/mndn. This suggests that Qohelet’s ]ndn which he seeks is 
already in existence, there (in theory) to be found by those with the wisdom to find 
it: in other words it is an abstract concept (like “Wisdom”). The verbs dpn and 
are also concentrated in 8:17 which, like 7:23-29, sums up Qohelet’s investigation 
and in which Qohelet admits defeat: “Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man 
cannot find out (x%D) the work which is done under the sun, because though a man 
labour to seek it out (dp3), yet he shall not find it (xi^o); indeed, though a wise man 
think to know it, yet he shall not be able to find it (x:^ü).”
This verse, in which dp3 occurs once, and K253 three times with “the work of 
God”, or “the work which is done under the sun” as their object, suggests that the 
term p3dn may be synonymous with “the work which is done under the sun”, and/or 
“the work of G od .”40 The verbs dp3 and occur’ almost exclusively in those 
passages in which Qohelet speaks of the work of God, or the p3dn (3:11; 7:23-29; 
8:17; 9:10)41
p3dn therefore appears to connote the divine order, the ndi^ Q,which
should be apparent in “the work which is done under the sun” (nnn ndrod ndrn 
dûdn) but, as the expression p3dm riQDn in 7:25 shows, it also denotes the wisdom 
by which that work is done or by which that work may be understood. Wliybray’s 
assertion that p3dn constitutes the whole of “That which is”, as well as the 
suggestions that ]i3dn is the “rationale of things”, or the “plan” for the “moral 
administration of the world” by McNeile and Tyler respectively appear to be boi'ne 
out by the context in which and dp3 appear.
In 7:27, Qohelet clearly considers that he may come to know the “account”
40 Like Gordis (Koheleth: The Man and His World, 298-99), Fox (Qohelet and His Contradictions, 
175) and Murphy (Ecclesiastes, 13), I argue that “the work o f God” is one and the same as “the work 
which is done mider the sun.”
41 Rudman, “Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes, 423.
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by which God works by adding “one to one” from his obsei'vations. In doing so, he 
plays on the idea of a numerical account. This is a theme which runs throughout 
Ecclesiastes: Qohelet considers the “profit” (jnrr nniD nriT— 1:3; 2:11, 15; 3:9, 19; 
5:15; 6:8, 11) and “loss” (]non— 1:15) inherent in the “account” which governs the 
world. Interestingly, in 3:14, Qohelet uses similar language of the work of God, 
affirming that “what God does is eternal: there is no adding to it, and no taking away 
from it” (3:14).42 Again, if the pnm is to be identified with “the work of God” (as I 
have suggested in Chapter 6), the “adding to” ('=]0'’) and “taking away” (:;i:) would 
refer to human attempts to interfere with the divine account which ensures that 
“That which is , is that which will be” (3:15). Thus, in the context of 7:27, p3on 
could, and probably does have a double meaning, indicating the supreme account 
governing the world, and the account which Qohelet himself intends to fonn in the 
course of his calculations: one which will hopefully balance with the account par 
excellence. Rather than choosing between the opposing views of modem 
commentators, it may be as well to accept the idea that Qohelet uses the term pnm 
in both its abstract and concrete senses.
It would appear that Qohelet plays on words again in 7:29, in which he 
remarks that “they (humankind) have sought out many mnsdn.” The MT points as 
nt'sdri, a word used elsewhere only in 2 Chr 24:6 of “devices.” Certainly, Lohfink 
argues that the fact that Qohelet uses this word so soon after his uses of in 
7:25,27 suggests a double meaning. 43 Fox goes further, however, and sees the use of 
as indicative that m]3tdn is merely the plural of that p30n which is described in 
7:25, 27.44 For him, the context of this verse demands that a meaning such as
42 Staples (“Profit in Ecclesiastes,” JNES 4 [1945] 88) also links the idea of the absence of “profit’ 
to humanity’s inability to act outside “the work of God.”
43 Lohfink, Kohelet, 58-59.
44 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 243.
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“explanation, solution” be attached to mnKin.
In Chapter 6 ,1 have argued for the correctness of Fox’s assertion, although I 
would not go as far as to claim that the whole of Ecclesiastes details “Qohelet’s
seai’ch for hiss^bonotf Qohelet in fact seeks a single “account” which will allow him
to understand existence. The thrust of 7:29 may suggest a changeable abstract p30n 
or possibly refer to the individual “accounts” which human beings have attempted to 
foim of it. Qohelet’s thought at this point is extremely obscui’e and no interpretation 
enjoys unqualified acceptance. On balance however. Fox’s suggestion as to the 
meaning of in this context would appear to make most sense.
Thus, in contrast to 7:25, 7 in which p3(dn appeal’s to have a double meaning 
as a divine account govei’ning the cosmos and an accurate human “account of the 
account” which Qohelet sets out to form, 7:29 appears to refer solely to human 
accounts of existence which have been sought. The context seems to militate against a 
divine “account” controlling existence, and this is reflected in the MT’s pointing 
nlût^n (“devices”) and in the Vulgate’s rendering, infmitis...quaestionibus (“many 
questionable things”). Nevertheless, the fact that Qohelet uses the singulai’ p30n in
7:25, 7 and 9:10 suggests strongly that the occurrence in 7:29 is merely the plural of j
ip3#n as Fox indeed argues. ;
!
Eccl 9:10 is interesting in its usage of the term pn^n outside the immediate j
context of the passage 7:23-29 which has been under consideration: I
Wliatever your hand finds to do (mtoy*? KliQ), do mightily (n33 ntor); for there is no 
work (nüUQ), nor p n m  nor knowledge (nri), nor wisdom (noDn) in Sheol, where 
you are going.
Here the term p30n appears not to mean a divine account which governs
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existence (although Qohelet once again plays on words, for it is placed parallel to the 
noun n&üü and elsewhere contextual evidence would appear to suggest that the p30n 
is coextensive with “the work which is done under the sun”).Nor, however, does the 
teiin pnon here seemingly refer to a human “account of the account.” In its position 
parallel to attributes such as action (ntyuQ), knowledge (n%n) and wisdom (nDDn), the 
generality of which seems to be emphasised, it would appear to have a much more 
pedestrian sense than is found in 7:25, 27 (although here as in 7:25, it is parallel to 
“wisdom” and “knowledge”) and is therefore often translated “thought.”45 This is a 
particularly strange usage of the term p3K)n, and one which finds no echo elsewhere in 
Hebrew.
In summary, it is fair to say that Qohelet does not use the term pnm with 
any one meaning in all locations. In some locations (7:25, 27) it refers to “the 
rationale of things” but also appears to be connected to “the work of God” or “the 
work which is done under the sun.” Qohelet, however, indulges in a certain amount 
of wordplay in 7:27, however, so that it has a double meaning of the “account” 
which governs existence and the account which Qohelet hopes to make of it. In 7:29, 
the plural occurs of the false accounts made by others of existence, or perhaps 
suggests a changeable account. Finally, in 9:10, the term pswn is used parallel to 
“Wisdom”, “knowledge” and “Work/action” and is typically rendered by 
commentators in yet another way, as “thought.” Thus, the term as Qohelet uses it 
has an extremely extended semantic range which appaiently encompasses thought, 
wisdom, deed and calculation in both the human and divine spheres.
(b) Stoicism and Qohelet: Two Accounts
In his consideration of the possible links between Stoic philosophy and the
45 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 158;
Qohelet and Stoic Determinism 220
thought of Qohelet, Gaminie remai’ks that “Stoic philosophy is perhaps closest to 
Qoheleth in its affirmation of the operation of a universal logos, cosmic nature or 
G o d .” 4 6  In Stoic thought, this logos was the rationality and structuring principle 
which governed the cosmos. It was therefore identified both with God and Fate.
Since the logos played such a central part in Stoicism, we should perhaps 
expect to find some trace of this idea in the book of Ecclesiastes if Qohelet’s 
deterministic worldview owes anything to Stoic thought. A study of this term is 
therefore appropriate at this point.
fri The Meaning of the term L 020S
The Greek verb Xeyo), from which the noun Xoyoc is derived, has two main 
senses: (1) To count, recount. (2) To say, speak. Although the derived verbal noun 
Xdyoç has a broad semantic range, its diverse meanings are connected to those of its 
parent verb: from (1) aie derived the senses “computation, reckoning, (financial) 
account, measure, esteem.” (2) provides the senses “explanation, argument, theory, 
law, s a y i n g .” 4 7
The term logos became veiy much a key word in the thought of Heraclitus of 
Ephesus (c. 500 B.C.E.), who used it in the sense of a system or rationality which 
governed existence. This Heraclitean doctrine was taken up by the Stoics in the third 
century B.C.E.. This in turn provides a remarkable parallel with the thought of 
Qohelet. One aspect of the Heraclitean/Stoic concept of the Universe being based on 
a logos (“proportion, explanation, account”), is that it suggests an underlying 
mathematical basis for life and the events which occur in it.
46 Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 180.
47 A. Debrunner (“ Xéyw A,” in TDNT 4.73) notes this sense of “calculation” in Hdt 3.142, 143 and 
in the sense of “total” in IG IV, 1485, 145, 151, 154, 155, 161, 173, 178 and 1487,12, 18. 
Documents from Hellenistic Roman Egypt also, as he points out, use the term in the sense of a 
financial account or balance.
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As we have seen, Qohelet also shows a familiarity with and an interest in the 
concept of a universe definable by numbers. Significantly, the semantic paiallel 
between the Heraclitean/Stoic logos and Qohelet’s pnm is almost exact. Both have a 
mathematical sense of an account which may be added up, but both are also used in 
the sense of “explanation” to describe “the whole of that which is” by their different 
authors. Qohelet’s p30n as I have pointed out in a recent aiticle, is described in terms 
which suggest that it is equivalent to “the work of God” or “the work which is done 
under the sun.” 48 This, as we shall see, is also true of the Heraclitean/Stoic logos. In 
the words of Kleinknecht concerning this sense of the term: “It is presupposed as 
self-evident by the Greek that there is in things, in the world and its course, a 
primary Xoyoc, an intelligible and recognisable law, which then makes possible 
knowledge and understanding in the human Xoyoc. But this Xdyoç is not taken to be 
something which is merely grasped theoretically. It claims a man. It determines his 
tme life and conduct. ”4 9
fiil Logos in Greek Philosophy 
The concept of Logos is central to Greek thought. The pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 500 B.C.E.) was the first to use it as a focus 
for his worldview, however. The work of Heraclitus provides the basis for the 
philosophy of the Stoics, and thiough them exerts a powerful influence on later 
Jewish ideas about God’s government of the cosmos.
Most of the time, Heraclitus uses the term logos in its more common 
meanings (“proportion, account, explanation”). However, he also used it in the sense 
of an underlying cosmic principle of order, an idea related to the more general 
meaning of measure, reckoning, or proportion with which the term may be
48 Rudman, “Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes,” 423.
49 H. Kleinknecht, “Xéyw B,” in TDNT A M .
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invested.50 Since all things occurred in accordance with this proportional 
aiTangement, various phenomena which appeared on a superficial level to be 
disparate in nature could be said to be part of one cosmic order:
Although this account (Xoyoc) holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both 
before hearing it, and once they have heard. Although all things come to pass in 
accordance with this account (Xoyoç), men are like the untiied when they try such 
words and works as I set forth.
(Sextus Empiricus, Zi/v. Math 7.132 [=D.l])
Heraclitus is unique among the early Greek philosophers in seeing the logos 
as a rationality governing the universe, a cosmic principle controlling events on earth, 
and one, moreover which is established by God. In this, he is followed by the Stoics, 
who refer to logos as “the craftsman god...by which it is established both at which 
time each thing will come to birth and when it will perish” (Calcidius 293). The logos 
is evident as the wisdom governing the universe, but it is also the wisdom of 
humanity.5i Hence, Heraclitus can say: “Although the accoimt (logos) is shared, 
most men live as though their thinking was a private possession” (Sextus Empiricus, 
Adv. Math. 8.133 [=D.2]). All human thought and action forms a part of the all- 
pervasive logos which controls existence—as a result, Heraclitus can claim that 
human thought is “shared” rather than “private” to the individual.52
As I have already suggested, Qohelet’s pnm, like the Heraclitean/Stoic logos, 
has the idea of an “account” or “rationale” which defines the nature of existence, but
60 Tobin, “Logos,” 4.348. ■
51 Guthrie, (History o f  Greek Philosophy, 2.428), Nalim (Selections fi'om Early Greek Philosophy, |
67ff.) and G. S. Kiik (Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments [Cambridge: C.U.P., 1954] 39) translate j
Xoyoç as “law” and “formula of things” respectively. These are both aspects of the logos but Guthrie I
argues convincingly for a dual rendering as human thought and the governing principle of the i
universe. j
52 Long & Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.491) typically translate Xoyoç by the term i
reason, ratlier than “account”, althougli it can have botli these and many otlier senses according to |
context. ■
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which also serves as its controlling mechanism (7:25, 27). But Heraclitus also uses 
the term logos in the latter quotation in a dual sense. Primarily, it refers to the 
“account” which governs existence, but Heraclitus also plays on the idea of thinking 
which is inherent in the teim. Thus, because the account is common, human thought 
is common. Qohelet also uses the term p30n with this play on meaning, for in 7:25, 
27 it refers to the account which orders the world, Qohelet also plays on the 
background meaning of Vnün (“think”, “consider”) in 9:10 so that the noun there 
refers appaiently to human thought.
This parallel usage is striking enough, but like Qohelet, who links the terms 
p30n and neon in Eccl 7:25, Heraclitus also directly links the logos with wisdom: “It 
is wise, listening not to me but to the account to agree that all things are one” 
(Hippolytus, Rejutatio 9.9.1 [=D. 50]). Again, this fragment emphasises that the 
logos has an independent existence of its own. Underlying the idea of the logos is the 
statement that ‘all things are one’: they are all a reflection of the action of a common 
logos, the system by which the events of life play themselves out. Wisdom lies in 
finding and listening to this logos, and agreeing with it.
The Stoic concept of logos, which goes on to play such an important part in 
Jewish wisdom speculation, is the direct descendant of this Heraclitean logos. As 
such, it serves as the controlling mechanism of the cosmos, and was thus identified 
with Fate or God (DL 7.134 [=5'FF 2 .3 0 0 ]). 53 Once again, it is the thought of 
Cleanthes as evidenced by the Hymn to Zeus which offers the best paiallel with 
Qohelet: “You (God) direct the universal logos which runs thiough all things...No 
deed is done on eaith, God, without your offices...For you have so welded into one
53 Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.268, 270. Debrunner, “Xeyco,” 84; F. FI. 
Sandbach ( Stoics [London: Chatto & Windus, 1975] 72) captures the manifold meanings of the 
term logos as used by the Stoics when he explains that it means “ the explanation of a thing, which 
may be the account or formula of its constitution, and tlie statement of its purpose. But to give the 
grounds for anything is a rational activity,...Perhaps ‘plan’ has something of the same ambiguity...(A 
Plan) hnplies the intentions of a rational bemg...”
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all things good and bad that they all share in a single everlasting account logosN 
{Hymn to Zeus, 11. 12-21 [^SVF 1.537]).
Significantly, the concept of logos as coextensive with wisdom and the divine 
work plays a part in Jewish wisdom speculation of the Hellenistic period. The work 
of Aristobulus (fl. 150 B.C.E.) indicates that acceptance of the concept of a logos had 
taken place at an early stage. Aristobulus (who is mentioned in 2 Macc 1:10) sought 
to interpret the LXX in the light of Greek (especially Stoic) philosophy and thus 
connected divine wisdom (oocjrCa) with logos in its guise as the cosmic ordering 
principle (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 1 3 .1 2 .1 0-13). 54 This connection between 
Wisdom and the logos is also notable in the Wisdom of Solomon. Here, God’s logos 
and God’s wisdom occur side by side describing the means by which the world and 
human beings were created (Wis 9:1-2). Philo used the term logos in its Stoic sense 
of a rationality which pervaded the cosmos (Heres 188; Fuga 111), and also 
connected it with wisdom (Leg All 165; Heres 191; Somn 2.242-45). According to 
Philo, the logos served as the medium through which the work of God found 
expression but was also the source of the universe’s intelligibility. 55 The use of the 
concept of logos in early Jewish writings is analogous to the way in which Qohelet 
uses the term pnm, for this too is a “rationale”, apparently coextensive with “the 
work which is done under the sun” or “the work of God”, but also the means by 
which Qohelet seeks to make sense of the universe around him.
The term logos is therefore used in the philosophical hadition represented by 
Heraclitus and the Stoics to denote a divine “account”, a rationale which governs 
existence and through which existence can be understood by the wise individual. This 
“account” is in effect the sum total of human thought and action but is also an
54 Charlesworth, Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 2.834-5.
55 Tobin, “Logos,” inABD 4.350-51.
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absti’act concept, a controlling mechanism for the cosmos.
One might object that here we have a parallel thought between Qohelet and 
Greek philosophy rather than direct influence, but what is striking about Qohelet’s 
usage is that he does not restrict the term ]n©n to the idea of a numerical account: in 
9:10, for example it appears to mean “thought” (a meaning which it has nowhere else 
in Hebrew).56 This is an example of wordplay analogous to that which we have seen 
in Heraclitus. Often, there is an ambiguity about whether Qohelet is using the term in 
an abstract or concrete sense (again, paralleled by Heraclitus’s use of the term logos 
in his philosophy). It is, however, in its dual sense of rationality and rationale, 
placed parallel to wisdom, that Qohelet’s p3(dn appears most like the logos as it 
appears in Stoic and early Jewish thought.
The concept of the logos is used by Heraclitus and the early Stoics in all the 
ways in which Qohelet used the term One is forced to conclude that there is 
more than a simple parallel of thought here. Qohelet has borr owed the concept of the 
logos as the governing mechanism for existence and is aware of the many ways in 
which it is used. This in itself, if one accepts the Hellenistic dating of Ecclesiastes, 
need not be surprising. The logos as a concept was subsumed into Judaism very 
early on (appearing in Jewish Greek writings from 150 B.C.E. onwards), and played a 
major part in Jewish wisdom thereafter. We do not know how early this idea entered 
Judaism, and it is entirely possible that Qohelet came into contact with this idea and 
adapted it for his own ends. This need not detract from Qohelet’s originality, nor
56 In Sir 42:3, ]nw'n Is used in the sense of a business account, a usage which is extremely common 
in tlie later period (cf. Exod. Rab. 51; Deut. Rab. 4; t. B. Kam 10.21). In b. B. Bath 9b too, it has 
tlie meaning of a financial total. In only two locations of which I am aware is tliere any figurative 
usage: b. B. Batli 78b and Aboth 4.22 both speak o f a pamn in the sense of an account in contexts 
having to do witli divine judgement. Thus, in b. B. Batli 78b one may speak of God balancing a loss 
incurred in obeying the law by rewarding an individual (and a gain occasioned from breaking the law 
by punishing the individual) after death, and in m. Aboth 4.22 of the individual rendering an account 
of one’s deeds before God on the day of judgement. Nowhere is it used either witli the range of 
meanings which Qohelet applies to it, nor in the same context.
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need it suggest that Qohelet’s determinism does not ultimately stem from his Jewish 
background: his language elsewhere is fundamentally in line with other Hebrew 
deterministic writings of this time. It is, however, precisely at such interfaces 
between different cultures that the boiTowing of general ideas is most likely. In this 
case, it is the specific contexts in which the concept is expressed by Qohelet which 
suggests that the connection between p30n and logos is more than a paiallel.
IV. Historv
An important part of the Stoic message focusses on the idea that history is
repeated in periodic cycles, and some commentators have argued that Qohelet echoes
this idea in Eccl 1:4-11.57 Specifically, Qohelet states in Eccl 1:9-10:
That which has been is that which will be.
That which has been done is that which will be done:
There is nothing new under the sun.
Is there a thmg of which it may be said “See, this is new?”
It has akeady been in ages which were before us.
Gammie rightly goes on to draw a parallel to the Stoic statement of Cicero, although 
some caution should be exercised since Cicero was writing in the first century
B.C.E.:58
If there were some human being who could see with his mind the connection of all 
causes, he would certainly never be deceived. For whoever grasps the causes of future 
things must necessarily grasp all that will be...The passage of time is like the 
unwinding of a rope, bringing about notliing new.
(Cicero, De Divinatione 1.127 [SVF 2.9AA])
57 Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 174-176; Most recently this position has 
been adopted by Levine (“The FImnor in Qohelet,” 78-79).
58 Ganmiie, 176.
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It may be objected that the idea that “there is nothing new” in existence is the sort of 
general thought which might easily be arrived at independently by different people in 
their consideration of life. As we shall see however, the content of the rest of this 
passage supports the idea that Qohelet is bon’owing from Greek, and specifically 
Stoic, thought.
The majority of commentators already accept, albeit tacitly, some foiin of 
Greek influence when they point out the fact that Qohelet’s depiction of the cycles 
followed by the wind, rivers, sun and earth itself makes use of the doctrine of the 
four elements. 5 9 This idea of the cosmos and everything therein being composed of 
these elements was canonical in Greek thought, and in Greek thought alone: it was 
also a major featuie of Stoic philosophy (DL 7.136 [SVF 1.102]; 7.137 [SVF 2.580]; 
Nemesius 164.15-18 [SVF2.418]; Plutarch, Comm. not. 1085c-d 2.444]). The
doctrine of the four' elements is also found at the very ear liest stages of Stoic thought. 
Stobaeus, a Greek anthologist writing in the fifth century C.E., states:
Chrysippus has the tbllowing views on the elements formed out of substance, 
following Zeno the leader of the school. He says that there are fom* elements <fire, 
air, water, earth, out of which everything is composed-animals,> plants, the whole 
world and its contents-and that they are dissolved into these.
(Stobaeus 1.129.2-3 [5'KF 2.413])
Qohelet’s use of this concept is therefore of some significance for the 
argument that Ecclesiastes is a product of the Hellenistic era. Again, one might argue 
that Qohelet’s mention of earth, fire (sun), air (wind) and water is coincidental.
59 Ibid., 174; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 62; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 39; Lohfink, Kohelet, 22. This 
common mterpretation was seemingly fust advanced by Ibn Ezra who was heavily influenced by 
Aristotelian philosophy (Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, 56-57; Zimmerli, Prediger, 
143; Hertzberg, Prediger, 61; S. .Taphet, “Goes to the South and turns to the Noith” [Ecclesiastes 
1:6] The Sources and History o f the Exegetical Traditions,” JSQ 1 [1994] 319). Fox is in a minority 
in understanding the term f  “iKn as refeiring not to the earth as such but to humanity as a whole, of 
which each generation forms a part {Qohelet and His Contradictions, 171).
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Against this, however, not only are each of the four elements mentioned in turn, they 
serve as an initial illustration of Qohelet’s thesis that ^^eveiything is ban” (1:2) as 
they do of the statement that “a// things are full of labour” (1:8). Both statements 
presuppose that 1:4-7 represents something more than four isolated examples of 
natural forces at work. Only by understanding the four elements in their Greek/Stoic 
role as being the basic building blocks for all things can one understand the logic of 
Qohelet’s jump from the use of these four examples of the elements in their natur al 
(i.e. unmixed) state, showing how each one engages in ceaseless activity, to the claim 
that “all things” are full of labour'. Indeed, just as Qohelet does in 1:8, Cleanthes drew 
a par allel between the ceaseless movement of the four elements in the cosmos and the 
human fi'arne.^o
Qohelet, however, also demonstrates influence from his own Semitic 
background in the way that these elements are depicted. The earth cannot be said to 
“move” as such, and so ceaseless activity in this realm is shown by the generations 
of human beings dying and coming to life.6i Chrysippus argued that animals were 
made up of all four elements. Qohelet sees earth as their primary element, in line 
with general Hebrew thought (3:20; 12:7 cf. Gen 2:7; 3:19) and thus the cycle of 
birth and death (or death and birth) serves as an example of unending activity in the 
realm of the element earth.
Many commentators have also pointed out the parallel between Qohelet’s 
statement that “all rivers flow to the sea yet the sea is never full” (1:7) with that of 
Aristophanes, who remarks “The sea, though all rivers flow to it, increases not in
60 Gould, The Philosophy o f Chrysippus, 35.
61 Ogden argues against this interpretation, although it is upheld by ahnost all commentators. For 
him, the term “in  refers to the “generations” (i.e. individual cycles) of the remaining thr ee elements; 
fire, wind and water (“The Interpretation of i n  in Ecclesiastes 1.4,” 91-92).
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volume” {The Clouds, 1294 [cf. Lucretius 6 .6 0 8 ]).62 The same commentators have, 
generally speaking, been rather more cautious in drawing parallels between Qohelet’s 
apparent application of these cycles to history with the Stoic doctrine of the 
periodic repetition of events. Thus, the Stoics held that fate was so constructed that 
the whole of history, down to the smallest detail, would be repeated periodically. 
One of the strangest consequences of this idea was that in order for history to repeat 
itself, the same people had to appear in it and thus every person who has ever lived 
would be reborn;
Chrysippus...when speaking o f the world’s renewal, di*ew the following conclusion:
‘Since this is so, it is evidently not impossible that we too after om- death will 
return to the shape we now ai*e, after certain periods of time have elapsed.’
(Lactantius, Z)/v. inst., 7.23 [SVF2.623])
The same idea is also attributed to the Stoics in Nemesius 309.5-311.2 [SVF 
2.625]; Eusebius, Prae/?. evang. 15.19.1-2 [^LF2.599]; Origen, Contra Celsum 4.68, 
5.20 [SVF 2.626] and many other sources, although the sources agree in its 
attribution to Chrysippus. Qohelet certainly does not suggest that the cycles of the 
four elements ar e indicative of such a periodic repetition of history. However, his use 
of these cycles of the elements before the statement that “there is nothing new under 
the sun” (1:9) is evidently of some significance.
Certainly, Hertzberg is right in pointing out that Qohelet’s thought here is 
unique in the Hebrew Bible (Ps 96:1; Jer 31:22, 31; Isa 43:19; 65:18).63 This 
becomes more significant if  it is remembered that in most of the previous examples, it 
is God who does a “new thing.” In Ecclesiastes, the actions that occur in the human
62 Gordis, Koheleth: the Man and His World, 206; Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 106; Zimmerli, Der 
Prediger, 143.
63 Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 62.
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realm are also divinely controlled, yet there is “nothing new.”
However, the majority consensus views Qohelet’s statement that “there is 
nothing new under the sun” as referring in the most general way to human actions.64 
One might sing a new song, but it still falls into the category “song.” One might make 
a new covenant but this too conforms to an archetypal “covenant.” In this sense the 
events which go to make up existence do repeat themselves. One problem with this 
view is that in 1:10 Qohelet forestalls possible arguments against his statement by 
remai’king that “there is no remembrance of former things.” The repetition cannot 
therefore be one of general “archetypes” or of general actions as Fox supposes: these 
archetypes are well known to humanity. Based on the contextual evidence, one can 
come to no other conclusion than that Qohelet is referring to specific actions or 
events which are being repeated. This brings the passage much closer to the literal 
repetition evident in the depiction of the four elements in 1:4-7, and also to the Stoic 
view of history.
The essential difference between Qohelet and the philosophy of the Stoics in 
this area lies in the Stoic claim that the world was subject to periodic conflagration 
(ejkpuvrwsii) which recreated the world anew, after which history would repeat 
itself down to the smallest detail (Eusebius, Praep. evang. 15.14.2 [SFF 1.98]; DL 
7.141 [SVF 2.589]). Qohelet, on the other hand, clearly states that “the earth remains 
forever” (1:4).
There is no denying that this doctrine appear s to have been advanced by the 
first three leaders of the Stoic school. However, it remained extremely controversial 
and subsequent leaders were forced to revise their arguments, either withholding 
judgement on the question or altogether denying the doctrine of ecpyrosis. Thus 
Philo writes:
64 Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 172-72; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 8.
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Boethius of Sidon and Panaetius...gave up the conflagrations and regenerations, and 
deserted to the holier docti'ine of the entke world’s indesti'uctibility. Diogenes too is 
reported to have subscribed to the doctrme of the conflagration when he was a 
young man, but to have had doubts in his maturity and suspended judgement.
(Philo, Aet. mundi 76-77)
The philosophers mentioned in this passage Boethius (2nd cent.), Panaetius (c. 185-. 
110) and Diogenes of Babylon (c. 220-152) are too late to provide a reasonable 
parallel with a third century dating for Ecclesiastes but are nevertheless indicative of 
a debate going on within Stoicism at an eaily date concerning the doctrine of 
ecpyrosis. More significantly, even among the earliest leaders there was no agreement 
about the precise nature of the conflagration: Cleanthes ar gued that the world would 
change into flame, while his pupil Chrysippus suggested that it changed into light 
(Philo, Aet. mundi 90 [= SVF 1.511]). Under the circumstances, it is not impossible 
that Qohelet had contact with the Stoic theory of cycles without accepting the idea 
of ecpyrosis as indeed both Gammie and Levine have previously claimed.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, we can perhaps say that although the differences between the 
thought of Qohelet and the earliest Stoics are many, there are also significant parallels 
which are sufficiently frequent and close to suggest some kind of connection. Firstly, 
Qohelet appears to diverge to some extent from his Jewish background in 
emphasising God’s determination of human thought and action rather than his 
foreknowledge of the same. Free will in Ecclesiastes appears extremely limited, in a 
way which is rare elewhere in early Jewish literature.
Qohelet’s position on moral/ethical free will is also similar' in many respects
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to that of the second leader of the Stoic school, Cleanthes: the righteous ar e stated to 
be under God’s deteiministic control, while the wicked are said to act outside it. 
Indeed, Qohelet may even cite Cleanthes’s dictum about the nature of the Stoic god 
against him. Whereas the Stoic god is said to “make crooked things straight”, 
Qohelet’s god does the exact opposite and makes that which is straight crooked. 
Qohelet appears to demonstrate some knowledge of the deterministic mechanism 
which the Stoics called the logos, and which he calls by an equivalent tenn, the ]i3ün.
Finally, Qohelet shows an awareness of the four elements which were 
canonical in Greek thought, and has a cyclical view of history, similar in many 
respects to that of the Stoics. Qohelet’s partial acceptance of Stoic thought, evident 
perhaps in his veiled criticism of Cleanthes, may also be reflected in his apparent 
rejection of the idea of ecpyrosis.
Qohelet is not a Stoic. This much is cleai’. This need not mean, however, that 
he was ignorant of its doctrines, nor that some of these ideas are not reflected in his 
work. Since the evidence for the date of Ecclesiastes in general points to the 
Hellenistic period, this means that some attempt must be made to understand 
Qohelet’s thought against the cultural backdrop of Hellenistic thought, both Jewish 
and G r e e k .  65 The work of Qohelet, I would argue, owes something to both milieus, 
although as this thesis has also demonstrated, he can and frequently does view things 
from a standpoint unique to himself.
65 Gammie’s justification for his attempt to link Stoicism with Qohelet’s thought is woi*tli citing in 
this regard: “even though the exegete may fall into erroneous expositions (should his or her 
assessment of date or backgiound subsequently be proven to be wrong), the worse eiror would be to 
attempt to inteipret with little or no reference to the relation of the biblical author to hs or her own 
cultural environment” (“Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” 173). This view is also echoed to 
some extent by Fox {Qohelet and His Contradictions, 16).
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion
The object of this thesis has been to demonstrate that Qohelet is a 
determinist and that his work is a product of the Hellenistic period. In Chapter 1, the 
evidence for a Hellenistic dating was reviewed, and the current scholai'ly consensus 
upheld, although with some reservations. Subsequently, several of the key terms 
(nnpQ, nr, aam , pbn) occurring in passages which have been traditionally 
inteipreted in a deteiministic sense were examined (Chapter 2). Perhaps the most 
impoitant conclusion of this chapter for the future direction of studies on 
Ecclesiastes is that Qohelet does not consider chance to be a force operative in 
existence, contraiy to the assertion of many commentators.
The term mpo, contrary to its usage elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, has the 
sense of “(unpredictable/uncontrollable) happening” rather than “chance happening”, 
for it is used primarily of death, which is clearly stated by Qohelet to be 
predeteimined. Likewise, Vr:a, which is translated “chance” by many commentators, 
is in fact used elsewhere only of some form of encounter or meeting which is planned 
by at least one of the parties thereto. When used of an event which befalls human 
beings, as Qohelet does, one may conclude that it is of an event which is 
predetermined.
Many commentators already understand the teim nu in the sense of a time 
for human action which is predetennined by God, and in accordance with which 
human beings must act. A consideration of the contexts in which Qohelet uses this 
term concludes that this is indeed the case, and that Qohelet therefore advances the 
concept of a far-reaching form of detenninism over all, or nearly all, human activities. 
Related to this topic is the question of what Qohelet means when he speaks of
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“judgement” (üsm), particularly in the difficult passage 8:5-6. Following an 
examination of the two different interpretations cuirently advanced by modem 
commentators, that Qohelet either refers to the judgement of the wise man and his 
ability to act at the appropriate time, or to the idea that at a certain predetermined 
moment, God will enact a tiaditional judgement on human beings, it was concluded 
that neither interpretation answered the problems evident both in this passage and in 
the wider context. A new interpretation was therefore advanced in which Qohelet 
understood the divinely deteimined times which befall human beings as a foiTn of 
judgement. This was demonstrated to fit Qohelet’s worldview and to all contexts in 
which VüSO is used of God’s activity except 11:9b, thus supporting the view of 
many coimnentators that 11:9b is a gloss.
Finally, Qohelet’s usage of the term pbn was considered: this usage was 
shown to be fundamentally different to that of other texts in the Hebrew Bible. 
Primarily, this dfference was apparent in the fact that God gives “portion” to the 
individual. More remarkably, however, this “portion” was shown to be not so much 
connected with material goods as with human emotions. The “portion” which God 
gives to humanity is joy, love, hate, envy. Qohelet’s deterministic worldview 
therefore finds clear expression in the idea that God is responsible for the emotions 
which human beings feel as well as the actions which they perfonn.
The question of the meaning of the teim nu is perhaps the most important 
one for establishing the nature and extent of Qohelet’s deteiministic worldview. If 
one can say that Qohelet uses the term ru; in the sense of predetermined time in 3:1, 
“for everything there is a season, a time for eveiy matter under heaven” and in the 
list of human activities in 3:2-8, then one can say that Qohelet is in the truest sense 
of the word a deteiminist. This position has been recently challenged by Joseph
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Blenkinsopp, and to this extent a response to Blenkinsopp’s paper formed the body 
of Chapter 3. Blenkinsopp’s thesis, that Qohelet is a determinist (in a looser sense of 
the word) but that this was not the idea which 3:2-8 was intended to express, was 
refuted on the basis of evidence brought out in the previous chapter, joined with 
fresh evidence to support the idea that 3:2-8 was Qohelet’s own work and that it 
was intended to express a deterministic worldview.
In Chapter 4, attention was directed at a problem hitherto unnoticed or 
ignored by modern commentators. Many of those who support the idea that Qohelet 
is a determinist ai’gue for the equivalence of “the work of God” and “the work which 
is done under the sun.” Yet cunent translations of 8:17a translate the particle 'D as if 
it were introducing an object clause, so that Qohelet in this text apparently states 
that the work of God is to prevent human beings from finding out the work which is I
done under the sun. An examination of the form in which such object clauses are Iiexpressed in Hebrew in GKC, however, led to the conclusion that it had been |
wrongly classified and that the paiticle "3 should therefore be translated affiimatively j
(i.e. “surely”). This finding reinforces the argument that “the work of God” and “the |
1
work which is done under the sun” are more or less equivalent phiases, and thus Î
bolsters the argument that Qohelet is a determinist in the true sense of the word. i
Chapter 5 produced two new contributions to the debate on the nature and 
date of Ecclesiastes. Seow has recently argued powerfully against the cuiTent 
consensus which would make the book of Ecclesiastes a product of the early 
Hellenistic period. His aigument that Qohelet’s work can only be dated to the 
Persian period hinges, however, on Qohelet’s use of Vîûba? in its legal/technical sense l
of “(delegated) authority” or “proprietorship”, a sense which he claims falls out of !
use after the Persian period. A closer examination of this claim found that, on the
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contraiy, examples of used in this sense could cleaiiy be seen in the books of 
Daniel and Ben Sira, both products of the eaiiy Hellenistic period. Moreover, this 
technical sense of the root occui's several times in Hebrew in the Talmud, in Syriac 
slave sale documents of the eaiiy Christian era, in Mediæval Aramaic maniage 
contracts and finally in a Yiddish proverb which has been used up to modem times.
These findings allow us to conclude that Qohelet may well have written his work in 
the Hellenistic period, and indeed the figuiative use in which Qohelet uses l^îü‘7^D has 
cleai* affinities with the usage in the Hellenistic book of Daniel, in contiast to the 
purely pedestrian sense in which it is found in Persian period texts.
Consideration was then given to Qohelet’s use of the root in the light of 
Seow’s claims as to its meaning. It was found that by and large, God is seen by
Qohelet as the distributor of to human beings (in contrast to Seow, who
Î
considers it to be, in the main, allocated by earthly authorities). This finding has j
particular relevance for understanding Qohelet’s worldview, since Qohelet uses this |
idea of divinely allocated in the context of finding happiness, but also to explain I
Îhuman evil and inequities in an existence which he believes to be divinely controlled. i
This idea of may therefore be understood as a limited form of fiee will. This in jIturn explains why Qohelet can advise his disciple on the manner of finding happiness i
(when “there is an appointed time for every matter”), and also shows that Qohelet |i
gave some thought to the problem of human evil in the context of determinism. By i
explaining evil and inequity as a product of human volition, the deity is to some !
extent distanced (although not wholly absolved of responsibility for) the existence of î
these things. It was also noted that Qohelet uses a special legal formula (“he does 
whatever he chooses”) of the king and apparently considers the king to have a special i
relationship with God. Kings are effectively fiee of the deterministic mechanism |
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which otherwise controls existence. This in turn may explain, at least to some extent, 
the royal fiction in Chapters 1 and 2 and the paradox of how Qohelet is free to 
conduct his investigations when all is predetermined, although such an idea is not 
made explicit therein.
In Chapter 6, consideration was given to what is perhaps the most difficult 
passage in the book of Ecclesiastes (7:23-29). Typically, the woman who appears in 
this passage has been regarded in one of two ways. The first is that she is a 
stereotypical “wicked” woman in line with other misogynistic depictions of such 
women in Proverbs or Ben Sira. The other has been that Qohelet quotes such an idea 
of woman in order to argue against it. A careful consideration of the entrapment 
imagery associated with the woman, however, revealed that Qohelet depicts her as a 
divine agent, for the nets which she uses to entrap men are almost always associated 
with Yahweh’s judgement elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. Nor could the reference in 
7:26 be considered appropriate only to “a certain type of woman”, for her activity 
was shown not to affect the stray individual, but the many. Whether her potential 
victim was caught or escaped was wholly in the hands of God. Thus, Qohelet’s 
depiction of woman demonstrated that there was indeed “a time to love”, in line with 
Qohelet’s statement in 3:8.
Having given consideration to the nature of the woman, who is appar ently a 
morally neutral figure, and whose actions (like the rest of humanity) are determined 
by God, attention was turned to the purpose for which the woman was introduced 
into this text, which essentially admits Qohelet’s failure to achieve the kind of 
knowledge of exitence which he seeks. Tentatively, it was concluded that the woman 
acts as a defence against human beings gaining mastery over existence and thus 
finding the work of God. She is symbolic of the pleasure which God allots to
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humanity in order to keep them occupied. As far as Qohelet’s own search goes (for 
Qohelet is appar ently one of the lucky few who have escaped), it would appear' that 
the danger which the woman represents prevents him from canying out his purpose.
These ideas lead on naturally to the subject of Chapter 7, in which Qohelet’s 
attitude towards human joy is considered, as evidenced in those texts in which 
Qohelet makes the recommendation to seek out pleasure (as defined by Whybray 
and de Jong). Although this subject is considered to some extent in Chapters 2, 5 and 
6, the evidence provided in this chapter shows that while a certain amount of human 
free will is presupposed in the seeking of pleasure, human beings remain entirely 
dependent on God for its attaimnent. This is particularly underlined by Qohelet’s 
reference to pleasur e as “the gift of God.” The conclusion reached in this chaper is 
fundamentally in line with the current thinking of the major commentators of 
Ecclesiastes (e.g. Crenshaw, Whybray), who themselves are only the latest in a long 
line of commentators who have understood Qohelet’s thinking thus.
Having to some extent reconstructed Qohelet’s worldview in the preceding 
chapters, the final two chapters of this thesis turned to consider the question of how 
this view of existence meshes with the background in which Qohelet is supposed to 
have lived and wrote. In Chapter 8, Qohelet’s deterministic depiction of life was 
considered in the light of Jewish thought. It was concluded that in general there is no 
consistent belief in determinism in the Hebrew Bible, although a few scattered ideas 
consistent with this concept may be found therein. There is, however, a strongly 
deteiministic element to be found in eai'ly Jewish extra-biblical literatiu'e from the 
Hellenistic period on. This is particularly true of apocalyptic literatuie, a fact which 
has led many to argue that this geme stems ultimately from the wisdom tradition in 
which Qohelet wrote. Again, this apparent flowering of the idea of determinism in
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the Hellenistic period would appear to support the consensus dating of Ecclesiastes 
to this time. Similarities were, moreover, noted between the way that both Qohelet 
and the author of the book of Daniel expressed this concept of determinism. The 
thought of Qohelet also was also demonstrated to show some affinity with Sirach in 
that both consider the problem of human wickedness in the light of deteiminism and 
allude to the idea that God may thereby be construed by the wicked as supporting 
their wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, several important differences were noted between Qohelet’s 
consideration of the problem of evil and that of the normative tradition which is 
expressed by other Jewish writers. In other texts of this time, where consideration is 
given to the problem of evil at all, total free will for human beings is asseifed in the 
moral/ethical sphere. Yet this cleaiiy contradicts the idea that God may determine the 
cour se of history or the life of the individual, for it is through the choices made by 
human beings that history is made.
In line with the similarities noted beween Ecclesiastes and Hellenistic 
literature in previous chapters, suggesting that Qohelet’s work is a product of this 
time, Chapter 9 then considers the question of a possible interface between the form 
of determinism advanced by the Stoics in the third century B.C.E. Discussion in the 
first part of this chapter was limited to those areas in which Qohelet appears to 
diverge fi’om contemporary Jewish thought, specifically the question of how human 
evil can be reconciled with a benevolent deterministic God.
Again, general similarities were noted between the form of determinism 
advanced by the Stoics and that of Qohelet. These ar e less striking by and lar ge than 
the similarities with Jewish thought. Unlike Jewish writers of the Hellenistic period, 
however, the Stoics paid a great deal of attention to the question of how human evil
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and wickedness may be reconciled with a belief in determinism. Qohelet makes no 
such convoluted or complicated attempts to reconcile the two as does the third leader 
of the Stoic school, Chrysippus (232-208 B.C.E.), with whom his work is most often 
linked. An analogous explanation for the presence of evil was, however, found in the 
work of Cleanthes (261-232 B.C.E.), the predecessor of Chrysippus, and a 
contemporary of Qohelet according to the current consensus for the date of 
Ecclesiastes. According to Cleanthes, God was held to control all things which 
happened on earth, with the exception of those actions which were performed by the 
wicked. This thought is a good parallel to that of Eccl 9:1 in which Qohelet sees 
God’s activity as being expressed through “the wise and the righteous and their 
works.” It is an open question however, as to whether this is an example of influence 
or of two original thinkers reading the same conclusion independently.
That the former may be the case, however, and that Qohelet may have been 
aware of the basic ideas of Stoic determinism is suggested by his use of the term 
]ncon. Elsewhere in Hebrew and cognate languages, this term typically means 
“account” in a numerical sense. Qohelet, however, uses it to describe the system by 
which the events of life play themselves out. As such, the appears to be 
coextensive with “the work of God” or “the work which is done under the sun”, but 
it is also the means by which these things may be understood. Qohelet also uses the 
term in a concrete (numerical) sense to refer to the account which he himself hopes to 
form, and of the accounts which others fonn of existence. Finally, he also uses it in 
the sense of “thought”, a meaning which it has nowhere else in Hebrew, although this 
meaning is implicit in Vn&n from which the noun is derived. Qohelet’s use of this 
noun is unique in Hebrew, but the meanings with which he invests it is almost 
exactly that in which the corresponding Greek term logos occurs in the philosophies
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of Heraclitus and the Stoics. As such, Qohelet’s usage appears to be more than a 
parallel of thought, but to be indicative of contact with this, the most fundamental 
aspect of Stoic determinism. This need not detract from Qohelet’s originality, nor 
need it imply that Qohelet takes on board the ideas of Stoicism wholesale. In many 
respects, his thought differs quite fundamentally from that of the Stoic philosophers, 
although other similarities with Stoic thinking (his reference to the four elements, his 
apparently cyclical view of history) have in the past been noted. The evidence 
adduced in this thesis supports the idea that Qohelet’s thought is primarily to be 
related to his Jewish background. At the same time, however, those aspects of Greek 
thought (limited though they may be) which find expression in his work should not 
be ignored.
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